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 Over recent years, censorship of the press in Turkey has been under international scrutiny, 
having been examined on the basis of recent political developments such as the Justice and 
Development Party’s democratisation promises with the incentive of the EU accession process and 
the role of the press in Turkey’s democratisation. This research aims to widen the terms of reference 
by providing a unifying framework for the problems posed by political, historical, and legal agents 
to press freedom, and analysing their interrelation throughout the history of modern Turkey. It seeks 
to identify the hindrances encountered by the press, which has its roots in the deep-seated State 
ideology and institutional framework that prioritises state security over individual rights and 
freedoms. This thesis therefore sets forth the inextricable link between the political history of 
Turkey and the current application of the law, and presents an in-depth analysis of Turkish political 
history in relation to press freedom, legal scholarship, and case-law as evidence to demonstrate this. 
  
 The analysis of the obstacles to establishing stronger legal protection for the press that 
would not be affected by political change, is based on doctrinal and socio-legal analysis that 
investigates the flaws in the Turkish Constitution, Turkish Penal Code and Turkish Anti-Terror Law 
and questions the judicial approach to the implementation of the right to free expression of the 
press. 
 
 The thesis specifies the loopholes in Turkish legislation that allow insufficient legal 
protection for freedom of the press and the inefficiency of the judiciary to realise the press’s right to 
free expression. The thesis recommends practical amendments to clarify broadly drawn legal 
provisions. A reduction in judicial bureaucracy to eliminate political influences on the judiciary. 
Judicial training for the internalisation of the right to free expression of the press as a human right . 
All of which would help overcome institutional hindrances based on the perception of a critical 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
  
 “A free press can of course be good or bad, but, most certainly, without freedom it will 




 Freedom of the press and democracy are inseparable as democracies have become 
“practically unworkable” without the existence of the former.
2
 The role of the press as a Fourth 
Estate is important to recognise, for the notion of the press as watchdog
3
 refers to its function as the 
guardian of public interest and the democratic process by monitoring the political process.
4
 Based 
on the importance of the press for the functioning of Turkish democracy,
5
 a valuable amount of 
work has been undertaken on the political and communicational aspect of the issue. Hindrances 




are looked at purely from legal or historical perspectives. This 
research attempts to approach the relationship between press and politics from a socio-legal 
perspective. Studying the role of the democratisation process in Turkey on the development of the 
press, in order to make suggestions for establishing stronger legal protection for the press. This will 
eventually contribute to the democratisation process in the country. As the situation of the press in 
Turkey has recently been under increasing international scrutiny, this research aspires to provide an 





                                                 
1
 Albert Camus, Resistance, Rebellion and Death: Essays (New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 1961) 102 
2
 O’Mahoney, T. P., ‘The Press and Democracy’ (1974) 63:249 An Irish Quarterly Review 47  
3
 James Curran and Mihael Gurevitch, Mass Media and Society (New York: Oxford University Press 4th ed., 2005) 
4
 Denis McQuail, McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory, (London: Sage, 2010) 
5
 Sahin Alpay, ‘Two Faces of the Press in Turkey: The Role of the Media in Turkey’s Modernisation and Democracy’ 
in (eds.) Celia Kerslake, Kerem Oktem and Philip Robins, Turkey’s Engagement with Modernity - Conflict and Change 
in the Twentieth Century (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2010) 379-387 
6
 The focus is on the print press as the traditional link between the print press and political power constitutes the 
optimum research grounds to question freedom of the press in Turkey in light of the relationship between press and 
politics. 
7
 This author uses “press in Turkey” rather than “the Turkish press” because the research focuses on the press and 
politics relationship starting from the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, and the history of  “the Turkish press” 
dates back to 1831.  
Source: Serif Demir, ‘Situation of the government-press relations in Turkey (1918-1960)’ (2012) 5:6 International 
Journal of Social Science 19 
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1.1 Scope and Purpose 
 
 Recent problems encountered by the press in Turkey have been debated by various scholars, 
NGOs, and human rights organisations on political, legal and social grounds. However, censorship 
of the press has been a long standing issue in the history of the Republic of Turkey. Since the 
establishment of Modern Turkey, the prohibitory approach taken by governments to freedom of the 
press have had detrimental effects on Turkey’s democratisation process. 
 
 This research revolves around the hypothesis that freedom of the press in Turkey has been 
mostly hindered by political and state interventions that follow a political ideology prioritising state 
security. This emphasis forms one of the biggest burdens for the application of legal provisions 
guaranteeing freedom of the press. 
 
 In that regard, the main purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the validity of this 
hypothesis as a means of making practical recommendations, for counteracting the hindrances 





 This research seeks to explain the current problems of the press, both on a legal and a 
political basis, by looking at the impact of Turkey’s political history on the development of freedom 
of the press. This approach helps to explain the approach adopted by the current government. It 
examines the political developments in the country and its impact on the situation of the press 
starting from the establishment of modern Turkey. 
 
 This detailed examination of Turkey’s legal, political, and historical framework is informed 
by theoretical and practical perspectives. The underlying reasons for this research were to locate 
flaws in the Turkish Penal Code and Anti-Terror Law. To demonstrate the approach of the judiciary 
(which is challenged in this thesis) and to substantiate the need for urgent reform in order to 
improve the legal conditions for freedom of the press in Turkey. In order to highlight the present 
scenario, scholarly discussions, legal amendments initiated by the reform process for EU 
membership, national and ECtHR jurisprudence, European Commission progress reports, 
journalists’ and NGOs’ views are discussed. Therefore, this thesis sets out the hypothesis that the 
Page | 3  
 
current application of legal reforms have their roots in the deep-seated political ideology that is 
embedded in Turkey’s institutional framework. 
  
 The research uses a socio-legal methodology in order to effectively seek reform by 
exploring the strong relationship between the press and politics in light of the effects the political 
ideology has had on this relationship. It therefore aims to analyse the extent to which the political 
ideology in Turkey has been affecting press freedom. In light of institutional perspectives on press 
freedom, it will make practical recommendations to eliminate the negative effects on freedom of the 
press, and assist the internalisation of the right to free expression of the press by the judiciary.   
 
 
1.3 Added Value 
 
 The thesis sets a unifying framework for the problems posed by political, historical, and 
legal agents by analysing their interrelation throughout the political history of Modern Turkey. This 
research fills the gap within existing literature where the problems encountered by the press were 
discussed solely from legal, political or sociological angles.It will do so by interpreting a range of 
Turkish sources, materials and controversies, allying them to regional and international legal 
standards. Based on  inter-disciplinary research, this thesis therefore elucidates the current situation 
of freedom of the press in Turkey from a rights-based approach. Adopting a socio-legal approach, it 
investigates the interactions between historical elements, related legal provisions and politics that 
served to prevent the emergence of a fourth estate press, in violation of regional and international 
standards. State intervention into press functioning and the political ideology that prioritises state 
security over individual rights and freedoms are suggested to be one of the challenges to press 
freedom in Turkey. Therefore, the research provides an exhaustive analysis based on political 
history in conjunction with the evolution of the press in Turkey in order to maintain that the state-
centric, top-down approach to “change” has not provided a solution to the long-standing hindrances 
encountered by the press. In light of this analysis, the research provides applicable 
recommendations for legal amendments in consideration of the institutional mindset toward 
freedom of the press in Turkey.  
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 Turkey aspires to become a regional role model, combining moderate Islam and 
democracy.
8
 However, the hindrances experienced by the press have negatively affected its 
democratisation process. Therefore, this research, given its aim to make suggestions for improving 
the press’s freedom, could help Turkey live up to the expectations of its neighbouring countries, 





1.4 Structure of the Thesis: a chapter-by-chapter synopsis 
 
 This thesis examines the relevant issues in four main chapters (2-5) while Chapter 1 has 
introduced the general scope of the thesis and its substantial elements as well as the intended 
contribution of the research as a whole. Chapter 6 concludes by discussing applicable 
recommendations based on the theoretical and practical discussions that are retrieved from within 
the main chapters and provides a brief summary of the thesis.   
  
 The organisation of the main chapters is as follows: 
 
 Chapter 2 concentrates on the legal framework regulating freedom of the press while 
locating the loopholes in the main articles of the Turkish Penal Code, Anti-Terror Law, and the 
Turkish Constitution in question. Comparing and contrasting the language of law before and after 
the legal reforms. Demonstrating the application of the legislation before the legal reforms, provides 
the grounds for comparison with the application of the amended versions of the same legislation, in 
the following chapters. Case examples demonstrate the judicial approach that enables and imposes 
on the press its stance of following the state’s political ideology, rather than supporting its own 
rights and freedoms. Case analyses indicate the need for improvement in the legal conditions of the 
press, pinpointing the international obligations of the Turkish state to provide legal reforms, 
bringing the right to free expression of the press in line with  international standards. 
 
 Chapter 3 explores the main factors underpinning the present political approach affecting  
lawmakers and the judiciary.Analysing the political developments and the substantive relationship 
                                                 
8
 Meliha Benli Altunisik, ‘The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey’s Soft Power in the Middle East’ (2008) 10:2 Insight 
Turkey 41-54  
9
 M. Hakan Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 208 
Matt Cherry, ‘When a Muslim Nation Embraces Secularism’ (2002) 62:3 Humanist 
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between the press and politics through the political history of modern Turkey. It traces the evolution 
of  related legislation, while showing the reasons for the deeply ingrained lack of toleration among 
the government officials of criticism by the press. This chapter demonstrates that censorship of the 
press in Turkey is a long-standing issue that needs to be solved in order to pursue an effective 
democratisation process. It does so by providing background information on the formation of the 
“sensitive subjects such as terrorism and why reporting of these subjects by the press in Turkey is 
censored . Effects of military interventions on democratic reliability are discussed, in relation to the 
vulnerability these military interventions imposed on civil governments, vulnerabilities that 
reflected the governments’ censorship of the press, and judiciary’s approach to the application of 
the law. Chapter 3 concludes that problems experienced throughout the history of Turkish politics 
have had negative effects overall on the democratisation process, and in relation to this, freedom of 
the press. This chapter is significant because the current limitations experienced by the press can 
only be understood based on the historical experiences that have given rise to them. 
 
 Chapter 4 critically discusses the legal and practical substantiality of the legal reforms  
undertaken by the AKP government in the EU accession process.Aiming to understand whether 
Turkey’s candidacy to the EU acts as a catalyst for the improvement of the legal protection of the 
press and the democratisation of the country. The lack of success in implementing the legal reforms 
is linked to the government’s lack of toleration of criticism. Demonstrated by the Ergenekon 
investigation and the Gezi protests. Censorship and self-censorship of the press are correlated with 
the weakening of the journalists’ unions and the cross-ownership of the media. Such ownership is 
not subject to  legal regulation. This constitutes a source of pressure on the press, for the media 
owners are in direct business relationships with the government. The chapter explains the current 
government’s political sensitivities in light of the political and historical discussions that take place 
in Chapter 3.Focussing attention on politically influenced cases that arguably play a role in 
censoring the opposition press. Based on these case examples, this chapter paves the way for the 
following chapter in which judicial independence and impartiality are discussed. 
 
 Chapter 5 identifies the problems arising from the new institutional organisation of the 
judiciary that became closely attached to the executive power. Undermining its independence and 
impartiality, contradicting EU conditionality, and casting doubts about the political motivations 
behind the change of law. The judicial approach to freedom of the press is examined in relation to 
its long established mindset, prioritising state/national security over individual rights and 
freedoms.Also examining the relationship between the Turkish courts and the ECtHR. The chapter 
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investigates the influence of the ECtHR jurisprudence on Turkish Constitutional Court 
decisions.Based on the 2010 legal reform, allowing individual application to the Turkish 
Constitutional Court.On the grounds that one of the fundamental rights and freedoms within the 
scope of the European Convention on Human Rights, guaranteed by the Constitution, has been 
violated by public authorities.
10
 The chapter concludes by stating the need for real transformative 
reform in the organisation of the judiciary, eliminating  the interference of the executive power and 
by instituting judicial training as a means of internalising human rights reforms. 
 
 The thesis concludes with  practical recommendations, drawing from the theoretical 
discussions within the main chapters.Highlighting the importance of substantial legal reform. It is a 
call to action for the government, to exhibit a genuine will to make amendments to the controversial 
legal provisions that will improve the legal conditions for the press.Eliminate political intervention 




1.5 Research method and methodology 
1.5.1 Research methodology: socio-legal methodology 
  
 The thesis seeks to contribute to the development of the law and legal institutions in relation 
to press freedom, assisting the democratic development of the country in general. It does so using 
socio-legal and doctrinal methodologies.  
 
 Black letter methodology is applied only partly in the present research as an analysis of a 
number of technical legal provisions that are found in primary sources; the Turkish Constitution, the 
Turkish Penal Code and the Anti-Terror Law. The aim of this approach is to effectively organise 
and describe the legal rules as authoritative legal sources, in order to provide an account of their 
importance in the case law analysis.Also pinpointing the underlying issues in the Turkish legal 
system that affect the rights and freedoms of the press. 
 
                                                 
10
 The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey no. 2709 (7/11/1982) s 3(148)  
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 Because this research partly depends on the broadly drawn legislation such as statutes, case 
law and academic/legal reviews, it was necessary to use doctrinal methodology in order to look at 
the law in action. In order to do so, the present study presents findings of analytical and historical 
doctrinal legal research.
11
Analysis of statutes, legal documents, Turkish and ECtHR jurisprudence. 
Historical legal research clarifies how the past conditions resulted in the formation of the current 
law and its application. This involves a systematic analysis of the statutory provisions using 
doctrinal research and relevant legal concepts. Examining the consistency between the language of 
law and its application.Further study of Turkish and ECtHR jurisprudence helps to  ascertain the 
failure of the Turkish judiciary to internalise a human rights approach. Challenges to the 
independence of the judiciary because of its institutional organisation are also identified. 
 
 However, law is not an insular discipline,
12
 and black letter methodology requires the 
researcher to focus mainly on the law itself rather than its application.
13
 Because the sociological 
and political implications of freedom of the press in Turkey are at the core of the thesis, socio-legal 
methodology has been adopted for this research. Reducing the study to a black-letter analysis of law 
on its own would not be suitable for the selected research. The research aims to discuss the impact 
of the law in action on the press and politics, while discussing its effects on the judicial approach to 
press freedom.  
 
 This thesis aims to investigate the inconsistencies between the language of law and its 
application. Socio-legal methodology observes the law in action in order to analyse what constitutes 
an impediment for socio-political transformation through law.
14
 A socio-legal approach is therefore 
essential to provide a unifying framework for explicating legal and political issues. Issues that have 
led to the hindrances of today, which have damaged the democratisation process in Turkey. This 
approach also provides a platform for recommending legal amendments and a change towards a 




                                                 
11
 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’ (2012) 17:1 
Deakin Law Review 
12
 Niklas Luhman, A Sociological Theory of Law (New York: Routledge, 2014)  
13
 Khushal Vibhute and Filipos Aynalem, Legal Research Methods (Justice and Legal System Research Institute, 2009) 
14
 Brian Z. Tamanaha, Realistic Socio-Legal Theory, Pragmatism and Social Theory of Law (Clarendon Press Oxford, 
1997) 
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1.5.2 Research Method 
  
 Addressing the research question entails an evaluation of data pertaining to the right to free 
expression of the press, political and judicial approaches to press freedom, the right to information, 
and political history in relation to the evolution of the press in Turkey. 
 
 Domestic case law is critically analysed with the aim to gain insight into the ideology of the 
judiciary and its application of law. This analysis identifies the issues attached to the legislative framework 
in relation to press freedom in Turkey, in order to make recommendations. For this purpose ECtHR 
decisions serve as a template for discussing whether Turkish courts have effectively implemented 
them. 
 
 The research aims to fill the gaps within the existing literature by library based research of 
correlating case law, legal provisions, European Commission Reports, legal and political 
commentaries, NGO reports, legal and political journals, reports, theses, treaties, and newspaper 
articles. Together these form the most important evidence for providing a unifying practical and 
clear framework for the future of the press-politics relationship in Turkey. 
 
1.5.3 Advantages and Limitations 
   
 Doctrinal research exposes inconsistencies between the relevant legal provisions through the 
analysis of the primary source information. This enables the researcher to discuss the loopholes and 
ambiguities within the statutes, in order to make applicable amendments for the improvement of the 
language of law. It set a solid basis for theoretical discussions on the relationship between the press 
and politics, while providing sound ground for analysing the research hypothesis in light of the 
evolution of related law within the political history in Turkey. 
 
 Because the thesis does not adopt a doctrinal approach on its own thereby avoiding a merely 
theoretical study, its use of a socio-legal approach supports the researcher’s perception of the law. 
Using socio-legal methodology allows the author to analyse the external factors (in this case, 
political and sociological) affecting the poor implementation of the relevant laws and to evaluate 
their influence on the judiciary and on the application of relevant legal provisions. Although an 
empirical study would assist in understanding the sociological factors, such as the awareness of the 
society of the importance of a free press for democratic governance. This has not been undertaken 
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because the press is structured according to the political circumstances in which it exists.
15
 
Understanding the political history of Turkey is key to a systematic approach clarifying the legal 
conditions of the press in Turkey. Doctrinal and socio-legal research methodologies have 
complemented each other, paving the way for this author to finalise the thesis with applicable 
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Chapter 2 - Current Turkish Law and Practice Infringing 




 This chapter is an attempt to analyse fundamental flaws in the Turkish legal framework, in 
relation to the freedom of the press. It revolves around the loopholes in the legal regulation that 
pave the way for heavy restrictions on the freedom of the press. The judicial mentality and the 
effects of the political ideology on its reasoning. The role of the mainstream press on the censorship 
of critical or opposition journalism. The NGO reports showing serious concerns on the press in 
Turkey, and finally European Commission and UN reports highlighting Turkey’s international 
obligations to protect freedom of the press.  
 
 In addition to the loopholes in the legal regulations, this chapter also aims to address the 
disparity between the language of law concerning freedom of the press and associated practices. It 
does so through a detailed examination of the problems arising from the language of the law itself, 
for such analysis is important to set the background to the discussions on the social and democratic 
implications of these legal flaws as investigated in the following chapters. Demonstration of the 
broadly drawn law with the selection of case examples will assist in testing the hypothesis of the 
research. Determining the differences between the language of law and its practice as well as seeing 
the effects of the political ideology on the Turkish court decisions.  
 
 
2.2 The Legal Scope of Press Freedom in Turkey 
 
 This research suggests that the censorship of the press in Turkey is only partly caused by the 
vague language of the relevant legal provisions. The other reasons include: incoherence between the 
legal provisions and their application, the problems caused by the ownership of the press, the 
problems caused by the mentality of the judiciary. The lack of impartiality and independence, 
finally and mainly the political influence on freedom of the press. 
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 Controversial legal provisions are discussed in this section highlighting the importance of 
the main research question “how to build higher standards and support a stronger legal protection 
for the press, that would not be affected by the political changes in Turkey”. Therefore, in order to 
analyse the reasons for censoring the press mentioned above, it is necessary to draw out the 
legislative provisions regulating freedom of the press in Turkey. Thus, the gaps in the legislation 
that weaken press freedom are distinguished, which is followed by selected case examples that 
demonstrate the difference between the law and its application. Such analysis facilitates the 
settlement of the main research question.  
 
 
2.2.1 The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 
 
 The Turkish Constitution
16
 provides the principal protection for freedom of expression and 
for freedom of the press in Turkey. Article 26 regulates freedom of expression and dissemination of 
thought: 
 
Everyone has the right to express and disseminate his/her thoughts and opinions 
by speech, in writing or in pictures or through other media, individually or 
collectively. This freedom includes the liberty of receiving or imparting 
information or ideas without interference by official authorities. This provision 
shall not preclude subjecting transmission by radio, television, cinema, or similar 




 The reflection of this right, which structures the scope of free expression and 
communication of one’s thought, is seen in Article 28 of the Constitution, which strongly asserts 
that the press is free and will not be censored. Therefore, freedom of the press and publication are 
guaranteed under Article 28, which defines freedom of the press accordingly: “The press is free, 
and shall not be censored. The establishment of a printing house shall not be subject to prior 




                                                 
16
 The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey will be referred to as “the Turkish Constitution” and/or “the 
Constitution” throughout the thesis.  
17
 Turkish Constitution 1982, s 2 (26) (1)  
18
 Ibid. s 2 (28) (1) 
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 However, these rights and freedoms, which are clearly set under Article 26 and Article 28, 
are restricted by the “exceptions and restrictions”. Both Article 26 and 28 come with their clauses of 
exceptions and restrictions. The following excerpt from Article 26 states the reasons for these 
restrictions: 
 
The exercise of these freedoms may be restricted for the purposes of national 
security, public order, public safety, safeguarding the basic characteristics of the 
Republic and the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, 
preventing crime, punishing offenders, withholding information duly classified as 
a state secret, protecting the reputation or rights and private and family life of 
others, or protecting professional secrets as prescribed by law, or ensuring the 




 Such restrictions on the freedom of expression are reflected in the exception specified in 
Article 28: 
 
The State shall take the necessary measures to ensure freedom of the press and 
information. In the limitation of freedom of the press, the provisions of articles 26 
and 27 of the Constitution shall apply. Anyone who writes any news or articles 
which threaten the internal or external security of the State or the indivisible 
integrity of the State with its territory and nation, which tend to incite offence, riot 
or insurrection, or which refer to classified state secrets or has them printed, and 
anyone who prints or transmits such news or articles to others for the purposes 
above, shall be held responsible under the law relevant to these offences. 
Distribution may be prevented as a precautionary measure by the decision of a 
judge, or in case delay is deemed prejudicial, by the competent authority explicitly 
designated by law. The authority preventing the distribution shall notify a 
competent judge of its decision within twenty-four hours at the latest. The order 
preventing distribution shall become null and void unless upheld by a competent 
judge within forty-eight hours at the latest. No ban shall be placed on the 
                                                 
19
 Ibid. s 2 (26) (2)  
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reporting of events, except by the decision of judge issued within the limits 
specified by law, to ensure proper functioning of the judiciary. Periodical and 
non-periodical publications may be seized by a decision of a judge in cases of 
ongoing investigation or prosecution of crimes specified by law; or by order of the 
competent authority explicitly designated by law, in situations where delay may 
constitute a prejudice with respect to the protection of the indivisible integrity of 
the State with its territory and nation, national security, public order or public 
morals and for the prevention of crime. The competent authority issuing the order 
to seize shall notify a competent judge of its decision within twenty-four hours at 
the latest; the order to seize shall become null and void unless upheld by a judge 
within forty-eight hours at the latest. General provisions shall apply when seizing 
and confiscating periodicals and non-periodicals for reasons of criminal 
investigation and prosecution. Periodicals published in Turkey may be 
temporarily suspended by court ruling if found to contain material which 
contravenes the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, the 
fundamental principles of the Republic, national security and public morals. Any 
publication which clearly bears the characteristics of being a continuation of a 





 These exceptions are open to interpretation. Vague terms used in these articles — such as 
national security, public order, public safety, public moral, safeguarding the basic characteristics of 
the Republic, indivisible integrity of the State, preventing crime, withholding information duly 
classified as a state secret, ensuring the proper functioning of the judiciary, news or articles which 
threaten the internal and external security of the state, tendency to incite offence, riot or 
insurrection, reference to classified state secrets — in combination with the “crimes” specified in 
Turkish Penal Code and the Law on Fight Against Terrorism in Turkey, create the causes and 
effects of the censorship of the press in Turkey. The combination of the vague language in these 
articles demonstrate the problems caused by the broad definition of each term as well as their 
controversial interpretation by the judges that can lead to the censorship of the press. The approach 
to press freedom adopted by the judges will also be discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
                                                 
20
 Ibid. s 2 (28) (2)  
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 Freedom of the press is regulated in the Constitution as a “fundamental right of the 
individuals”. However, this study contends that the right itself is narrowly defined whereas the 
exceptions to the use of the right are broadly defined. The intention of the lawmaker for such 
narrow interpretation of the right and broad coding of its exceptions must be discussed separately. 
Some studies have acknowledged that the term “moral”, conceived as a “general moral” in order to 
be used to restrict  rights and freedom, could easily allow lawmakers and the executive power to 
limit rights and freedoms arbitrarily.
21
 However, this requires detailed analysis of what notions 
might originally be behind the language of the law. 
 
 Nevertheless, it falls under the scope of this research to analyse how the Turkish courts 
interpret these constitutional provisions that regulate the freedom of the press and the possible role 
of the judiciary in broadening this definition. Interpreting how it should be protected under the  
constitutional law and in respect to the international agreements ratified by Turkey. 
 
 In addition to the guarantees and exceptions in the Constitution, regrettably, such broad 
interpretations are still possible despite the direct statement in the Turkish Press Code defining the 
right to freedom of the press and describing the press as “free”… Yet reiterating the lawmaker’s 
emphasis on the possible restriction of the press based on national security, public order, and public 
safety: 
 
The press is free. This freedom includes the right to acquire and disseminate 
information, and to criticise, interpret and create works. 
The exercise of this freedom may be restricted in accordance with the 
requirements of a democratic society, to protect the reputation and rights of others 
to protect the public health and public morality, to protect the national security, 
the public order and the public safety. The exercise of this freedom may also be 
restricted to safeguard the indivisible integrity of the state territory, to prevent 
crime, to withhold information duly classified as state secrets, and to ensure the 




                                                 
21
 Nihat Bulut, ‘Hak ve Özgürlüklerin Sınırlandırılma Nedeni Olarak Genel Ahlak/General Moral as the Reason to 
Limit the Fundamental Rights and Freedoms’, (2000) 4:1-2 AÜHFD, 29  
22
 Turkish Press Law 2004/5187 s 1(3) 
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 Despite the constitutional endorsement for the rights to free expression and freedom of the 
press, and the inclusion of press freedom in Turkish Press Code, it is possible to clearly see that 
they are not put in practice.  Based on the language of the Constitution, it is mandatory to ensure the 
full enjoyment of the right to free expression and freedom of the press. However, as previously 
argued, the broadly coded exceptions of articles 27 and 28 facilitate the censorship of the press. In 
practice, the exceptions have been interpreted broadly by the Turkish courts. This paradox is based 
on the perception of the importance given to press freedom amongst the judiciary and the political 
theory that will be further clarified in the next chapter.  
 
 
2.2.2 Turkish Penal Code 
 
 The Turkish Penal Code
23
 and the Law on the Fight Against Terrorism in Turkey are the 
two mostly used laws to restrict free expression of the press in Turkey. The current version of the 
Turkish Penal Code (TCK) came into force on 1 January 2004 and was highly criticised by various 
authors and NGOs, as discussed below. It included exceptionally vague terms that allowed its 
arbitrary use to pressure the press and imprison journalists. The older version of TCK was also 
predominantly condemned for its Article 159, which regulated “Denigrating Turkishness, the 
Republic, and the Institutions and Organs of the State.” Article 159 reads as follows: 
 
(1) A person who publicly denigrates Turkishness, the Republic or the Grand 
National Assembly of Turkey, shall be punishable by imprisonment of between 
six months and three years. (2) A person who publicly denigrates the Government 
of the Republic of Turkey, the judicial institutions of the State, the military or 
security organisations shall be punishable by imprisonment of between six months 
and two years. (3) In cases where denigration of Turkishness is committed by a 
Turkish citizen in another country the punishment shall be increased by one third. 




                                                 
23
 The Turkish Penal Code will be referred to as “TCK” throughout the thesis.  
24
 Turkish Penal Code 1926/765 s 2 (159) 
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 Evidently from the description of the provision above, Article 159 was left open to 













, and 2003. In 2002, TCK was amended with the aim to bring the Turkish Penal Code 





 Old TCK, which included Article 159, was abolished in 2005.
32
 However, the same article 
was placed with its exact language in the new TCK Article 301. The vague terms of which have 
been invariably reproached by legal scholars and domestic and international NGOs
33
 . This 
equivocal language allows a broader definition of crimes that results in high imprisonment rates for 
journalists. TCK Article 301 remained in force until it was amended in 2008 in light of the EU 
accession process of Turkey and in reaction to adverse ECtHR rulings and practices identified later 
within this chapter.  
  
 Because of the strong pressure from the international legal community, NGOs pressures for 
the protection of journalists, and finally and most importantly the European Court of Human 
Rights’ decisions highlighting the inadmissibility of TCK Article 301, the article was amended in 
2008.
34
 The new version of the Article 301, which is still in action, defines an offence of insulting 
the “Turkish nation” rather than “Turkishness” under Article 301 of the new TCK. It reduces the 
maximum sentence to two years and first-time offenders are now eligible for suspended sentences. 
                                                 
25
 Turkan Yalcin Sancar, Türklüğü, Cumhuriyeti, Meclisi, Hükümeti, Adliyeyi, Bakanlıkları, Devletin Askeri veya 
Emniyet Muhafaza Kuvvetlerini Alenen Tahkir ve Tezyif Suçları (Eski TCK m.159/1- Yeni TCK m.301/1-2)/ Denigrating 
Turkishness, the Republic, the Assembly, the Government, the Judiciary, the Government Offices, the Military and/or 
the Police Officers (Old TCK art. 159/1 - New TCK ART.301/1-2 (Seçkin Publications, 2006) 46 
26
 Turkish Penal Code 1936/3038 (159) 
27
 Turkish Penal Code 1938/3531 (159) 
28
 Turkish Penal Code 1946/4956 (159) 
29
 Turkish Penal Code 1961/235 (159)  
30
 TCK was amended twice in 2002 
Turkish Penal Code 2002/4744 (159) 
Turkish Penal Code 2002/4771 (159)  
31
 Turkan Yalcin Sancar, ‘Türk Ceza Kanunu’nun 159. ve 312. Maddelerinde Yapılan Değişikliklerin Anlamı/The 
Meaning for the changes of the Turkish Penal Code Articles 159 and 312’ (2003) 52 Ankara University Faculty of Law 
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32
 It was abolished completely in 01/06/2005 with the law number 5252 article 12. 
33
 Human Rights Watch, ‘Turkey: Government Amendments Will Not Protect Free Speech Article 301 Should Be 
Abolished’ (HRW 16 April 2008) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/04/16/turkey-government-amendments-will-not-
protect-free-speech> accessed 23 May 2012 
34
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Bulent Argan argues that the principle of proportionality in the cases against freedom of expression 




 Finally, but most crucially, with this amendment, the approval of the Minister of Justice is 
required for the investigation of these offences. The authority given to the Minister of Justice for 
examining cases related to this article is criticised on the basis that the judicial process is now 
exposed to political involvement.
36
 However, there are also authors who specify that the role of the 
Minister of Justice is to prevent arbitrary prosecutions by the public prosecutors under the subject 
article.
37
 The implications of the amended Article 301 (4) are discussed in Chapter 4 in order to 
understand whether such concerns are relevant in point. The amended version of Article 301 
follows: 
 
(1)The person who publicly denigrates the Turkish People, the Republic of 
Turkey or the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the Government of Republic of 
Turkey and the judicial bodies of the State is penalised with imprisonment for 
between six months and two years. (2) The person who publicly insults the 
military organisations or the police organisations of the State is punished 
according to the first sub-clause. (3) The declarations made with the aim to 
criticise are not evaluated as crime. (4) Examination related to this article depends 




 Although Article 301 is best-known for its role in the lawsuits against Turkish Nobel 
laureate Orhan Pamuk
39
, the author Elif Safak
40
 and the journalist Hrant Dink. Cases
41
 publicised 
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 Bulent Algan, ‘The Brand New Version of Article 301 of Turkish Penal Code and the Future of Freedom of 
Expression Cases in Turkey’ (2008) 9:12 German Law Journal 2237, 2244 
36
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in Turkey’ (2010) 9:2 Global Media and Communication 177, 183 
37
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38
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39
 Orhan Pamuk is one of Turkey’s veteran authors, whose books have been published in more than twenty languages 
worldwide. Pamuk won the 2006 Nobel prize for literature. He was prosecuted based on the interview he had with a 
Swiss newspaper in February 2005, in which he stated that "Thirty thousand Kurds and a million Armenians were killed 
in these lands, and nobody but me dares to talk about it.” He was tried for insulting “Turkishness” based on Article 301 
of Turkey Penal Code (5237). Despite his acquittal, there had been a sharp criticism from the international NGOs and 
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Assembly that international human rights law should protect Turkish citizens from prosecution or other sanctions 
arising from the non-violent expression of their views.” Human Rights Watch, ‘Turkey: Case Against Novelist 
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by the international press. In just the first three months of 2007 no less than one thousand people 
were brought before the courts based on the allegations under Article 301, and more than seven 
hundred cases under Article 301 were pending.
42
 Moreover, between 2005 and 2007, more than one 
hundred journalists were tried under TCK Article 301.
43
 Although the contentious Article 301 was 
amended in 2008 based on the harmonisation package provided by the EU, which listed its 
requirements for granting Turkey EU membership. Based on the reforms motivated by the 
possibility of Turkey’s EU membership, the wording of Article 301 was changed. The assassination 
of Hrant Dink, the prosecution of Ragip Zarakolu and the upsurge of journalist arrests in 2011 led 
to continuous strong international criticism of Article 301 and intense pressure for its abolition. 
Amnesty International cited in its report AI’s Europe and Asia director Dalhuisen, as he advocated 
that “The criminalisation and incarceration of individuals simply for expressing their opinions must 
not continue. Now is the time for the government to show their commitment to freedom of 
expression”.
44
 Andrew Gardner, AI’s expert on Turkey, also stated that the “most abusive 
prosecutions target either individuals’ criticism of public officials or their expression of legitimate 
views on sensitive political issues. The Turkish authorities must accept criticism – and respect the 
right to freedom of expression”.
45
 The amendments to Article 301 were criticised by scholars for 
being only semantic rather than substantive; in other words, the language of the provision did not 
reflect an actual change in content or policy.
46
 Therefore, despite the lawmakers’ intention to 
broaden the limits of  freedom of expression by replacing “Turkishness” with “the Turkish Nation” 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Threatens Freedom of Expression’ (28 September 2005) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/09/28/turkey-case-against-
novelist-threatens-freedom-expression> accessed 03 February 2012  
40
 Elif Safak is a well-known Turkish author, whose books have been translated widely and are being sold worldwide. 
Safak was tried for comments made by the characters in her work “The Bastard of Istanbul” on the mass killings of 
Armenians in the final years of the Ottoman Empire in 1915, and despite her acquittal, the accusations of “denigrating 
Turkish national identity” based on Article 301 attracted international criticism on the application of Article 301 for 
curtailing freedom of expression, especially considering that among the high number of journalists and authors and 
academics who were charged under Article 301, it was the first time that it was applied to a fictional work.  
41
 Hrant Dink was a Turkish-Armenian journalist in Turkey who had been advocating Turkish-Armenian reconciliation 
and human and minority rights in Turkey. He was prosecuted under Article 301 and received a six months suspended 
charge for “denigrating Turkishness” based on one of his articles published in weekly AGOS, which was taken out of 
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2012 
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October 2007) 
44
 Amnesty International ‘Turkey: Time to remove the shackles on freedom’ (AI, 27 March 2013) 
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Aykırılıklar/Violations to the freedom of expression in the Penal Code and in the Recent  Verdicts of the Court of 
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(effectively narrowing the term “Turkishness”, which also covered societies outside Turkey
47
 ) 
Article 301 is still ambiguously open to interpretation, thereby facilitating its prevailing bias against 
the freedom of expression and enabling the censorship of the press. It is due to the unchanged 
nature of the provision as discussed by various scholars that both “Turkishness” and the “Turkish 
Nation” finally have the same meaning.
48
 Reasons for this flexible interpretation of the Turkish 
state institutions are discussed more in depth in Chapter 3 in light of the chronological analysis of 
the press-politics relationship in Turkey. 
 
 Despite the changes to the controversial Article 301 that were simultaneous with the EU 
accession and its contingent reform packages, the article itself remains to be disputable as stated by 
Sancar. Vagueness is the common characteristic for the words Turkishness and the Turkish nation.
49
 
Besides, the application of this article still continues to limit the freedom of the press as 
demonstrated by the examination of the criminal court verdicts in the present research. The case of 
Hrant Dink is given as the most applicable example to this later in this chapter. A positive step 
towards the complete abolishment of the Article is necessary as repetitively agreed by scholars. In 
this regard, the political aspect of the use of this Article was emphasised by Bayraktar who defines 




 While this is a fact, the present author finds it worth mentioning here that this loophole 
caused by the ambiguity in Article 301, in combination with the exceptions regulated in the 
Constitution as previously discussed, is one of the main reasons for the arbitrary application of this 
Article. Another hindrance that stands in the way of the freedom of the press, besides the law 
written in vague language, is the political ideology followed by the judiciary. As discussed by 
Onderoglu, Article 301 was used by the judiciary in Turkey as “a political weapon against the 
freedom of expression”.
51
 This statement strongly serves the hypothesis of this thesis, which argues 
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that the political ideology is the main burden preventing a free press in Turkey. This argument is 
supported by Algan who fairly expresses that the application of Article 301 varies enormously 
according to the political period in which it is used, which also influences the legal interpretations 
of the provision, in particular the freedom of expression.
52
 The present author aims to demonstrate 
that the legal provisions related to the freedom of the press are closely related to the ideology of the 
state and how the political rulers approach fundamental rights and freedoms. In this political 
context, Chapter 3 will shed light on the state ideology that influenced press freedom in Turkey, and 
Chapter 4 will argue that despite the call of the ECtHR for its abolishment, given that journalists are 
being frequently convicted based on their critical reporting on sensitive political proceedings, such 
calls made through the case law of ECtHR are continuously disregarded by the lawmakers the 
government, and the judiciary. 
 
 
2.2.3 Law on Fight Against Terrorism of Turkey 
 
 In order to fully understand the legal grounds for the censorship of the press, Anti-Terror 
Law
53
 Article 6, Article 7, and Article 8 (even though it was abolished in 2003 under the 6th 
adjustment package on the accession process to the EU
54
) must be analysed in relation to TCK 
Article 314 and 220, for the majority of the imprisoned journalists have been convicted based on 
combined application of these articles as clearly demonstrated in the most recent “updated list of 
imprisoned journalists in Turkey” prepared by Erol Onderoglu from RSF.
55
 According to the report, 
by July 2015, 21 journalists were convicted based on the controversial articles of TCK and Anti-
Terror Law (TMK) mentioned above: 
 
 To be exact, Article 6 regulates announcement and publication on terrorist organisation: 
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(1) Those who announce that the crimes of a terrorist organisation are aimed at 
certain persons, whether or not such persons are named, or who disclose or 
publish the identity of officials on anti-terrorist duties, or who identify such 
persons as targets shall be punished with one to three years of imprisonment. (2) 
Those who print or publish leaflets and declarations of terrorist organisations, 
which praise or promote the violent methods of these terrorist organisations, shall 
be punished with one to three years of imprisonment. (3) Those who, in 
contravention of Article 14 of this law, disclose or publish the identity of 
informants shall be punished with one to three years of imprisonment. (4) If any 
of the offences defined above are committed by periodicals, editors in charge of 





 It is necessary to look at the definition of “terrorism” given by TMK in order to understand 
whether an announcement or a publication falls under Article 6, making it punishable to publish 
terrorist organisation declarations and rules an additional punishment for editors once it is 
committed through periodicals. Terrorism is defined under Article 1 of TMK as follows: 
 
Terrorism is any kind of act that constitutes a crime done by one or more persons 
belonging to an organisation with the aim of changing the characteristics of the 
Republic as specified in the Constitution, its political, legal, social, secular and 
economic system, damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its territory and 
nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, weakening or 
destroying or seizing the authority of the State, eliminating fundamental rights and 
freedoms, or damaging the internal and external security of the State, public order 





 Self-evident from the wording of TMK Article 1 is that it places the same emphasis that 
Article 26 (2) of the Constitution does on the unity of the state, possible damage to the internal and 
external security of the State, and the weakening, destroying, or seizing the authority of the State. 
However, TMK does not expand on what it means by “damage” and what “pressure”, “force”, 
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“violence”, “terror”, “intimidation”, “oppression”, or “threat” involves. In its Progress Report on 
Turkey in 2012, the European Commission stated that “the application of Articles 6 and 7 of TMK 
in combination with Articles 220 and 314 of TCK leads to abuses; in short, writing an article or 
making a speech can still lead to a court case and a long prison sentence for membership or 
leadership of a terrorist organisation.”
58
 Based on this statement in the European Commission’s 
report, related case examples will be analysed further in the chapter. However, it is necessary to 




 Article 7 of the Anti-Terror Law regulates leading a terrorist organisation and spreading 
and/or promoting terrorist propaganda: 
 
(1) Whoever founds, leads a terrorist organisation, and becomes member of such 
an organisation, with purpose to commit a crime, in direction towards objectives 
prescribed in the Article 1, through methods of pressure, threatening, intimidation, 
suppression, and menace, by taking advantage of force and violence, shall be 
punished according to the provisions of the Article 314 of the Turkish Penal Law. 
Whoever arranges activities of the organisation shall be punished as leader of the 
organisation. (2) Whoever makes propaganda of the terrorist organisation by 
promoting violence shall be punished by imprisonment for one to five years. In 
case of committing this crime through media, the penalty shall be increased by 
one half. In addition, a judicial fine for one thousand to ten thousand days shall be 
adjudged for owners and persons in charge of publication, who have any 
admittance in committing the felony by the media. However, the maximum limit 
of this penalty for persons in charge of the publication shall be five thousand days. 
These given acts and behaviours shall too be punished according to provisions of 
this paragraph: a) fully or partially veiling the face with the purpose to hide 
personal identity in the course of an assembly and demonstration march, turned 
into a propaganda of terrorist organisation. b) to carry emblems and signs, shout 
slogans or announce through audio means, which would show membership or 
support of the terrorist organisation, or to wear uniforms with emblem and signs 
                                                 
58
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of the terrorist organisation. (3) If offences prescribed in the second paragraph are 
committed inside any block, local, bureau or outlying buildings belonging to 
associations, foundations, political parties, labour and trade unions or their 
subsidiaries, or inside educational institutions or student hostels or their outlying 




 It will be necessary to refer to the language of this article, for the majority of the journalists 
in Turkey have been investigated or/and convicted based on being a member of a terrorist 
organisation or committing the crime of making propaganda of a terrorist organisation through the 
press.
60
 TCK Articles 220 and 314 have been used in combination with TMK Articles 6 and 7 in 
order to penalise the opposition press or the journalists for being a leader of a terrorist organisation, 
whereas in fact they had merely been investigating and/or commenting on terrorism in Turkey. In 
addition, TCK Article 220 lays out the criteria for “forming organised groups with the intention of 
committing a crime”: 
 
 (1) Those who form or manage organised groups to execute acts which are 
defined as offence by the laws, are punished with imprisonment from two years to 
six years unless this organised group is observed to be qualified to commit 
offence in view of its structure, quantity of members, tools and equipment held for 
this purpose. However, at least three members are required for existence of an 
organised group. (2) Those who become a member of an organised group with the 
intention of committing crime, are punished with imprisonment from one year to 
three years. (3) In case the organised criminal group is equipped with arms, the 
punishment to be imposed according to the above subsections is increased from 
one fourth to one half. (4) In case of commission of a crime within the frame of 
activities of a organised group, the offender is additionally punished for this 
crime. (5) The directors of the organised criminal group are additionally punished 
for all the offences committed within the frame of activities of the organised 
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group. (6) Any person who commits an offence on behalf of an organised criminal 
group without being a member of that group is additionally punished for being a 
member of the organised group. (7) Any person who knowingly and willingly 
helps an organised criminal group without being part of the hierarchic structure of 
the group, is punished as if he is a member of the organised group. (8) Any person 
who makes propaganda by praising the organised criminal group and its object is 
punished with imprisonment from one year to three years. The punishment to be 
imposed is increased by one half in case of commission of this offence through 
press and broadcast organs.
61 
 
 TCK Article 314 refers to “alliance for offences; establishing, commanding or becoming a 
member of an armed organisation with the aim to committing certain offences”: 
 
     (1) If two or more persons make a deal to commit any one of the offences listed in 
fourth and fifth sections of this chapter
62
 by using suitable means, the offenders 
are sentenced to imprisonment from three years up to twelve years, depending on 
the quality of offence. (2) No punishment is imposed on the persons who break up 
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 The Anti-Terror Law Article 7(2) makes provisions for the restriction of the press’s freedom 
by regulating the committing of the crime of making propaganda of a terrorist organisation through 
the use of the media.Increasing the penalty by half in such circumstances, it is silent on what 
constitutes propaganda. The lack of clarity in this provision results from the amendments made to 
the Anti-Terror Law in 2006, which omitted the following phrasing from the provision: “in a way 
that would promote violence or make it appealing to use other methods of terrorism”. Academics 
criticised this amendment as a step backwards for the freedom of the press in Turkey.
64
 Hazar 
argues that the new version of TMK is in contradiction with the ECtHR case law requiring the 




 In this context, where the broadly drawn language of law leads to the censorship of the 
press, this author argues that the Turkish courts have the duty to provide a balance between national 
security and the freedom of expression, which is discussed separately in Chapter 5. However, it is 
crucial to state that criticism against the government and government officials is perceived as a 
threat to the national security and territorial integrity by the Turkish courts. This perception reflects 
the judiciary’s persistence in following the official state and government ideology to reform the 
Anti-Terror Law. This may be argued as one of the reasons why the reforms being made to the EU 
accession process have not been implemented, along with the lack of government will as it 
continues to use the Anti-Terror Law arbitrarily to censor the press. Seemingly a common 
occurrence throughout the political history of Turkey, which will be examined in detail in Chapter 
3. 
 
 As a result, both articles of TCK and TMK can be considered as the main problems in the 
legislation related to the freedom of expression and the press that must be addressed by the 
legislation. In addition to that, recommendations will be made on the role of the judiciary for the 
solution of this problem, which is expansively discussed in Chapter 6. However, it is crucial to state 
that despite the latest developments in the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court of Turkey in 
favour of the press,
66
 the Turkish lawmakers must boldly demonstrate the will to comply with 
international standards in a satisfactory manner.  
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 Yasar Salihpasaoglu, ‘Türkiye’de Basın Özgürlüğü/Freedom of the Press in Turkey’ (Ankara Seckin Yayinlari, 
2007) 185 
65
 Zeynep Hazar, ‘Freedom of Press and National Security’ (2013) 17:1-2 Gazi University Law Faculty Journal 
1525,1543 
66
 Examined throughly in Chapter 5. 
Page | 26  
 
2.3 Examining the Case of Hrant Dink in Light of the Turkish Penal Code and 
the ECtHR Verdict 
 
 In order to highlight the practical implications of the legal provisions of TCK studied above, 
this section investigates the case of Hrant Dink. The case of Hrant Dink is mainly based in the 
application of TCK Article 301 and has been chosen to indicate how its vague language has led to a 
broad interpretation by the Turkish authorities, namely the public prosecutors and the judges, 
resulting in Dink’s conviction. With the investigation of this case, the research aims to propose 
recommendations for legal amendments designed to prevent the problems encountered by Dink. 
2.3.1 Hrant Dink v TCK Article 301 
 
 Hrant Dink was an outspoken Turkish-Armenian community member, born and educated in 
Turkey, who served as an editor at the weekly Turkish-Armenian AGOS newspaper for 11 years. 
He was part of the group of writers, journalists, and scholars who aimed to prepare the first ever 
conference on the Armenian massacre in Turkey. Dink’s ultimate wish was to enable Turkish 
citizens to search for the truth and to encourage Armenians who were Turkish citizens to feel 
confident about naming themselves with their identity with no constraints.
67
 Dink spoke at many 
conferences in the USA, Australia, Europe, and Armenia about Armenian identity and the 
relationship between Turkish and Armenian People Encouraging critical thinking about this 




 Dink was first prosecuted based on his statement — “the purified blood that will replace the 
blood poisoned by the ‘Turk’ can be found in the noble vein linking Armenians to Armenia, 
provided that the former are aware of it”
69
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which he meant to call diaspora Armenians to dispense with their detestation of “the Turk”.
72
 Dink 
was brought to the court by the public prosecutor’s appointment of criminal proceedings against 
him, based on a criminal complaint of his being an extreme nationalist.
73
 The proceedings against 
Dink were grounded on denigrating “Turkishness” according to the old TCK Article 301, and 
despite the expert report received by the court which came to a conclusion that his remarks in the 
article in question had not included any insult or denigration to anyone
74
, Dink was found guilty in 
7 October 2005 for “denigrating Turkishness” by the Sisli Criminal Court in Istanbul.
75
 Dink was 
sentenced to six months imprisonment while the Sisli Criminal Court determined that “the public 
could not be expected to read the whole series of articles in order to grasp the real meaning of his 




 By way of this research it is observed that the Court’s decision could have set an example of 
tolerance for ideas that differ from the political ideology in the country. Promoting unity among 
different ethnic backgrounds by taking the expert report as a basis to understand the overall idea of 
Dink’s article for its judgement. Therefore, the public could be motivated to read the whole series 
of articles in order to try to understand Dink’s intention for using the words that lead to his 
conviction. As the political and cultural situation in Turkey suffers from the lack of dissemination 
of divergent ideas and of toleration towards such ideas, the Courts’ decisions should not be tools 
that contribute to such hostility between people from different ethnic backgrounds. On the other 
hand, by not taking the expert report into account, the Court led to the creation of mistrust within 
society on the impartiality of the judges, as the people suspected the case was politically driven.
77
 
However, Sisli Criminal Court preferred to use subjective terms to conclude its verdict, which 
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exposed the ideological sensitivities of the judges in their approach towards the misconstrued 
sentence from Dink’s article; 
 
 the judgement stated: 
 
There exists such country whose flag can be turned into a piece of clothing, it 
would be tolerated. There exists such country that when you touch its cow it leads 
to a moral outrage. There is such nation that when blood is mentioned it reminds 
them of their ancestors whose blood is in every inch of these lands… Every single 




 The Turkish Court’s judgement, although containing subjective terms that carried hostile 
expressions towards Dink was covered without criticising or questioning the subjective terms used 
by the court.
79
 Similar coverage was also evident in the next lawsuit against Dink, who had been the 
subject of a smear campaign as discussed further in the chapter.  
 
 Finally, the verdict was upheld by the Court of Cassation in May 2006 when appealed, and 
the extraordinary appeal that was made by the Principal State Council was also dismissed by the 
Court of Cassation. After Hrant Dink’s assassination on 19 January 2007, Sisli Penal Court of First 





2.3.2 Turkey v Article 301: ECtHR decision of Dink v Turkey 
 
 The decision of the ECtHR in Dink v Turkey included the combination of two cases. The 
first was the decision on Dink’s application before his death in 2006, for challenging his conviction 
under TCK Article 301 for “denigrating Turkish identity” ruled by the Turkish Court, which Dink 
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argued to be violating Article 10 of the ECHR (the Convention).
81
 The second was the lawsuit 
brought by Dink’s family against Turkey under Article 2 of the ECHR for breaching the guarantee 
of the right to life. The ECtHR judgement stated that the Turkish court’s ruling “made Dink a target 
for extreme nationalists. The suggestion of the role of the press in making Dink a target for extreme 
nationalists is discussed in the “Role of the press in Dink’s assassination: A case of “hate speech”” 
in great depth. The Turkish authority, who had been informed of the plot to kill him, had not taken 




 The ECtHR found a violation of Article 10 of the ECHR, despite the contestation of the 
Turkish Government’s claim that Dink was finally not convicted at the time of his death and that 
there was therefore not a breach of Article 10.
83
 The present author notes that ECtHR’s verdict is of 
great importance in that it sets a benchmark for the interpretation of the freedom of the press by the 
Turkish courts, given its ruling that the highest court’s judgement upholding Dink’s guilty verdict 
created hatred among the extreme nationalist wing in Turkey. The Turkish authorities’ failure to 






2.3.2.1 Violation of Article 2: responsibility of the Turkish authorities   
 
 The Turkish authorities’ failure to protect Hrant Dink’s life, given their lack of success in 
investigating his assassination, was highlighted by the ECtHR. The ECtHR concluded that Turkey 
had violated Article 2
85
 of the ECHR, based on the consideration that the Turkish security forces 
had been notified of the nationalist circles’ hatred towards Hrant Dink before his assassination and  
the Istanbul and Trabzon police were informed of the possibility of his assassination, supported by 
the suspects’ identification.
86
 The court’s decision was based on the claim by an informant 
confirming that two non-commissioned officers of Trabzon gendarmerie were warned about the 
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intention of Dink’s assassination by the informant. These officers also claimed that their superiors 
were informed of the details and received a response ordering them to deny having received such 
information. Finally, Istanbul’s public prosecutor made further investigations into the involvement 
of Trabzon gendarmerie, and it became clear that Trabzon police officers were negligent in taking 
any action to prevent Dink’s assassination. There was no action taken against the Trabzon police by 
the Trabzon prosecution authorities based on the defence that the information received by the 
Trabzon police was not found credible enough to act upon.
87
   
  
 It became apparent that the Istanbul authorities were informed of the preparations for Dink’s 
assassination, and as a result Istanbul’s provincial governor’s office chose to start a criminal 
proceeding for negligence against a number of Istanbul police members.
88
 The attempt was useless 
because the Istanbul Regional Administrative Court of Appeal overlooked the order requiring the 
commencement of the criminal proceedings. This reluctance was defended by the Istanbul Regional 
Administrative Court of Appeal by alleging that the investigation of the case was insufficient.
89
 A 
minimal investigation took place once there was a complaint by the applicant, Rakel Dink (Hrant 
Dink’s wife), based on the heroic picture taken of the assassin while in custody bearing a Turkish 
flag. Last but not least, except disciplinary action, there was no legal action taken against the police 
officers concerned based on Samsun’s public prosecutor’s decision that defending a crime could 




 In conclusion, the ECtHR considered that the prevention of Hrant Dink’s assassination 
would have been possible, however none of the informed authorities took the necessary actions for 
its prevention. Even though Dink never requested police protection, the Turkish authorities were 
responsible for taking necessary actions for his protection; the ECtHR therefore concluded that 
Article 2 of the Convention was breached both in its substantive and procedural aspects.
91
 
 The Turkish Court fails to promote a positive duty on the state to provide legal protection to 
journalists; this failure is based on the lack of the universal application of the law that secures the 
right to free expression and the freedom of the press. The absence of protection for Dink and of 
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further investigation into his assassination triggered serious concern among the public.
92
 The 
government’s duty to protect threatened journalists must be strictly ensured by the Turkish courts.  
For the enforcement of the right to free expression of the journalists, it is essential that their right to 
life is protected, for the absence of such crucial protection creates the atmosphere of self-censorship 
by the press. 
 By way of this research it is argued that the responsibility of the press for Dink’s 
assassination does not only belong to the Turkish authorities as suggested by the ECtHR. It is 
important to look from the perspective of the mainstream press in order to examine whether the 
press perceived the case from a fourth estate perspective, requiring addressing the state’s 
responsibility for his assassination. Alternatively taking a stance close to the state ideology which 
leads to a narrow interpretation of press freedom adopted by the Turkish court. Considering the 
contribution that such discussion would make to the examination of the main research question, the 
attitude of the press towards Dink’s trials will be covered later in this chapter.  
 
2.3.2.2. The ultimate challenge of the press in Turkey: expressions against the political 
ideology 
 
 The verdict of the first instance court in the case of Hrant Dink appears to be an appropriate 
example of how the presiding political ideology leads to the censorship of the press and shapes the 
judicial decisions in Turkey. 
 
 By inspecting the Court of Cassation’s interpretation of Turkish identity, ECtHR also stated 
that Dink was indirectly penalised for opposing the Turkish State’s denial of events in 1915 that 
allegedly were in the nature of a genocide.
93
 Dink’s statements that he had to go through all these 
trials because he is an Armenian and that he was silenced for exploring issues that challenge the 
Turkish political ideology
94
, can be considered, to understand how effective the sensitivities were 
related to the official state ideology, and their impact on the political motivations behind this case. 
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 Considering that Dink was convicted based on his journalistic work, and that his articles 
were of public interest, the ECtHR's principle on “the limits of acceptable criticism” is of great 
value. The Court asserts that “Article 10 of the Convention prohibited restrictions on freedom of 
expression in the sphere of political debate and issues of public interest, and that the limits of 
acceptable criticism were wider for the Government than for a private individual.”
95
 This decision 
by the ECtHR indicates that the judges in Turkey, in press-related cases, must take the ECtHR case-
law into consideration. When ECtHR's case-law is considered, there are three ways to interfere with 
the exercise of free expression to take place; namely, it has to be “prescribed by law, pursued a 
legitimate aim or/and be regarded as being necessary in a democratic society.”
96
 However, it is 
observed that the First Instance Court showed obstinacy and refused to evaluate Dink’s statements 
within their overall context as previously mentioned and the ECtHR ruled that there was no 
“pressing social need” for Dink’s conviction based on denigrating Turkish identity. In light of this 
context, when Dink’s articles are analysed altogether, it is clear that “poison” was not used to 
describe “Turkish blood” but the “perception of Turkish people” by the Armenians instead.
97
 It is 
fair to argue that Dink was the victim of “the sensitive issues” he expressed that contradicted the 
present political ideology in the country
98
,  built on national and secular ideologies where the 
protection of the State against communists, Islamists and Kurdish separatists is given utmost 





2.3.3 Role of the press in Dink’s Assassination: a case of “hate speech”  
  
 While Dink was being tried for his statement, he was brought to public attention in the 
mainstream press (Hurriyet) by a column written based on Dink’s reporting on Sabiha Gokcen (the 
first female Turkish military pilot) in which Dink claimed that Gokcen had Armenian roots.
100
 More 
specifically, in 2004, his article was cited in Hurriyet by Ersin Kalkan, whose column was written 
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in a neutral style
101
 and did not aim to create tension within the society. Nevertheless, the 
publication of Kalkan’s article, despite the writer’s sole aim of “making news”, portrayed Dink as 




 As also stated by Dink, his article was important because it highlighted what Armenian 
people experienced in 1915.
103
 This was equally the reason why it disturbed some readers as well as 
the military. Although Hurriyet supported Dink’s report with interviews from witnesses and used a 
professional tone in covering the news, Hurriyet received negative reactions from the people fuelled 




 This declaration emphasised two main terms, which require further attention in relation to 
the research question. For the TSK (Turkish Armed Forces) used “national unity” and “communal 
peace” as the two notions being threatened by the discussion on a symbolic character like Sabiha 
Gokcen and openly questioned the quality of Hurriyet’s reporting. The statement by TSK is a good 
example of direct state intervention and will therefore be cited fully: 
 
On 21 February 2004, one newspaper published an allegation under the name of a 
news item with the title of “80 Years Secret of Sabiha Gokcen”. Ataturk’s foster 
daughter, Sabiha Gokcen, whom we lost in 2001 is a great value for the Turkish 
nation. As the first war pilot of Turkey, she is an honorary member of Turkish 
Military Aviation.  
 
Sabiha Gökçen also symbolises the valuable and rational position in the society 
that Ataturk desired for Turkish Women to hold. Allowing such a symbol to be 
discussed is an approach that does not serve communal peace and national unity, 
no matter what the intention is. 
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Noble Ataturk defines the Turkish nation as “People of Turkey who established 
the Republic of Turkey are called Turkish”. Accordingly, Ataturk Nationalism is 
not based on ethnic and religious grounds. In Article 66 of our Constitution 
Turkish citizenship is defined as “Everyone bound to the Turkish State through 
the bond of citizenship is a Turk.” It is not acceptable that an allegation is reported 
under the name of journalism that abuses national feelings and values.  
It is of high concern to follow the unfair and groundless criticism being made 
against Ataturk nationalism and the nation state structure by one part of the 
Turkish Media, which, intentionally or unintentionally, irresponsibly features 
dangerous ideas that aim to deprive Ataturk nationalism.  
In such a period that requires a strong national unity, the majority of the Turkish 
people can understand the intention and follow with apprehension these 
publications which are against our national unity and national values.     
Besides the Turkish Armed Forces, it is also the duty of Turkish people and 
institutions to defend and claim the unity of the Turkish nation, communal peace, 
and Ataturk’s ideology and morals.   
To this extent, it is expected by the nation that the Turkish media conforms with 
Ataturk’s morals, ideology, the principal values of the Republic of Turkey, the 
unity of the people, and revises its publication principles in light of these ideas 




 Goktas highlights TSK’s expectation from the press; they declare their concern with any 
news that “intentionally” or “unintentionally” features “dangerous ideas” that could aim to 
undermining Ataturk nationalism. Therefore, TSK gives a warning to the press not to incorporate 
any opposing views even if they have news value.
106
 This is a damaging example of how TSK 
directly interfered the Turkish press in order impose its political ideology on their reporting and 
eliminate any opposing views no matter their news value or importance to society. As further 
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analysed in Chapter 3, the press in Turkey has not adopted the watchdog or the fourth estate role but 
stood as the spokesman of the State; this is verified by the affirmative reaction of the mainstream 
press to TSK’s declaration. 
 
 Goktas concludes that the most important point to consider in the press reaction to this 
declaration is that there was no anomaly for the press in including TSK’s declaration, which 
consisted of intense criticism towards the coverage of the news on Gokcen. Interfering with the 
editorial freedom of the press with no focus on the restrictions they received from the military 
forces on their choice of content. When the press published the declaration of TSK with a critical 
point of view, the criticism was rather based on how TSK made a tactical mistake by making such a 
declaration. Goktas’ statement that none of the newspapers carrying the declaration on their pages 
were concerned about their freedom of expression and TSK’s intervention in their editorial 
freedom
107
 is an appropriate observation that requires serious consideration.  
 
 It is suggested in the present research that the press’s reaction to TSK’s declaration suggests 
that press traditions allowed the political ideology
108
 to set the rules for the limits of their 
expression and thus the freedom of the press in Turkey. In this regard, it is possible to argue that the 
press in Turkey customarily/conventionally accepts the intervention of the State authorities in their 
editorial freedom. Consequently, the discussion in the news related to the inquiry, whether there 
was enough evidence to question whether Sabiha Gökçen was Armenian or not had turned into a 
common opinion. That simply mentioning “Gokcen” and “Armenian” in the same piece constituted 
a dangerous element for the national security. It is remarkable to see the influences of the political 
ideology on the assessment and expression of the mainstream press. Also, it is an example of the 
need for a better understanding of the presence and nature of racism in Turkey as it impacts on 
freedom of the press. The assassination of Hrant Dink was based on his ethnic origins in 
combination with the arbitrary use of TCK Article under which his prosecution brought him to the 
spotlight of the ultra-nationalists. Despite that Turkey had ratified the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) on 16 October 2002. This 
argument can be supported on the basis of the repeated targeting of the Kurdish journalists and 
Kurdish newspapers as discussed throughout the thesis. 
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 However, Murat Belge, in his column in Radikal newspaper, criticised TSK, not on their 
intervention in the press but the mentality that led to discrimination against the minorities 
(including Armenians) based on the aim to create a “nation-state”. Which he suggested to be the 
main philosophy during and after the establishment of the republic. He explains why such a report 
on Sabiha Gokcen is seen as a danger or a threat to the founding principles and values of the 
Republic of Turkey: 
 
…Let’s say that someone proved that she was Armenian. What would happen? 
Would founding principles and values of the Republic would be in danger? The 
only logical conclusion after reading TSK’s declaration can be that according to 
them, yes it would be in danger…They perceive Gokcen to be Armenian as a fact 
that would obliterate the nation, the state, its values, and its principles. I hope and 
think that the majority of Turkey does not perceive it the same way as TSK does. I 
don't think that they have to. I don't think that it is a healthy way of thinking that 





 Kursat Bumin from Yeni Safak newspaper was one of the rare columnists who turned the 
discussion towards the freedom of the press and stated that “Most importantly, it is the journalists 
and the readers who would decide what could be defined as news, not TSK.”
110
 Ekin Turkantos’ 
article, “Gokcen is not Armenian, She is Bosnian”
111
 accepts that Gokcen could be from another 
background than Turkish; however, the overall concern was not that Sabiha Gokcen could be from 
another nationality or ethnic background but that she “cannot” be Armenian.
112
Indicating  the 
subjectivity of the press when it comes to covering news on minorities in Turkey. 
 
 In his research, which focuses directly on the role of the press for building public opinion in 
Turkey, Goktas uses Hrant Dink as the main example.Based on the information derived from his 
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111
 Ekin Turkantos, ‘Gokcen Ermeni Degil Bosnali/Gokcen in Not Armanian, She is Bosnian’ Aksam Newspaper (23 
February 2004) 
112
 Kemal Goktas, ‘Turkiye’de Basinin Kamuoyu Olusturmasi Ornek Olay: Hrant Dink’in Hedef Haline Gelen Bir 
Siyasi Figure Donusturulmesi/Creation of public opinion by the press in Turkey:Hrant Dink being targeted as a 
political figure’’ (Master’s Thesis,  Ankara University 2007) 87 
Page | 37  
 
work, it is possible to see the step by step process which is motivated by the press that brought Dink 
under the spotlight. Making him a target on the basis of TCK Article 301 for his sentence which 
was taken out of context from Dink’s article in weekly magazine Agos. In this setting, Emin 
Colasan’s article from Hurriyet newspaper
113
, Deniz Som’s article from Cumhuriyet newspaper
114
, 
Orhan Kirvelioglu’s article in Once Vatan newspaper
115
, Arslan Tekin’s article in Yenicag 
newspaper
116
, Alican Satilmis’ article in Ortadogu newspaper
117
, were cited by Goktas.In order to 
conclude that journalists from the mainstream press which had a heavy impact on the reader,on the 
assassin of Dink and the judges who conducted Dink’s trial under TCK Article 301, were accusing 
Dink for stating that “Turkish blood was poisonous.” Which was only possible by taking Dink’s 
words out of their original context. 
 
 The pressure on Dink increased with a high volume of death threats he received from the 
ultra nationalists and the pressure created by the press. Even though Dink was an admired figure 
among democratic-minded journalists internationally, who considered him to be a bridge between 
the Armenian and Turkish people
118
.He was portrayed as a traitor by the mainstream media in 
Turkey. Dink was accused by the mainstream columnists of insulting the Turkish nation; this riled 
the nationalist wings, and the negative reactions against Dink based on these accusations lasted until 
his assassination. In light of this context, this research suggests that the press’s role in his murder 
was significant because the ultranationalist columnists labelled Dink a traitor during his 
prosecution. 
 
 In the case of Dink, the press’s reactions suggested that the focus point was not on the 
freedom of the press or on people’s right to information but, was rather limited to what is 
considered to be “acceptable news” within the lines of the official state ideology and/or national 
security. In Dink’s case, the court’s interpretation of Article 301 and  TSK’s the interpretation of 
free press were the determinant factors in drawing the lines for the press.The press chose to 
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undertake the subject matter within those limits instead of looking at it from the perspective of the 
rights and freedom of the press. In light of this, the present researcher highlights the importance of 
making a reformist amendment to Article 301 or completely abolishing it, arguing that it has been 
used as a legal basis for silencing the views of the opposition press that do not follow the official 
state ideology.  
 
 More importantly, this section concludes that the free public sphere was under the restraint 
of the broadly drawn legal provisions and the state authorities’ approach to press freedom. James 
Curran and Jean Seaton discuss the importance of the press in a democratic society by identifying 
four main elements as the responsibility of the press in a democratic system where people can make 
independent choices: (1) people must be informed of the public and political theories by the media 
systems, (2) individual and collective approaches must be respected in the delivery of the news in 
which the articulation of standpoints is the objective, (3) plurality must be respected by the media 
by providing grounds for pluralist comments, and (4) ideas and discussions as well as diversity in 
cultural perspectives must be respected with information that is conveyed accurately.
119
 Concerning 
these four main elements, it is fair to conclude that the present political ideology affects the press in 
Turkey, because it prioritises the state interest rather than individual rights and freedoms. This 
analysis is supported by the clear apprehension of the rights and limitations to which the Turkish 
press has become accustomed and acculturated. In relation to this, it is fair to argue that the press 
did not respect diversity of cultural perspectives or pluralist comments made by Dink and rather 
supported the state ideology which led to his conviction and facilitated his assassination. 
 
 
2.3.4 The expectations of  “change” after Dink’s assassination 
 
 After Dink’s assassination, PM Erdogan declared that Dink’s death was “a shot against       
Turkey”
120
. When Turkey’s Foreign Ministry said that while there was a chance of appeal at the 
ECtHR Grand Chamber against the verdict within three months, the country would not appeal as it 
“would abide by the ruling and take measures to prevent reoccurrence of such violations.”
121
 The 
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Turkish government was expected investigate the real motives behind Dink’s assassination and 
make the necessary legal amendments for the prevention of journalist killings, based on the 
ideological hostilities emphasised by the application of Article 301. However, in spite of the 
national and international outrage against Article 301 after Dink’s murder, there were no steps taken 
for the amendment or the abolishment of Article 301, which still stands as a heavy block to 
Turkey’s press freedom records. Discussed by Freedom House, Reporters Without Borders, 
Committee to Protect Journalists and finally by the EU progression reports on Turkey as examined 
in the following section. 
 Even nine years since Dink’s assassination, trials for Dink’s case are still ongoing. Although 
actions stated in ECtHR decision in Dink v Turkey (as discussed above) were to be enforced within 
a reasonable time, no actions were taken thereafter to ensure and reveal the actual links behind his 
assassination and the compliance of the case. In fact, the government officials who were responsible 
for Dink’s assassination were promoted to various higher positions.
122
 Only some of these 
individuals were brought to justice after the enormous efforts of Dink’s family based on the ECtHR 
court decision, which found the Turkish government in violation of its duty to protect Dink’s right 
to life, as discussed above. Therefore, the political alliance among these who silenced Dink, first by 
convicting him under Article 301, then enabling his assassination, are still of public concern, and 
justice is still waiting to be served in Dink’s case.  
 Reporters Without Borders (RSF) states that Dink’s case is under the risk of manipulation 
for political purposes, and besides the democratic implications, this is another reason why the case 
must be finalised without delay. RSF therefore calls for the Turkish judiciary to come to a 
conclusion on the case of Hrant Dink promptly and without the influence of any political 
prejudgements. This call is based on the course of political events that have been affecting the 
independence and impartiality of the judges. The progression in Dink’s case has occurred at a time 
when the political atmosphere in Turkey is undermined by the tense relationship between Erdogan 
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 for the judiciary stands on the grounds of the tension between these former allies.
124
 
As has been noted, “[c]ommon pro-Erdogan narratives hold that the Gulen movement has directly 
controlled large elements of the criminal justice sector in Turkey for a number of years.”
125
 
Therefore, the Court has been running an incomplete investigation with political motivations to 
protect the State. The relationship between the political tension and judicial independence is 
thoroughly reviewed in Chapter 5 where the profound political influence on the judiciary in Turkey 
is examined. 
 Finally, it is suggested in the present research that, if the initiators of Dink’s assassination 
are never brought to justice, the block to the press and of freedom of expression in Turkey cannot 
be fully eliminated, specifically as Dink’s case highlights two major setbacks: one being a manifest 
lack of respect towards pluralism of ideas and expressions and the other being the interpretation of 
the law by the judges deciding in accordance with the present political ideology. In that regard, 
Dink’s case is a vivid example of the loopholes in the legal provisions that regulate freedom of the 
press in Turkey and the political influence on the judiciary. The democratisation process in Turkey 
can continue its process only when the motives behind the journalist killings are clarified through 
open and fair trials. During which the public is informed by an uncensored press; because of  
obstructions by the police authorities, in combination with the intransigence of the judges, justice is 
still not maintained in Dink’s case. 
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2.4 Examining the case of Pelin Sener in light of the Anti-Terror Law and the 
ECtHR verdict  
 
 This section investigates the application of the Anti-Terror Law against the journalists who 
are involved in political debates that are of public interest but are rather convicted of “spreading 
terrorist propaganda” or for “being a member of  a terrorist organisation”. The courts’ reliance on 
the broad definition of terrorism in TMK and the interpretation of these legal provisions by the 
judges against the freedom of expression of the journalists, before the amendment of the law. The 
case of Pelin Sener under the old law is discussed in this section in order to establish the grounds 
for comparing the application of the old and the new law and the effects of their application on the 
censorship of the press. It is also necessary to evaluate whether the legal changes made in light of 
the legal and judicial reforms motivated by the EU accession process are applied when the freedom 
of the press is at stake.  
 Abolished Article 8 of TMK is examined in this chapter under Sener v Turkey in order to 
demonstrate its application before its abolishment and to compare whether there have been any 
differences after its abolishment of journalists’ imprisonment (Article 8 was intensively used to 
imprison journalists and publishers). The existence of such a difference will be extensively 
evaluated in Chapter 4, in which the Ergenekon is the main example to demonstrate the conviction 
of journalists under the Anti-Terror Law.  
2.4.1 Sener v Turkey 
 
 This section includes the ECtHR’s verdict on Sener’s case, which was given before the legal 
amendments were made to the controversial Anti-Terror Law in 2006. In order to critically discuss 
whether the changes brought any positive change for the journalists who have been censored under 
the provisions of TMK, it is interesting to examine Sener’s case because it was concluded by 
Istanbul State Security Court. Considering that the State Security Courts (DGM), which tried 
“offences against the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, the free 
democratic order, or against the Republic, whose characteristics are defined in the Constitution. 
Offences directly involving the internal and external security of the State”
126
, were abolished in 
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 for being incompatible with the principles of fair judgement
128
 and for lacking 
independence and impartiality.
129
 Exploring Sener’s case, which dates back to 1995, finally will 
give a clear picture of what has been changed since the abolition of the DGMs and after the legal 
amendments to the Anti-Terror Law based on the legal and judicial reforms on the EU accession 
process, and what have been the practical implications of these changes on the censorship of the 
press. The similarities between the recent judgements, which will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, 
and the judgement in Sener’s case will be used to verify the hypothesis of the present research. 
Arguing that the present political ideology and government interference are inhibitors to press 
freedom in Turkey, despite the loopholes in the legal provisions that enable the censorship of the 
press. 
 
 Sener is the owner and the chief editor of the weekly review Haberde Yorumda Gercek/The 
Truth of News and Comments, which was seized by Istanbul State Security Court on September 
1993 based on an article named Ayin Itirafi/Confession of the Month.
130
 Allegedly containing 
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 “We are watching the wholesale extermination of a nation. We are watching a genocide on such a scale that it is not 
a mistake to call it unprecedented. We are groaning between the cogwheels of a dirty war. We know we should take a 
stand against the war, but instead of shouting out our anger and smashing the cogwheels, we are groaning. We only 
wail. We try to praise death in the deathly silence. Fear seeps into our rooms from the whisper of the breeze and the 
rustle of leaves. Our hearts jump in our throats. We surrender to the State while we praise death in fear of death. We 
suddenly become quarrelsome during our feverish discussions and while sipping our hot tea in the cool breeze of the air 
conditioner. We talk about the right to self-determination of nations. We are saying that there should be no impediment 
to the exercise of this right. We try to explain that recognition of Kurdish reality is an important step. The reason for 
war in the middle-east is American imperialism and we think that to stand up against this war is a requirement for being 
a human being. The Namaz mountains, the Tendürek, the Nurhak and many others are being bombed at this moment. 
Kurdistan is blazing. The genocide pounds on. We watch the terror in Bosnia on our colour TV screens. Suddenly we 
are full of anger. We become human rights advocates. Chemical weapons are being used on the Nurhak mountains. ‘We 
will not leave a stone standing’ says a military authority. Their determination to exterminate a whole nation echoes in 
our ears. ‘Operations will be conducted not only in the south-east but also in the west. We’ll deal with the people who 
help the terrorists’ he adds, and of course makes sure to tip off the press. Here we forget that in our own words a dirty 
war can only end in defeat. We [also] forget the axiom that the only way to oppose a war is to wage a just war.  We 
want to forget it. The bomb falling on Tendürek explodes in our hearts. ‘What a pity’ says one of us. ‘Why shed so 
much blood? Aren’t Kurdish and Turkish nations brothers?’ And he begins his usual speech.We seem to have been 
waiting for that speech all the time, but we were not aware of one another. We each confess our fears as if we are saying 
different things. We take great care to serve the army officer faultlessly. We chorus that we have never approved of 
Turkish chauvinism but cannot approve of Kurdish chauvinism either. We turn a blind eye to the fact that an oppressed 
nation cannot be chauvinistic. We brazenly preach the necessity of trying peaceful methods to resolve the Kurdish 
problem and discuss what the solution might be. We fill the pages of our newspapers with bogus news of the terrorists’ 
raid on the Sündüz plateau and details of how they killed women and children. Oblivious of the fact that the public at 
large knows nothing of the briefing given to the press, we democratically explain in our newspaper columns that 
Kurdish and Turkish citizens have lived together in brotherhood for centuries and that the terrorists’ aim is to 
undermine that brotherhood. And we denigrate the attitude of the Kurdish peasants who started a freedom march. We 
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separatist propaganda. Sever was charged by Istanbul DGM under TMK 1991 Section 8 for 
dissemination of propaganda against the indivisibility of the State by publishing the article. Section 
8 of the Code regulated the “offence of undermining the territorial integrity of the Republic of 
Turkey or the indivisible unity of the nation through written and spoken propaganda…”
131
  
 In that regard, Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law regulated the offence of undermining the 
territorial integrity of the Republic of Turkey or the indivisible unity of the nation through written 
and spoken propaganda, meetings, assemblies and demonstrations, irrespective of the methods used 
and the intention. Any person who engaged in such an activity could be sentenced to imprisonment 
or a fine, which for a press editor then could be up to 2 years of imprisonment and a fine of up to 
three hundred million Turkish lira (based on old currency before 1 January 2005). Sener denied the 
charges on the basis that the criminal proceedings against her aimed at silencing the review, as the 
author of the article was not the subject of the proceedings, and argued that her freedom of 
expression was restricted by the use of TMK 1991. In addition, Sener also claimed that TMK 1991 




 Desmond Fernandes, regarding the amended TMK, states that TMK contradicts Article 13 
of the Constitution, which guarantees that limitations on freedoms must be in accordance with the 
Constitution itself and with the needs of democratic order as well as a secular republic. It 
contradicts Article 26 of the Constitution, which secures the freedom of expression, and finally 
Article 90, which states the priority of international conventions signed by Turkey which have been 
violated in practice
133
 by the imprisonment of the journalists under TMK provisions. 
 
 However, Sener was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment and penalty, and Istanbul DGM 
ruled for the seizure of the “offending” publication. The article was found to offend, allegedly for 
disseminating propaganda against the indivisibility of the State based on the use of the word 
                                                                                                                                                                  
are intellectuals. We shall not give up the democrat’s way of life. But who ever died of a lie? We also make it our rule 
to serve the State. We consider people stupid. Our many years of ink-licking make us different from them. This is a 
confession. We are stupid.” The English translation of the article has been retrieved from Sener v Turkey App no 
26680/95 (ECtHR, 18 July 2000) para. 7 
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“Kurdistan” for a certain part of TurkeyLabelling of people living there as Kurdish citizens and use 
of the word “genocide” for Kurdish nation who was argued by the court to be presented in the 
subject article as being subject to extermination. Sener’s appeal to the Court of Cassation was 
dismissed on the same grounds as Istanbul DGM, and Sener’s judgement was upheld. However, 
following the changes to the 1991 Act made by Law no. 4126 in October 1995, Sener’s case was re-
evaluated, and Sener’s application of appeal was reversed by the Court of Cassation which ruled for 
the suspension with a final sentence to be imposed in the case of the applicant’s conviction of a 





 In the relevant sections of the law no. 4304 which allowed the suspension of Sener’s 
sentence, section 1 follows: 
 
The execution of sentences passed on those who were convicted under the Press 
Act (Law no. 5680) or other laws as editors for offences committed before 12 July 
1997 shall be deferred. The provision in the first paragraph shall also apply to 
editors who are already serving their sentences. The institution of criminal 
proceedings or delivery of final judgments shall be deferred where proceedings 
against the editor have not yet been brought, or where a preliminary investigation 
has been commenced but criminal proceedings have not been instituted, or where 
the final judicial investigation has been commenced but judgment has not yet been 
delivered, or where the judgment has still not become final. 
 
 
Section 2 of the same law follows: 
 
If an editor who has benefited under the provisions of the first paragraph of 
section 1 is convicted as an editor for committing an intentional offence within 
three years of the date of deferment, he must serve the entirety of the suspended 
sentence. Where there has been a deferment, criminal proceedings shall be 
instituted or judgment delivered if an editor is convicted as such for committing 
an intentional offence within three years of the date of deferment. Any conviction 
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as an editor for an offence committed before 12 July 1997 shall be deemed a 
nullity if the aforesaid period of three years expires without any further conviction 
for an intentional offence. Similarly, if no criminal proceedings have been 
instituted, it shall no longer be possible to bring any, and, if any have been 
instituted, they shall be discontinued. 
 
 Meanwhile, the author of the article, Erhan Altun, was also found guilty by Istanbul DGM 
and was sentenced for 1 year 1 month and 10 days of imprisonment with a penalty, which then was 
suspended on similar grounds as Sener, based on the prospect that he would not commit any further 
offence.
135
 Despite the fact that the cases for both Erhan Altun and Pelin Sener were procedural 
cases, it is fair to argue that interference with their right to freely express their opinions on a 
subject, even critical in the circumstances of the South East Turkey, creates pressure on the 
journalists, leading to self-censorship “by bringing the weight of the criminal law to bear on the 




 Despite the suspension of her sentence, Sener applied to the ECtHR with the alleged 
violations of Article 10, Article 6, and Article 13 of the ECHR. Owing to the fact that ECHR 
Article 10 falls within the scope of this research, it is important to look at the Turkish government’s 
reaction as it defended the domestic court’s decision for being justified under the second paragraph 
of Article 10. In response, ECtHR found the domestic court’s decision to interfere with Sener’s 
right to freedom of expression “prescribed by law” under TMK 1991,
137
 and found the aim of the 
interference “legitimate” considering the “sensitivity of the security situation in south East Turkey 
and to the need for the authorities to be alert of acts capable of fuelling additional violence…”
138
 
Yet, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 10 despite the justification grounds used by the Turkish 
government, which stated that the interference was necessary in a democratic society as “the 
applicant disseminated separatist propaganda since the article in issue encouraged terrorist violence 
against the State” and “that the imposition of the final sentence on the applicant had been 
suspended…which aimed at providing for more lenient sanctions for offences committed through 
the medium of the press.”
139
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 ECtHR’s verdict follows: 
 
…the incriminated publication was an article by an intellectual whose statements 
contained sharp criticism of the policy and action of Turkey with regard to its 
population of Kurdish origin. The author expressed his view on the Kurdish 
question and did not associate himself with the use of violence in the context of 
the Kurdish separatist movement. In the Commission’s view, the measures taken 
against the applicant amounted to a kind of censorship, which was likely to 




 In addition to ECtHR’s statement in Surek v Turkey that restrictions on political speech or 
debate on questions of public interest has little scope under Article 10 section 2, the ECtHR stated 
that the threshold for allowing criticism towards the government and/or politicians must be higher 




 Referring to the Lingens v Austria
142
 judgement, the Court stated that Sener’s case must also 
be analysed on the basis of the role of the press; without conflicting with State interests such as 
national security and territorial integrity. The press is required to convey political news and ideas 
even if it is disruptive since the people have the right to such information. The ECtHR accepted that 
the above mentioned article included parts using an aggressive tone; however, when considered as a 
whole, it did not boost or celebrate violence and rather made an intellectual analysis of the Kurdish 
issue, which the ECtHR considers to be essential. Consequently, because of these reasons the 
decision by Istanbul State Security Court to convict Sener was found disproportionate to the aims 
pursued and “not necessary in a democratic society”, and the ECtHR decided that Turkey violated 




 The present author concludes that this case particularly highlights one major drawback of 
the legislation stated above — the broadly drawn language of TMK itself, which became apparent 
in the ECtHR’s decision that found the interference with Sener’s right to freedom of expression 
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 when in fact it is the broad and vague definition of the law that it makes the 
interference possible. The facts of this case, despite the fact that Sener was tried under the old 
provisions of the related law before the amendments took place in 2006, reflect the current practice 
in Turkey as it is possible to observe in Chapter 4, which examines the treatment of the journalists 
under the amended versions of the broadly drawn legal provisions. It can also be observed from the 
numbers provided by the OSCE reports
145





 Considering that Sener’s case was tried by the DGM, which was abolished in 2004 with the 
will to fulfil the requirements of the democratisation process in the EU membership process, it is 
compelling to note the irony that the number of cases brought to the ECtHR under the Anti-Terror 
law has been increasing,
147
 despite the steps taken by the Turkish state by the legal and judicial 
reform packages. The Turkish Courts are reluctant to take ECtHR case law as a yardstick, 
disregarding the criteria of “necessity in a democratic society” while restricting freedom of the 
press. The interpretation of law is narrow when the freedom of the press is the subject matter; this 
leads to human rights violations in a country that is supposed to be under the guarantee of the 




2.5 Freedom of the press in Turkey from the international perspective 
 
 This section concentrates on the international NGO reports  such as Freedom House, 
Journalists Without Borders, Amnesty International, and the Committee to Protect Journalists, 
European Commission (EC) reports, and UN reports that concern the situation of press freedom in 
Turkey. The purpose of taking these reports into consideration is to try and locate Turkey’s press 
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freedom level in order to ensure that the problems experienced by the press are explained not only 
from a doctrinal perspective but also from a practical point of view. Undertaking such an analysis 
will demonstrate the differences in the numbers of imprisoned journalists after the reforms that took 
place under the motivation of EU accession, numbers that have risen significantly. The cases 
explained above had both been concluded before these reforms
148
 and the recent numbers of 
imprisoned journalists examined in this section are from the recent NGO reports, which implies that 
Turkey has not been successful in implementing the reforms. The main burden facing the freedom 
of expression is the political intervention into press operations, which is examined as a tradition in 




 Between the years of 2002 and 2012, Turkey experienced the most drastic fall of press 
freedom rankings in its history. in press freedom rankings, according to the study conducted by 
Reporters Without Borders (RSF). Based on the information obtained from RSF, Turkey held 99th 
place among 139 countries in the 2002 Press Freedom Index, and after 10 years, in 2012, RSF 





 This significant change, which took place during the 10 years of the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) government, is shocking. The situation of the imprisoned journalists in 
2002, when compared with the present numbers, demonstrates that the reform processes have not 
been proactive. Presently, according to the Freedom House 2015 report, Turkey, in the last five 
years, is the country (after Thailand and Ecuador) that had experienced the third fastest decline in 
freedom of the press.
150
 This drastic fall is evidenced by the tens of journalists who were sentenced 
to imprisonment and who were fired as well as thousands of journalists who faced suits for 
damages. In his report, Onderoglu (RSF) provides an updated list of imprisoned journalists by July 
2015. Based on this report, there were 21 journalists in total who were imprisoned mainly based on 
the controversial articles of the Turkish Penal Code and Anti-Terror Law. It is striking that more 
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than 60% of these imprisoned journalists (13 out of 21) are sentenced based on the Articles 5, 7, 
and 7(2).
151
 These numbers and the reasons of their imprisonment demonstrate the misuse of the 
broadly drawn laws against the pro-Kurdish journalists whose views are generally seen against the 
state ideology. This brings Turkey to the 149th place among 180 countries based on the Press 




 When the number of journalists mentioned in Onderoglu’s study is compared to the 
Committee to Protect Journalists’ report in 1985, which suggests that the Kurdish journalists were 
not arrested as “journalists” but “terrorists”,
153
 it can be argued that there has not been a positive 
change for the situation of Kurdish journalists since CPJ’s 1985 report was published. 
 
 The amendments made to the Anti-Terror Law on 29 June 2006 introduced new press 
offences that are punishable by imprisonment. These amendments led to more media members who 
reported on military operations or pro-Kurdish demonstrations being prosecuted for collaborating 
with PKK. Currently, there are 14 journalists in jail, all based on their journalistic work. 11 of these 
journalists are imprisoned based on the anti-state charges for their reports on sensitive outlawed 
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and/or Turkey's security operations taking place in the south. RSF 
reported their concern on the legal obstacles that the Kurdish press would face by the application of 
the amended Anti-Terror Law (3713). These legal obstacles were listed to be Article 6 (2), which 
regulated a 3-year imprisonment for “any dissemination of statements and communiques by 
terrorist organisations”, and Article 7 (2), which stated, “Whoever makes propaganda for a terrorist 
organisation will be sentenced to five years in prison. If the crime is committed by means of the 
press, the penalty may be increased by half. Owners and editors will also be sentenced to a heavy 
fine”. The limitations brought by these changes in 2006 were highly criticised based on the 
vagueness of the terms used such as “terrorist organisation”. In its report RSF also suggested that a 
clear definition of “terrorist organisation” must be made in order to eliminate arbitrary arrests 
and/or imprisonments.
154
 However, the latest legal amendments that took place in 2013 do not 
narrow down the vague concepts such as “coercion” and “threat”, which do not have a clear link to 
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violence. The present researcher finally argues that, despite the amendments to articles 6 (2) and 7 
(2) by the reform package in 2013, Anti-Terror Law in Turkey still falls short of international 
standards, which stipulate that prosecution should only take place when the statements have an 
intention to make propaganda for war or advocate violence. Nonetheless, Turkish Anti-Terror Law 
Article 6(2) provides “printing or publishing of declarations or statements of terrorist organisations” 
and Article 7(2) provides “making propaganda for a terrorist organisation”.
155
 In line with Amnesty 
International’s criticisms, this research also suggests that the broad and vague coding of Turkish 
Anti-Terror Law has been in violation of the freedom of the press and lacks international standards 
for the protection of the right to freedom of expression. Recommendations for the necessary 
amendments are discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
 In a similar vein, the Chair of the Progressive Journalists Association (PJA), Ahmet 
Akbakay, states that the press in Turkey has been experiencing the heaviest pressure on the freedom 
of thought and freedom of expression since AKP governance came into power in 2002. Akbakay 
reports that the press is under intense suppression since AKP came to power, and the AKP 
government has the worst record for the freedom of the press in the history of modern Turkey: 
“…at some point there were more than 100 journalists in jail. There are still 23 journalists in jail 
and 21 of them are imprisoned based on KCK
156
 press case due to the Anti-Terror Law, which does 





 Ercan Ipekci, who had been the Chair of the Journalists’ Union of Turkey (TGS) between 
2004-2013, states that Turkey has become the biggest threat for the freedom of the press in the 
World. He highlighted the fact that even though almost 300 journalists have been released, their 
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2.5.2 European Commission reports 
 
 The press related legislation and its application in Turkey has been under international 
scrutiny over recent years for two main reasons. The first reason is the striking number of 
journalists imprisoned, which was the highest recorded number worldwide in 2012 (as mentioned 
above), and in the history of modern Turkey, which leads to serious concerns for its democratisation 
process.  The second reason is the close inspection/review of the media - state relationship executed 
by the European authorities, on the basis of Turkey’s EU accession process. It is instructive to look 
at the freedom of the press in Turkey in light of the suggestions made by the European Commission 
(EC) reports. 
 
 Turkey’s accession negotiations to the EU started in December 2005
159
, and based on these 
negotiations, Turkey was expected to fulfil certain criteria on the freedom of expression as a 
precondition for its future access to the EU. Throughout the integration process, the European 
Commission provided progress reports on Turkey, and the most striking EC Progress Report on the 
freedom of the press in Turkey was published in 2012. Emphasising the number of high-profile 
cases where human rights defenders faced individual criminal proceedings and investigations based 
on the vague and broad definition of the Anti-Terror Law.
160
 Journalists who encountered 
unreasonably long pre-trial detention periods were criticised as well as the sensitive subjects such as 
the Kurdish issue, the Armenian issue, the military’s role in governance and any other topic that 
involved opposition to the government. Based on the vague definition provided by the Anti-Terror 
Law Article 1, journalists in Turkey can easily fall under the definition of “terrorist”; therefore, they 




 European Commission Enlargement ‘EU-Turkey Relations’ <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-
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are censored from reporting on the Kurdish issue, which is critical for improving the kind of 




 The Commission states that the increase in the violations of the freedom of the press is 
alarming; because of the pressure on the press applied by the state officials and the removal of 
critical journalists (as the press sector concentrated on industrial interest rather than the free 
circulation of information)
162
, self-censorship of the press case became a common fact in Turkey.
163
 
As stated by the EC, “High-level government and state officials and the military repeatedly turn 
publicly against the press and launch court cases. On a number of occasions journalists have been 
fired after signing articles openly critical of the government.” By way of this research it is observed 
that in addition to the direct censorship of the press by the government through pressure, the press 
applies self-censorship not to contradict the government
164
 and this remains an issue, which 





 Similar to the recommendations in the previous reports, the latest EC report in 2015 stresses 
the need for respect for fundamental freedoms and rights in law and in practice
166
 by expressing 
concerns over the increasing number of journalists who are arrested, encounter detentions, judicial 
prosecutions, and experience layoffs.
167
 However, there are no measures suggested for overcoming 
the vague language of the law itself or the business relations between the government and the media 
owners as it is one of the main reasons for journalists layoffs, even though the report suggests that 
“the lack of transparency on media ownership casts doubts on the independence of editorial 
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 The most highlighting recommendation made by the commission was to observe the 
proportionality principle, as the Penal Code and Anti-Terror Law is considered by the Commission 
to still be outside the lines of ECtHR case law.
169
 The report highlighted the practice of arbitrary 
interpretation of law in combination with political pressure resulting in the dismissal of journalists 
or court cases that frequently have to be dealt with by the journalists. The commission observes that 
this leads to self-censorship of the press.
170
 In order to reduce the pressure on the press, if not 
completely to eliminate self-censorship, this report mentioned recommendations like acting against 
the intimidation of journalists, taking active measures to prevent attacks on journalists, and 
investigating threats received by the press. It also suggests that the courts must ensure that 
defamation laws are not used against the press in order to silence criticisms, be fully aware of 




 Overall, this report suggested changes to be made in the legislation, namely the 
Constitution, that would extend the protection of the right to free expression and the freedom of the 
press; however, it contributed little to the solution of the problem of how lawmakers, who are 
highly influenced by the political agents, would be motivated to change the language of law when 
trade union rights are insufficient and when journalism is becoming more of an insecure profession 




2.5.3 UN Reports 
 
 Criticism issued by the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) on the use of 
“vague” Anti-Terrorism Law to prosecute journalists in 2012 states that despite the implementation 
of the legal reform package in July 2012
173
, the measures were not improved. In its report UNHRC 
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found several provisions in conflict with the ICCPR and denounced the vague definition of 
terrorism, the extensive restrictions on the right to due process, and the immense number of 





 According to UNHRC, the “widespread use of lengthy pre-trial detention of up to ten years 
for terrorism-related offences and five years for other offences, including three one-year extensions, 
largely caused the problem of overcrowding of prisons.”
175
 Therefore, this application of Anti-
Terror law causes self-censorship of the press on covering the “sensitive topics” such as the Kurdish 
issue or opposition against the government because by doing so they face accusations of plotting 
against the government and making terrorist propaganda or being a part of a terrorist organisation. 
Ergenekon, KCK and Oda Tv cases
176
 are recent examples of how the coverage of these sensitive 
topics by the journalists can lead to accusations of belonging to a terrorist organisation or plotting 
against the government, and based on these accusations journalists face long pre-trial detentions. In 
the “Detained Journalists Report” published towards 2012, the number of journalists who are 
imprisoned in Turkey are recorded to be higher (71 journalists) than the number of journalists in 
1980 (31 journalists) when there was a military regime.
177
 In the report, these numbers are argued to 
prove the danger of the current situation in Turkey. According to the report, by the 31st of January 
2013, 70% of the detained journalists were Kurdish journalists who were accused of “co-operating 
with a terrorist organisation” based on their reporting on PKK and KCK. The rest were accused of 
belonging to outlawed leftist organisations and of being a part of plots against the government.
178
 
As also highlighted by UNHRC, the common ground for the journalists’ imprisonments were 
allegations of having connections with a terrorist organisation in relation to TCK and Anti-Terror 
Law. The evidence for the journalists’ connection with a terrorist organisation was: sharing 
information of the news with a colleague, sending the reports to be turned into news, and 
unpublished interviews. It is observed by the present author that most of the detained journalists had 
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to endure long trials and detention periods
179
, further fuelling censorship and self-censorship of the 
press.  
 
2.5.3.1 An example for convicting journalists based on the KCK operations 
 
 Journalists were sentenced for “spreading propaganda in favour of PKK organisation” 
and/or “collaborating with the Union of Kurdistan Communities (KCK)” based on their journalistic 
work. Seyithan Akyuz, who is the Southern Turkey representative for Azadiya Welat newspaper, 
which is published in Kurdish, was sentenced for keeping some copies of Ülkeye Bakis newspaper 
(banned in Turkey) and was convicted for selling newspapers in İzmir during "1 May” (MayDay) 
demonstrations. He was detained on December 7, 2009, arrested on December 10, 2009 and 
convicted on October 16, 2012. Akyuz was convicted on four different cases and sentenced to 21 
years and 9 months of imprisonment by Adana 8th Heavy Penal Court. 12 years of imprisonment 
was imposed by the Court for “being a member of KCK” and “spreading propaganda” in the name 
of PKK, despite the fact that the High Criminal Court did not allow him to defend himself in 
Kurdish and his lawyer was not authorised to inspect his file or the evidence against him because of 
the Court’s decision of secrecy for one year.  
 Analysis of Akyuz’s imprisonment under TMK 7(2) and TCK 314 (2) is significant because 
Akyuz wrote for Azadiye Welat newspaper, which holds the highest number of convicted journalists 
under TMK and TCK. Journalists who belong to Azadiye Welat have been under the pressure of 
censorship, and 8 journalists from Azadiye Welat are still under arrest in 2015.
180
  
 In his article in Tutuklu Gazete (Arrested Newspaper), which was distributed alongside 
Birgun, Evrensel, and Cumhuriyet newspapers, Akyuz emphasised the political influence of the 
journalist imprisonments in Ergenekon and KCK cases, under the title, “Nobody can be arrested for 
opposition”:  
Although, in every opportunity, the Prime Minister
181
 and government officials 
declare that we are not journalists, there are almost 70 journalists being jailed for 
carrying out their journalistic duties. The allegations against these journalists for 
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belonging to ‘illegal organisations’ such as Ergenekon or KCK or for making their 
propaganda, does not change the fact that they have been performing their 
professions as journalists. Moreover, no system would arrest opposing people 
based on the justification of them being the opposition. It would find legal frames 
and would try to make it appear legitimate by people’s perception. What we 




 By denying due process rights under 1991 Anti-Terror Law, Turkey is alleged by UNHRC 
to be going against international law standards, which raises concern about the authoritarian 




2.6 Turkey’s international obligation to protect the freedom of the press 
 
 The protection of freedom of expression and press is sustained by three main international 
agreements that Turkey is a signatory party to. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights accepts 
the right to freedom of expression and freedom of information as the two fundamental rights that 
should be exercised by people without fear and constraint. In that respect, Article 19 of the UDHR 
states that “everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom 
to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through 
any media and regardless of frontiers.”
184
 In that context, UDHR is considered to be a “declaratory 
of customary international law” by Reisman
185
 as it constitutes a basis for “moral, political and 
legal influence” for human rights; as ECHR and ICCPR also incorporate the right to freedom of 
expression since UDHR sets the principle foundation of “the post 1945 codification of human 
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 Bia News Centre, ‘Tutuklu Gazete Tarihe Not Dustu/Convicted newspaper wrote history’ (BiaMag, 25 July 2011) 
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183
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rights” as argued by Hannum.
186
 More specifically, Article 10 of ECHR states the right and freedom 
of expression, with its limitations that are only applicable by the requirement of law. 
 
 It can be observed above that the right to free expression is not absolute and can be limited 
by law if there is a necessity in a democratic society on the basis of the reasons stated in the second 
paragraph of the article. Although this right is not absolute, according to the ECHR, countries can 
only abridge this right if the expression falls under one of the categories in the second section of 
Article. The importance and application of this clause can be observed in the ECtHR verdict of 
Sener v Turkey: “Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic 
society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self-fulfilment.”
187
  
 This research points out that Turkey attempted to use this exception as an excuse for its 
censorship of the press and argued that the restriction on the freedom of the press by “unity of the 
Turkish nation and the territorial integrity of the state” falls under the category of “territorial 
integrity” specified in the second section of ECHR Article 10.
188
 Based on the application of Article 
301 to curtail freedom of expression in Turkey, Tate states that “Turkey has failed to conform to the 
Convention even in light of direct orders from the ECHR and the enticement of EU membership in 
exchange for human rights reforms.”
189
 Therefore, in light of the observations above, it is fair to 
argue that Article 301 conflicts with ECHR Article 10 and that the Turkish Courts have a narrow 
interpretation of what constitutes criticism and consider the journalists expressions and reporting as 
denigration. 
 Prosecutions under Article 301 demonstrate that Turkey does not support a fair balance 
between the individual’s fundamental right to free expression and its legitimate right to protect 
itself under Turkey’s human rights obligations under ECHR.
190
 ECHR stated that “a state may only 
restrict free expression under Article 10 section 2 where it can demonstrate a pressing social need 
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 Besides, since the EU recognised Turkey as one of its official member candidates, Turkey is 
expected to comply with international human rights standards and make reforms in order to achieve 
these standards. One of ECHR’s most important concerns is freedom of expression. Turkey needs 
to comply with its decisions as Turkey is a signatory of ECHR, and this requires respect for human 
rights which is made a sine qua non for the EU candidate countries.
192
 However, Turkey has not 
applied 1,241 verdicts of the ECtHR out of 2,400 under which it was convicted until today. 
According to these numbers, Turkey holds the second place after Italy in terms of non-compliance 
with ECtHR decisions.
193
 As observed in section 2.3.4 in this chapter, ECtHR’s decision on Dink 
has not been applied; this violates the membership obligations to the European Council, for the 
European Council member states have the obligation to apply ECtHR verdicts, which are monitored 
by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. Consequently, Turkey is under the 
obligation to settle the amount of compensation, if there is any approved by the ECtHR; to make 
legal and administrative changes in domestic law in order to prevent similar violations from taking 
place, and most importantly, to train the government officials who are responsible for applying the 
ECHR. In the case of non-application of the ECtHR verdicts by the member states, the most 





2.7 Assessment  
 
 In light of the above, this author argues that there is a strong need for a clear distinction 
between the definition of a journalist and a terrorist. Such a distinction is only possible if TMK goes 
through a reformist change: therefore, it may be argued that the language of law itself is 
questionable and is in violation of the Constitution Article 26
195
 and 13. More specifically, Article 
13 requires any restriction of freedom of expression to conform with the Constitution, democratic 
and secular order of the Republic:  
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Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted only by law and in conformity 
with the reasons mentioned in the relevant articles of the Constitution without 
infringing upon their essence. These restrictions shall not be contrary to the letter 
and spirit of the Constitution and the requirements of the democratic order of the 




  Considering that the broadly drawn TMK allows the punishment of opinions in name of 
preventing terror, the press expressing contradictory views may be tried for a terrorism offence 
regulated under TMK. Considering the inconsistency between TMK and the Turkish Constitution, it 
is possible to argue that TMK violates the Turkish Constitution Article 26 and Article 13. As Lon 
Fuller suggests, law must be “clear”, “non-contradictory” and “congruence”
197
. Therefore, from the 
language of the law it must be clear to the citizens what is prohibited, permitted and required by 
law
198
, law must not prohibit what is permitted by another, and the way law is enforced by the 
government authorities must be compatible with the language of the law.
199
  Based on these criteria, 
the analysis of TCK Article 301 and the Anti-Terror Law in Turkey, as their arbitrary application, 
the language of law and its application regulating freedom of the press in Turkey does not enable 
the press to form reliable expectations
200
 of the treatment of their actions. 
 
 It is therefore not difficult to imagine in the present circumstances that the practice of 
silencing the press based on the vague definitions and terms used in the Turkish Penal Code, Anti-
Terror-Law, and under the exception clauses of the Constitution, is not unusual for the arbitrary 
censorship of the press in Turkey. Even though section 4 of Article 301, which regulates the 
permission of the Minister of Justice to opening proceedings, was put in place to protect the 
freedom of expression and the press and even though it arguably might provide legal safeguards in 
theory, it is debatable whether it is sufficient to protect the press against the controversial 
application of this provision; moreover, as Akcakoca argues, worsening of the relations with the EU 
would hinder the purpose of such a guarantee.
201
 By means of this research it is argued overall that 
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the interpretation and application of vaguely written legal provisions in relation to the freedom of 
expression and the press depends on the mentality and approach of the political power in Turkey. In 
that regard, the current government’s lack of toleration to criticism is explained further in this study 
as the main reason for the increased number of journalists in jail as well as the increasing attitude of 
self-censorship which has become a tradition in the press in Turkey. The absence of any effective 
mechanism to ensure the protection of the press from political pressure
202
 allows the government to 
put pressure on the press. Thus it may be argued that the legal provisions examined above are used 
as mere excuses by the government to silence the press. This is where it is important to consider the 
implementation of the reforms suggested by the European Commission and various NGOs.  
 
 As observed above, most of the legal provisions that allowed censorship of the press were 
criticised for being too vague and broad. Despite the elaborate recommendations made by the 
European Commission and the NGOs, there is no movement toward changing the related law to 
manifest a more precise language that would allow broader press freedom. The constant criticism 
has not assisted in the improvement of the interpretation of the vaguely written legal provisions; 
Bulent Algan argues that it cannot be expected from the legislative bodies to write the legal 
provisions in full clarity, and the broadly or vaguely formulated ones must be interpreted by the 
judiciary for the protection of the basic human rights.
203
 More specifically, Mithat Sancar argues 
that the legal provisions, if in doubt, must be interpreted in favour of the freedoms (in dubio pro 




 This research concludes that these legal provisions need to be amended in order to comply 
with the international standards of press freedom laid by ECHR and ICCPR. Exhaustive reforms 
must be made immediately for a preferable interpretation of the constitutional rights; detailed 
suggestions are made in the recommendations section in Chapter 6. There is no doubt that these 
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 By way of this chapter, the researcher concludes that due to the broadly drawn language of 
TCK and TMK and the exceptions to free expression and press written in vague language in the 
Turkish Constitution, the legal protection provided to the free expression of the press in the Press 
Law and the Turkish Constitution falls short in preventing the frequent application of the main 
problematic Articles of TCK and TMK for silencing the opposition press in Turkey.  
 Even though the amendments to Article 301 aimed to broaden the limits of press freedom, 
this author points out the insufficiency of these changes: The Article is still being used as a basis to 
silence the press. Vagueness is still the common characteristic of both the TCK and TMK’s related 
articles limiting press freedom. This indicates the underlying intention of the lawmakers keeping 
the Article in place for penalising press opinion that falls outside the official state ideology.  
  
 The importance of judicial approach to press freedom plays an important role for the 
protection of opposing ideas against the threat of being silenced on the basis of state security in 
order to allow the elimination of TCK and TMK’s use for creating political crimes.  
  
 The fundamental right of free expression and the freedom of the press, which is incorporated 
separately and specifically in the Constitution and re-iterated in the Turkish Press Code as well as in 
the ECtHR case law, do not appear in practice. Today, journalism is more difficult in Turkey, which 
raises serious concerns about the country’s dedication to democracy. This direction clearly lacks 
respect for free expression of the press, for no concrete change is being made to enable the legal 
protection of freedom of expression for the press in Turkey: in view of the large numbers of 
journalists even today jailed under TCK and TMK, the present researcher concludes that, even 
though Turkey is a signatory party to ICCPR, UDHR and ECHR, internalisation of the right to free 
expression and press freedom as a human right remains an issue. 
 
 The next step in this is a chronological analysis of the relationship between the press and 
politics in Turkey as an explanation of the arbitrary application of Article 301 of TCK and the Anti-
Terror Law to silence the opposition press. The next chapter emphasises the mentality behind the 
controversial legal provisions in relation to the press, the sensitivities of the current government, 
and the current worsening situation of the press in Turkey. It is therefore essential to study the 
position of the press since the beginning of Modern Turkey and the impact of politics on the press 
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traditions and the freedom of the press. An elaborate analysis of this intense political influence on 
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Chapter 3 - Historical Development of Press-Politics  
Relationship in Turkey 
3.1 Introduction  
 
 This chapter explores the relationship between the press and politics throughout Turkey’s 
political history. The chronological order of this study aims to identify state and political 
intervention as the main burden to the freedom of the press, demonstrating how the press traditions 
in Turkey developed over time. 
  
 Taking into account that Turkey has not been successful in implementing reforms
206
, 
investigating the reasons for this lack of motivation for their implementation by pinpointing the 
historical elements that strongly influence the current position of the press in Turkey are instructive 
for the Turkish legislator who can be inspired to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past. This study 
is therefore essential, for Turkey is required to understand the importance of giving agency to 
freedom of the press in order to reach the democratic standards to which it aspires. Thus, to ensure 
that recommendations can be made and applied to create higher legal standards for the protection of 
the freedom of expression for the press, different political phases will be explored in relation to the 
level of censorship with the consideration of the legal provisions effective at each political stage.  
Differences in the level of press censorship during the tenure of each political party are explored 
with an extensive literature review on scholarly books and articles in combination with the 
exploration of prominent cases that hold importance for the positive and negative progress of the 
press. 
 
 Background information on the emergence of the “sensitive subjects” helps clarify why the 
press in Turkey is restricted to report on certain topics, such as “terrorism”, as specified in the 
previous chapter. In that regard, gradual legal changes that took place in relation to the rights and 
freedoms of the press are explored. In addition, the reasons why the law was broadly drawn are 
explained based on the political ideology that prioritises the protection of the state rather than 
individual rights and freedoms. In addition to the formation of the law itself, the responsibility of 
the press to adopt the role of a spokesman of the state rather than a fourth estate is also addressed in  
this chapter.  
                                                 
206
 Detailed analysis is made in Chapter 4. 
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 Last but not least, this chapter examines the role of the military’s intervention into politics, 
that also caused the occurrence/formation of the “sensitive subjects” that are restricted from the 
press coverage (by the natural reaction of the press itself and by the censorship of the press). These 
analyses are especially relevant when considering the most topical political period for the press in 
Turkey — namely the AKP period from 2002 until today. AKP’s overly suspicious beginning to its 
political life
207
 can only be understood based on the historical experiences, as this chapter also 
provides background information for the demonstration of the danger that is created by the 
combination of a press culture/trend that has been operating under censorship without the fulfilment 




3.2 First years of the Republic: the foundations of the press in Turkey 
 
 The link between the press and politics in Turkey is unique in that the press in Turkey was 
formed differently than the press in Western Europe.
208
 While the press emerged as a result of 
societal and economic developments in Western Europe, the press in Turkey was deliberately used 
by the government with the intention to control this institution, which was subjected to stronger 
influence of political powers.
209
 In that regard, during the transition into the phase of republic 
around 1919-1921, when the Independence War was taking place, the Istanbul government under 
the caliphate intended to use the press to gain support for its own policies, though this was not 
successful.
210
 The press was rather searching the truth during the transition between the Istanbul 
government
211
 and the Independence War.
212
 Consequently, the press in Turkey cannot be analysed 
separately from Turkish political history which began its one-party political period in 1923 that 
established the Republic of Turkey.  
 
                                                 
207
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 Ozbudun and Genckaya state that Ataturk and his colleagues on the road to the 
establishment of the Republic aimed to create a Western and even a European country.
213
 In that 
regard, starting from 1923 until the end of single party period, the press in Turkey was used as a 
tool for state propaganda in order to establish a Turkish society that would be governed with 
secularism and the Western values of modernism. The press in this period existed for the advocacy 




 In the process of the evolution into a republic, the founder of the Republic of Turkey and the 
first president of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk valued print press as an important agent in the 
top-down process of modernisation.
215
 On this basis, the Hakimiye-i Milliye (National Sovereignty) 
Daily and Anatolian News Agency were founded in 1920 with the purposes of disseminating 
detailed and factual information to the internal and international public on the Turkish War of 
Independence
216
 for the press operations that took place in Ankara
217
 were experiencing problems in 
the distribution of information. Anatolian News Agency therefore aimed to introduce the 




 However, in 1924, opposition groups were being formed against Ataturk as well as the 
newly established government; these were also supported by the opposition press against the 
establishment of the Republic. There were two groups in opposition to the new government in 
Ankara; the first group was sceptical about the new government even though it supported the 
Independence War, and the second group supported conservative values with an attachment to the 
caliphate.
219
 These opposition groups, in particular the second group supporting conservative values 
with a strong bond to the caliphate and the press who were in favour of the Caliphate was seen as a 
danger to national security by the founders of the Republic.
220
 This author argues that the sensitive 
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subjects that restrict the press in Turkey today
221
 originate from such conditions. Ataturk controlled 
the press to create a national unity based on a secularist, nationalist, unified, centralised 




 On the other hand, it can be argued that accepting Western values and aiming for 
Europeanisation with the recognition of secularism, rule of law and equality of the citizens required 
a top-down revolution, considering that the former authority before the establishment of the 
Republic ruled by religion on the basis of “imperial-patrimonial monarchy”.
223
 This also implies 
that the state revolution had a top-down approach, which took place on the state level rather than 
the application of change within the social structure.
224
 This research points out that the effects of 
this lack of involvement of the social integration, which set the foundations of the state in the first 
years of the Republic,
225
 are still observed today as reasons for the censorship of the press.  
 
 Despite the number of newspapers that were established in Ankara, Istanbul’s press was still 
more effective and powerful and able to censor the pro-republican press for being pro-republican.
226
  
Because of the anti-republicans’
227
 efforts to silence the pro-republican press, the “Office of Press 
and Intelligence Administration”
228
 was established to control and censor the press in Istanbul.
229
 
The present research suggests that such establishment and the censorship of the press in the initial 
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years of the newly established republic, should be interpreted differently than the censorship of the 
press today. Radical changes were taking place, and the aim of such censorship, according to 
Kabacali, was to prevent pro-monarchy publications
230






3.2.1 Imposition of a pro-government attitude on an ostensibly free press: First steps 
 
 After all, structuring a democratic system for the press started in 1923 with the removal of 
martial law and the censorship of the press. The press in Istanbul was therefore set free as there was 
no regulation for the press in 1921 Constitution Act, and the new 1924 Constitution Article 77 
regulated freedom of the press, stating that “The press is free within the limits of law. The 
supervision executed before publication is not subject to examination.”
232
 Nonetheless, the first 
intimidation toward the journalists from the new Ankara government was based on the publication 
of a letter by the opposition press
233
, sent by Indian intellectuals directed at the new government in 
Ankara advising them not to remove the caliphate. The opposition journalists who published this 
letter were tried in an Independence Tribunal
234
 and they were acquitted.
235
 The publication of this 
letter by the press before it even reached the Prime Minister was not welcomed by the government, 
and veteran journalists such as Ahmet Cevdet, Hüseyin Cahit, Velit Ebuzziya, and Lutfi Fikri. Even 
though these journalists were not charged, the court obviously intimidated the press
236
 to 
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demonstrate how determined the government was to apply the reforms.
237
 This author argues that 
the new government did not solely aim to the censor the press due to its lack of toleration to 
criticism, but for the successful application of the reforms which arguably indicated the sincerity of 
the government on the application of the reform process.  
 
 This section points out that the press was an agent for re-shaping the country whose political 
system only recently had been transformed into a republic. More than having the role of a watch-
dog over the government, the press was seen as an effective way to educate, transform and shape 
the establishment of Modern Turkey which inevitably shaped the approach of the journalists in 
Turkey to freedom of expression and press freedom. Moreover, the legislation, which prioritised 
state interest over the rights and freedoms of individuals (in this case journalists) was in conflict 
with the liberal democratic initiation which aimed to establish a Republic in which the government 
serves the public.
238
 The centralist state properties of Turkey were established during the first years 
of the Republic due to the motivation of building a new political structure that emphasised the 
“state” itself instead of “social integration”.
239
 The negative effects of this state centred approach in 
the democratisation process of the country are chronologically analysed throughout the chapter in 
relation to the missing link between the ruling elite and the people
240
 and in light of the legislation 
regulating press freedom. 
 
 
3.2.2 Single party period and the political stance of the press 
 
 The single-party period in Turkey lasted for twenty-seven years until the transition to the 
multi-party period, which only started in 1950. During this period, CHP was ruling the country with 
a state-centric ideology with heavy involvement of the Turkish military,
241
 bureaucracy, and the 
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ruling elites. Thus, the military was taking an active part in the political decision making process 
even though CHP had this responsibility.
242
 It is important to recognise the military’s role in the 
early years of the Republic, for the military interventions that took place in 1960, 1971, and 1980 
had a negative impact on the freedom of the press.  
 
 
3.2.2.1 Law for the Maintenance of Order  
 
 During the single-party period, the Law for the Maintenance of Order 
243
 (Takrir-i Sukun) 
that censored the opposition press was passed in 4 March 1925 because the Sheikh Said Riots
244
 
had put the state and the new regime under a serious threat. This new law brought restrictions on the 
press and resulted in the closure of five newspapers
245
 after the trials that took place in Tribunals of 
Independence (Istiklal Mahkemeleri).
246
 Article 1 of the Maintenance of Order stated that:  
 
All organisations, provocative or incentive enterprises and publications 
concerning any reaction, uprising or the infringement of the assembly, peace, 
tranquility, security and the order of the country is subject to be obviated by the 
government with the approval of the President. The government may entrust those 
in breach hereby to the Independence Court.
247
 
 This law was used to limit any publication that seemed to be able to harm the social peace 
and cause unrest within the society. Meanwhile, Eastern Turkey, which was under Martial Law, 
was subject to “The Censorship Regulation to be implemented in the Martial Law District on the 
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 The suppressive Takrir-i Sukun provisions only lasted five years
249
, and no journalists were 
imprisoned during the reform process, supporting the notion that even if the press was used as a tool 
to re-shape the system, the initial intention was not to limit the press freedom, but to implement the 
reforms. Accordingly, the economic support provided to the press by the government in the 
transition from Arabic to Turkish language
250
 can be considered a good example of how the new 
regime tried to establish standards that would structure the press. 
 
 
3.2.2.2 The 1931 Press Code: the first press law of the Republic of Turkey 
 
 During this twenty-seven years of CHP (Republican People’s Party) governance, the press 
was under the pressure of the state, for the first press law of the Republic of Turkey, enacted in 
1931, was based on limitations. According to the 1931 Matbuat Kanunu (The Press Law), it was 
forbidden to make publications about the caliphate, the Sultanic rule, communism or anarchism 
(Article 40) as well as publications that are considered libellous against members of parliament, the 
Council of Ministers, and government officials (Article 30).
251
 The government had the authority to 
close down newspapers that reported against the interest of the state and the nation as sanctioned in 




The newspapers and magazines can be closed down on the bases of reporting 
against the general politics of the country by the Council of Ministers, for a 
temporary time period (…) The person responsible for the newspaper which has 
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been closed down based on these reasons cannot start a newspaper under another 




 Article 50 of 1931 Press Code was criticised to be a totalitarian regulation,
254
 for “the 
general politics of the country” was a vague term to define and led to arbitrary interpretation that 
authorised the government to close down newspapers. Therefore, its application led to self-
censorship by the creation of pressure over the press rather than direct censorship.  
 
 CHP specially put extreme pressure on the newspapers who supported the Democrat Party 
toward the end of the single-party period. The most illustrative examples of such restriction on the 
press took place when the journalists, namely Adnan Duvenci, Mithat Perin, Sevket Bilgin, and 
Adnan Bilget, were arrested on the basis of publishing the speech by Democract Party leader Adnan 
Menderes criticising the CHP government in Democrat Izmir (Demokrat Izmir) and New Century 
(Yeni Asir) newspapers.
255
 On the other hand, based on this application of Article 50, Ulus (Nation) 





 The present author concludes that Article 50 of the first press law set the template for 
balancing protection of the press and the protection of state’s interests and rights, which has been 
influential until the present day. It accords clear priority to the interests of the state over the 
freedom of the press. The Minister of Interior Affair’s approach to freedom during the 1930s, when 
the press was under the strict control of the single political party
257
 (CHP) was that “the best 
freedom is the freedom that complies with the interest of the country and the character of the nation 
which protects the rights and interest of the state.”
258
 However, despite the vague language of the 
Press Law 1931, CHP considered it to allow insufficient government control over the press. 
Consequently, in 1935, General Management of Press and Publication was established, followed by 
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a new Press Law (Basin Birligi Yasasi) in 1938
259
, which allowed the content limitation of the 





3.2.2.3. Centrist government means centrist press? 
 
 The limitations on the press that were initiated by the two press laws enacted in 1931 and 
1938 were tightened even more during the Second World War (WW2), and in 1939 the government 
took full control of the press
261
 and was authorised to close down newspapers via telephone orders 
as the judicial bodies were edged out during the WW2.
262
 Especially during the years between 1939 
and 1945, the press in Turkey was under  strict control when the political actors even controlled 
which news would appear on which page of the newspaper with what font size.
263
 In summary, the 




 In light of this information, the present author argues that the press theory in Turkey during 
the initial years of the Republic and during the single-party period was more in accordance with 
authoritarian theory as suggested by Siebert et al: in the authoritarian theory of the press the initial 
idea of the press was to inform the rest of the society about what their rulers wanted them to know 
as well as what their rulers thought they should support. Unsurprisingly, this approach resulted in 
giving the press in Turkey a supporting role of the government policies and therefore the press’s 
main function in a democracy as a watchdog was hindered by the government censorship under the 




 During the single-party phase, modernisation of the nation was the priority, and Kamali 
suggests that this modernisation process had a nature of an imposition due to its top-down 
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 and Mardin argues that “nation state” and “centrist government” ideology has a 
strong influence on the press operations in Turkey.
267
 In a similar vein to Kamali’s ideas, Shaw and 
Shaw claim that journalists in Turkey were used as tools of the state in order to shape the society 
according to the Western values and prepare the society for modernisation, but most importantly, 
secularism. As a result, the role of encouraging the reform plans was given to the press throughout 
the establishment of the Republic until the end of the single-party phase in Turkey.
268
 On another 
note, Hughes looks at the freedom of the press at the time of the single-party period from the 
societal perspective and observes that the plans for the Republic and the modernisation process 
were imposed on society by the use of the press.
269
 His view is supported by Bek, who suggests that 
behind the accusations toward the press of being a propaganda tool
270
 is the way it was arranged as 
the state’s tool for the implementation of its own ideology during the Independence War.
271
 
Brummet and Crimmins argue that the press was kept under military and/or state control as it was 
perceived to be of national interest to have a press that followed the ideology of the state.
272
  
Therefore, this author observes that the ‘nation-state’ structure of the 1920s was used to silence the 
press on matters that did not follow the state’s official ideology.  
 
 On the contrary, Duverger highlights that the single-party system in Turkey was never based 
on the single party doctrine and never gave way to a formal monopoly of a single party with the aim 
of abolishing the liberal system.
273
 This argument is supported by Catalpas, who suggests that the 
Anatolian News Agency was established to respect people’s right to accurate information during the 
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 Based on the analysis of the opinions observed above, the researcher concludes that it is fair 
to argue that the censorship of the press during the first years of the Republic of Turkey and during 
the single party period must be interpreted differently, for the principal aim of the government was 
not to apply censorship to the press, but to use the press for the establishment of the new political 
system and the application of these restrictions were seen necessary as radical changes needed to 
take place.  In that regard, the special circumstances of the time must be taken into consideration 
before reaching an opinion on the levels of censorship on the press during the first years of the 
establishment of the Republic in Turkey. One important point to remember here is that the first 
years of the Turkish Republic set the foundations of the press in Turkey that still affect the freedom 
of the press today. The founding principles of the Turkish political theory were based on 
secularism, security of the state, national security, and the protection of the state interests which 
have been prioritised over individual rights and freedoms. The analysis of the role played by the 
press in the initial years of the Republic clarifies the grounds/motivations of today’s press ethics 
and operations as further discussed within this chapter and Chapter 4. 
 
 
3.3 Transition to the multi-party period: the emergence of the Democrat Party 
 
 There had been various attempts to begin the multi-party democratic system before the 
Democrat Party (DP) came into the picture. It was a time when the tendency of the press to have a 
clear political stance and support one or another political party revealed itself. In 1930, when the 
Liberal Republic Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası/SCF) became active, it already had its own 
supporters; Last Post
275
 and  Tomorrow
276
 started to support SCF
277









 As observed by Sapolyo, the newspaper in 
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 which is a crucial example 
of how important it was to have an opposition newspaper. The demand by society for alternative 
news was high. On the other hand, the dichotomy between the newspapers supporting the           
government (CHP) and the opposition party (SCF) was another example of how the press 
voluntarily became the spokesman of the political parties, for CHP was supported by Republic 
(Cumhuriyet), Evening (Aksam) and National Sovereignty (Hakimiyet-i Milliye), and SCF was 
supported by Last Post (Son Posta) and Tomorrow (Yarın).
284
 Considering the strong attachment 
the opposition press had with the opposition party, it is fair to argue that once SCF self-revoked, the 




 However, the most concrete step towards the beginning of the multi-party system took place 
in 1946 when the Republican People’s Party (CHP) allowed the opposition parties to be formed and 
to compete. As a result of this, Democrat Party (DP) ran the strongest competition against CHP; it 
was formed by four eminent members from CHP who were in clear opposition on the basis of 
CHP’s strict policies including the uniform economic policies that were based on an interventionist 
approach rather than liberal policies.
286
 As Yilmaz argues, although after the establishment of 
modern Turkey there has not been an attempt to establish any other economic system than 
capitalism,
287
 the expectations of a liberal economic system which reinforced private sector was not 
met.
288
 Even though the 1946 elections were a success for CHP, DP rose to power in 1950 
elections, earning 53% of the overall votes.
289
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 The 1950 multi-party period is crucial for Turkish democracy because DP came into power 
differently than did CHP; it received the support of the rural voters, the military bureaucracy and 
state centrist voters.
290
 Scholars argue that before DP, there was an “official” party that prioritised 
the political control over representing the people; this demonstrates more of a top-down approach to 
politics.
291
 On the other hand, the forming members of DP were from CHP, and they could form an 
opposition only because they were “allowed” to do so,
292
 which is criticised for not constituting a 
substantial difference than having CHP as the single party in power.
293
 Such an approach to the 
multi-party system took place after WW2, when Turkey, based on its close relations with the USA, 
was influenced by the multi-party democratic regime of the USA
294
 and the United States of 
America started to request Turkey to establish a democratic structure; this was followed by 
President Ismet Inonu’s claim to adopt a multi-party system in Turkey in 1945. As a result, DP was 
established by Celal Bayar by the approval of President Inonu. In light of this background, the 
transition into the multi-party period was seen by some scholars as the turning point for the Turkish 
democracy
295
 and by some as simply a concession by CHP to take more liberalising measures in 




 The normalisation of press freedom took place simultaneously with the normalisation of the 
political sphere. Toward the last years of the single party period, DP (main opposition) and CHP 
(the first and the only party during the single party phase in Turkey) reached a consensus on the 
abolishment of the 1931 Press Code Article 50, agreeing that such abolishment would constitute an 
important step for the democratisation process. As a result, in 1946 Article 50 of the 1931 Press 
Law, which regulated the government’s authority to temporarily close down newspapers and 
magazines,
297
 was amended, and the closure of newspapers was determined to be prerogative of the 
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 However, this amendment did not prevent the arbitrary closures of newspapers. During 
the 1950 elections, two newspapers, namely Yeni Sabah (New Morning) and Gercek (The Truth) out 
of three who published Celal Bayar’s declaration alleging the CHP government’s tampering with 




 The same years (1946-1947) also saw the beginning of commentary-based journalism in 
Turkey. Many attempts were made for the publication of leftist newspapers and magazines by 
people who had important roles to play in the development of freedom of expression in Turkey. 
Sabahattin Ali and Aziz Nesin tried to publish newspapers with leftist ideology; however, the 
government blocked each of their attempts.
300
 Sabahattin Ali had been arrested for criticising 
Ataturk in one of his poems and served his sentence for several months; he was released in 1933 in 
an amnesty granted to mark the 10th anniversary of the declaration of the Republic of Turkey. He 
was the owner and editor of the weekly Marko Paşa together with Aziz Nesin,.  (he was the 
President of the Turkish Writers Union) who had a socialist stance and was several times 
imprisoned by the State Security Courts for his criticism of the American invested capital in Turkey 
as he supported national independence. On the other hand, the government tolerated nationalist 
newspapers and magazines more willingly. These magazines could show more improvement in 
their publication history because of less government interference.
301
 The Islamic ideology was 
represented by two magazines that were originally established in 1908 but not published until the 




 1948 was another crucial year in which a newspaper emerged in conjunction with the 
formation of a new political party; the Millet (National) Party was founded by the parted/dismissed 
members of DP, on the basis that DP was not sufficient as the opposition to CHP, and stayed active 
between 1948 and 1954. Fourteen new newspapers came into print with the aim of supporting the 
development of the newly formed political parties. Therefore, each party had its own newspaper as 
its public spokesman: Nation (Ulus) and Populist (Halkci) were CHP’s key newspaper, and Zafer 
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(Victory) was DP’s means of disseminating supporter information.
303
 As a result, 1948 became a 
symbolic year for introducing partisan press.
304
 1948 also witnessed the establishment of the 
newspaper Hurriyet (Independence). Hurriyet symbolised a new press approach based on appealing 
to a wide range of people and a modern language of communication. The high number of 
circulation rates of Hurriyet demonstrated the society’s need for such journalism. Hurriyet’s 
success opened the way for modern journalism to target a mass audience and was followed by the 




 Meanwhile, the democratisation process in Turkey inaugurated the transition to a multi-
party system. Political interactions with the European countries had a positive influence on the 
democratisation process as more emphasis was placed on the people’s participation in the country’s 
governance.
306
  The most crucial political development that positively influenced the democratic 
transition of Turkey was the UN agreement signed by Turkey in 1945; it compelled Turkey to 
follow the democratic rules of the UN.
307
 This agreement resulted in the adoption of a multi-party 
system in Turkey where the Democrat Party won the elections against CHP as mentioned above, 
gaining 53.3% of the votes.
308
 Staying in  power until 1960 when the civil governance was 




 Besides the UN agreement, the beginning of closer communication with the European 
countries and a new emphasis on the people’s participation in the governance were also effective in 
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the transition to a multi-party system,
310
 which was the first major step into Turkey’s 
democratisation. The democratic system of Turkey had remained incomplete without the existence 
of an opposition party against CHP for almost three decades.
311
 For that reason, the change of 
political dynamics with the introduction of an opposition party, namely the Democrat Party is 




3.4 Democrat Party: a new phase for democracy and the press in Turkey 
 
 During the elections of 1950, the press was supportive of the Democrat Party with the 
anticipated establishment of liberal press standards through the amendment of the 1931 Press Code. 
Such expectations of the press were in response to the repressive approach of the CHP towards the 
press during the single party period for 27 years until 1950. DP’s success was based on the liberal 
ideas spread by the WW2.
313
 Besides, DP had a political agenda of democratisation through the 
liberation of the press, which gave hope to the journalists who struggled for democratic and liberal 




 The relationship between the press and  politics was highly determined by the Istanbul-
based press before and during the period of DP power. The majority of the newspaper owners were 
supportive of DP, and except for a few newspapers, the Istanbul-based press supported DP 
throughout the elections.
315
 Turkey as a whole was under the influence of the press in Istanbul that 
was ready to glorify the new democratic movement.
316
 Karakoyunlu argues that the aim of this 
support was to start a period of propaganda whereby the relationship between the press and politics 
were kept in close co-operation.
317
 The present researcher points out that the emergence of this 
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close relationship between the press and the political parties is important to understand the 
background of today’s government’s expectations of  the press and the hindrances encountered by 
the press based on these expectations.  
 
3.4.1 The liberalisation of the press in parallel to the democratisation process  
 
 In the first years of its power, DP gave priority to the freedom of the press in order to fulfil 
the democratisation expectations. On 14 May 1950, DP applied remission on all the political 
offenders and journalists. This was seen as a political purification that DP considered to be 
necessary after 27 years of CHP rule. Therefore, DP, with the first amnesty law of the multi-party 
history of the republic, made a clear inception in its political life.
318
 This atmosphere of democratic 
progress  initiated by DP during the first years of its political power, instilled the Turkish press with 
faith in the possibility of a new decree. The abolishment of the 1931 Press Code was realised by DP 
following the enactment of the new legislation 5680 Press Law on 15 July 1950, which provided 





3.4.1.1 5680 Press Code 
 
 The Law for Governing the Press was abolished, and the new 5680 Press Code embraced 
the rights and freedoms of the press. Subsequently, the authority once held by the government was 
abolished, and the newspaper closures were subjected to the court decision. The obligation to 
receive a license prior to newspaper publication was abolished; however, the responsible manager 
had to be specified in prior notification to publication. The article that restricted people with bad 
reputations from engaging in journalism was abolished.Crimes committed in relation to the press 
were to be tried by special authorised courts called Collective Press Courts (Toplu Basin 
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 designed to extend a legal guarantee to the press.
321
 Finally, the 5680 Press Code 
abolished the criminal liability of the newspaper owners based on the published articles and held the 





3.4.1.2 Law no. 5953 
 
 Besides the amendments to the Law for Governing the Press, journalists were also granted 
some employee personal rights that included the utilisation of social securities, obligation to 
contract, compensation, and paid leave
323
 under the “The Law about the Arrangement of the 
Relations between the Employees and Employers in Press”, numbered 5953 and dated 13 June 
1952. These changes brought by DP for the establishment of freer press regulations in Turkey,
324
 
faced positive and negative criticisms. The two main newspapers that supported CHP and DP had 
different views on what these amendments meant for the press. CHP’s supporter Ulus newspaper 
had reservations about the power of these amendments for making a difference and meeting the 
expectations. On the other hand, DP’s supporter newspaper, Zafer, perceived these steps as the right 
move towards the establishment of the freedom of the press.
325
 This law is still in force with 
amendments that took place in 1954 and 1961. 
 
 
3.4.2 Media ownership and the effects of economic interests on press freedom 
 
 One other distinctive transition during the DP government took place regarding the 
ownership of the press. Changing trends in the ownership of the press involved a transition from 
experienced journalists owning newspapers to businessmen intending to hold a respectable position 
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as a media owner having significant capital due to their actual professions such as ship ownership, 
mine ownership, the stock market and trade.
326
 This new trend allowed capital owners from other 
sectors to step into the press world, and these changes reflected a new approach that prioritised the 




 In this economic setting, the fealty between the press and the politics became stronger with 
the acceleration of newspaper distribution, made easier by government subsidies in the 1950s.
328
 
Yildiz observes that this financial support to the press lasted until the end of DP power by means of 
allowing bank credits and building sites, official paid announcements made by the government 
through newspapers, and the allocation of printing paper.
329
 This also allowed the news to reach the 
readers early in the morning; this impacted on the value of contents as reaching the readers before 
work became more important than the quality of news.
330
   
 
 Based on the enactment of these legal regulations and the democratic atmosphere motivated 
by DP, the number of newspapers, the scope of the newspaper contents, the number of newspaper 
readers, and the circulation rate of the newspapers rose remarkably.
331
 However, the ten years of DP 
political power, partly as the capital focused on the press ownership and partly because of the 
monetary support given by the government to some newspapers while excluding others, led to the 
polarisation of the press based on their political views. The press that did not support DP 
encountered surcharges on paper. DP’s sanctions on the press took different forms,  as a result, 
surcharges were imposed on the paper needed for the newsier printing. Leading to an increase in 
newspaper prices impacting on their circulation.
332
 The surcharges that were put on the postal 
payments, which was as high as 300 percent, were conveyed to the readers as “a way to censor the 
press” by the Ulus newspaper on 11 July 1951.  
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 Nevertheless, the biggest financial sanction applied on newspapers by DP was the official 
announcement policies. The distribution of declarations did not have a pre-set basis, and the 
newspapers that had close relations with the government could make a high income even though 
their actual sales were below the average. On the other hand, successful and wide-read newspapers 
with a high sale figures could not receive official announcements.
333
 Kudret newspaper is a good 
example of the effects of the advertisement distribution policies of DP because the government 
prevented the official announcements from being made through this newspaper, which had to close 
in 1952.
334
 This research observes that such a cooperation between the government and specific 
press outlets turned into normal press practice and tradition over time. As will be demonstrated in 
the following chapter, these days instead of government subsidies it is the business relations 
between the media owners and the government which lead to the censorship of critical journalists 
and self-censorship of the press, owing to the media owners’ fear of losing business, should their 
press outlets contradict the government’s policies.  
 
 
3.4.3 Reasons for the tension between the Democrat Party and the press 
 
 Despite the wide support DP received from the press since the first day of its opposition to 
CHP and during its initial years of political rule, tension developed between the press and the new 
government, due to the secularist’ concern about the language of prayers, which used to be Turkish 




 While the government supported the press through the subsidies mentioned above, they 
protected the pro-government press and excluded the opposition by using the publication of official 
announcements as a means of imposing pressure on the press.
336
 The circulation of given 
newspapers was highly correlated to the official government announcements. A clear example of 
this situation is given by Kologlu, who states that the Millet newspaper received considerable 
monetary support from DP government because it supported its power since the beginning of DP 
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 Nevertheless, it was not new for the press to be supported according to political 
ideology.The Ulus (Nation) newspaper received the most support during the single party period 
from CHP for its pro-CHP publications. DP supporters such as Triumph,
338





 and Latest Post
341
 received monetary support once the political power changed 
hands from CHP to DP.
342
 It is observed by the researcher that the parallelism between this 
press/politics relationship is evident in Turkey during the single party period and continued through 
DP power; reflecting heavily on press restrictions today with the tendencies of the current 
government to censor opposition.  
  
3.4.4 Changing Habits of DP towards the press 
 
 The press in Turkey, which experienced a great degree of freedom during the first years of 
the DP government, started to be subjected to censorship because of the changing political climate 
and the rise of the opposition amongst the society. DP had the impression that the opposition could 
be controlled by State pressure.  
 
 The opposition newspapers, mainly supported CHP and were excluded from DP political 
party meetings and receptions. Ulus newspaper, which was the main opponent of DP and a 
supporter of CHP, was the most obvious example for such exclusion. The government showed signs 
of respecting the rights and freedoms of  journalists  as long as they did not criticise the 
government. For example, the leading author of Ulus newspaper, Huseyin Cahit Yalcin was 
demoted from his duty of UN Palestine Arbitration Committee because of his critical comments 
against the government.
343
 This political censorship on the press during the period of DP 
government was based on the idea that the problems in the country were created by the press. This 
notion led to the government’s censorship of the press by prosecuting and imprisoning the 
journalists. Yusuf Ziya Ademhan, Selami Akpinar, Cuneyt Arcayurek, Cemil Sait Barlas, Beyhan 
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Cenkci, Bedii Faik, Tarik Halulu, Naim Tirali, Kemal Toker, Cemalettin Unlu, Oktay Verel, and 
Ahmet Emin Yalman were some of the journalists who were prosecuted and imprisoned based on 
the allegation of “making publications that harms the national interests”
344
 under Article 161 of the 
Turkish Penal Code: 
 
The person makes publication and disseminates information that is precarious 
and/or and that could harm the society’s morale or could reduce the strength of the 
county against the enemies in a way that would lead to excitement and 
precipitation amongst the society, or the person who acts in any way that could 





 The reforms came to an impasse with the suppressive actions of the government: 
specifically the amended 1950 Press Code (1953) created the offence of criticising a minister and 
regulated that it could be investigated by a public prosecutor without the requirement of a 
complaint. 1954 amendments and the new law executed alongside “Crimes committed through 
publication and radio”346 increased the penalty of imprisonment from six months to three years for 
publications that question the integrity, individuality, and reputation of one. Monetary penalties 
were imposed on journalists who committed these crimes through publication. Huseyin Cahit 
Yalcin’s imprisonment for defamation against the PM, based on this law, is one example of its 
use.347 Yalcin received 26 months of imprisonment, which was also approved by the Court of 
Appeal. However, Yalcin was released after 26 days due to extreme health conditions and as a 
result of heavy criticism from domestic and international sources. 348  Baban also criticised the 
legislation and stated that this law was a result of the PM's temperament that did not easily tolerate 
views against DP’s operations and aimed to eliminate the critical views that were galvanising 
before the 1954 elections.349 These suppressive policies of the government attracted international 
attention and led to criticism by international bodies such as International Press Institute (IPI), 
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which expressed its concerns on the situation of the press freedom in Turkey and urged the 
government to improve the conditions of journalists.350 However, such international reaction was 
seen as a threat to the internal affairs of Turkey by the PM Adnan Menderes. 351  This author 
observes that democratisation promises that prioritised the freedom of the press when DP first came 
into power in 1950 show similarities to the way the current Justice and Development Party came 
into power. Similarly, the sensitivities and undemocratic approaches adopted by the former AKP 
leader, current President R.T. Erdogan,352 shows similarities to Menderes’ reactions toward the 
democratic demands of people and the press, representing the typical manner of political 
approaches to criticism and the extent of political toleration to opposition in Turkey.353 The present 
author concludes that the PM Adnan Menderes’ dubious approach to criticism and his perception of 
opposing ideas as a threat to the regime and the political power of his government is based on the 
political ideology that prioritises the security of the state rather than the individual rights and 
freedoms. The result of the top-down approach to the democratisation process that could not be 
internalised by political agents, leading to the censorship and self-censorship of the press. 
 
 The 1954 elections, were considered DP’s first test after four years of governance. The step 
taken by PM Menderes to execute this law allowing  censorship of the press on reporting against the 
government, not only led to an escalation of pressure on the press but also caused a controversy 





 The main reason for the resolution was the highly disputed proposal of the regulation of 
the law on the right to prove,
356
 which essentially aimed to regulate a journalist’s right to prove 
his/her statement in a case if she/he faced a lawsuit.
357
 The actual aim of the amended law was to 
increase the punishment by one third or half.
358
 However, it was described by Menderes as being 
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protective of the citizens’ honours, personal rights and freedoms, which were, according to him, 




 Also, the amended Press Code in 1956 forbade the publication of parliamentary group 
discussions.
360
 Furthermore, persons who had been imprisoned for more than six months could not 
become newspaper managers, this was clear evidence of the changing habits of the government’s 
approach tow the freedom of the press. Opposing views were not only penalised but also forced 
outside the profession. The government’s most appreciated accomplishment by the journalists, 
whose support was criticised for advancing the party into the multi-party arena, was shaded by the 
government’s intolerance of opponent ideas. The DP put an embargo on reporting the events or 
protests that took place against the government, and journalists who did not obey the embargo were 
sent to Ankara high security prison. The same legislation also raised the number of years and the 
amount of monetary penalties given to  journalists who allegedly insulted others’ reputation and 
honour.
361
 It is observed by this author that reporting on events and protests against the government 
is still one of the most censored and silenced subjects. The Gezi protests which are discussed in 
Chapter 4 are a current example of journalists being imprisoned and sacked for similar reasons as 
during the DP period in the 1950s / 60s. On both occasions it was the government’s ingrained lack 
of political toleration that is caused by the official state ideology which resulted in severe 
restrictions being placed on the individual rights and freedoms of journalists.  
 
 The course of these events led to the government taking extreme actions toward the press, 
and in between the years of 1955-1960, 867 journalists were imprisoned as a result of 2300 press 
trials.
362
 Huseyin Cahit Yalcin, who was the first journalist imprisoned, accused for his articles in 
Halkci newspaper in 1954.
363
 He was followed by veteran journalists Cemal Saglam, who received 
a sentence of sixty five months of imprisonment, Nihat Erim, who received a heavy fine of 35,222 
Turkish Lira, the owner of Millet newspaper Fuat Arna, who was sentenced to eight months of 
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 Mustafa Tokmak, ‘Basın-İktidar İlişkileri Çerçevesinde Demokrat Parti Ve Ankara Radyosu/Democrat Party and 
Ankara Radio in Relation to Press and Government Relations’ (Master Thesis, Hacettepe Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri 
Ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, 2007)  
360
 Nuran Yildiz, ‘Demokrat Parti Iktidari (1950-1960) ve Basin/Democrat Party Power(1950-1960) and the Press’ 
1960) Ankara University Seminar Paper, Turkey’s Political Problems 481, 494 
361
 Cem Erogul, Demokrat Parti Tarihi ve Ideolojisi/Democrat Party and Its Ideology (Imge Kitabevi, 2003) 61 
362
 Orhan Kologlu, Osmanli’dan Gunumuz Turkiye’de Basin/Press in Turkey From Ottoman Until Today (Iletisim 
Yayinlari, 1992) 69 
363
 Huseyin Cahit Yalcin was a critical journalist, author and politician. He was a member of parliament until 1954; 
however, his parliamentary immunity was canceled because of his article in Ulus newspaper in 1952, and because he 
published the articles against the policies of DP, he was charged twenty-six months imprisonment for defamation. 
Page | 88  
 
imprisonment, and Bedii Faik, Metin Toker, Cuneyt Arcayurek, Nizamettin Nazif, and Orhan 
Gokce, who were arrested with the allegations of defamation against Mukerrem Sarol who was a 
minister of state. Because of this extreme situation, Journalists Union held a meeting and suggested 
that making amendments to the Press Code was a necessity in support of press amnesty. 
Considering the “possible” effects this declaration could have on the courts where the journalists’ 





3.4.5 Underlying reasons for the DP’s change of attitude towards the press  
 
 Apparently, the government, instead of paying attention to the problems of the journalists in 
search of a solution, chose to strengthen its control over the press in response to other crucial events 
such as the Cyprus issue
365
 and the 6-7 September incidents. The Turkish people were disturbed by 
the emergence of the Cyprus issue on the international platform, leading to negative reactions 
against the Greek people living in Turkey/Istanbul. Mass protests took place on the 6th of 
September 1955 against the news falsely reporting that Ataturk’s house in Selanique was partly 
harmed by a bombing. These protests turned into attacks against the houses and workplaces of 
Greek people living in Istanbul; shortly followed by attacks on churches and graveyards. The 
insufficiency of police interference and the wide social unrest caused by the attacks on the non-
Muslim community in the 6-7 September incidents led to a declaration of martial law by the 
Democrat Party in Istanbul, Izmir, and Ankara, which brought about a phase of prohibitions, and 
harsh criticism from the opposition for failing to restore order. The newspapers that received 
embargoes were Ulus, Hurriyet, Tercuman, Hergun, Medeniyet, Dunya and Vatan which received 
daily orders on what to cover. In cases where such orders were considered to be insufficient by the 




  However, once the amendments to the press code were revealed, they were severely 
criticised for leading the country towards a “police state”; nevertheless, Menderes responded to 
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these arguments by defending the changes as being the only way to maintain social order.
367
 
Various segments of society were criticising the DP government for having authoritarian tendencies 
despite its success in the 1954 elections in which it won on 57.61% of votes. Its policies were found 





3.4.6 Legislation no. 6733: “Lost freedom of the press”  
 
 At the end of martial law, which lasted for one year in Istanbul, (the base of most of the 
newspapers) the press faced another barrier to freedom of expression. Legislation no. 6733             
included amendments to the previous legislation on “some offences committed through publication 
and radio” (Legislation no. 6334) and received a new name: “some offences committed through 
publication, radio or at meetings.”
369
 The new law was seen as the abolition of press freedom by the 
journalists as highlighted by the International Press Institute (IPI), which claimed that such 
regulations were no different than martial law. Forbidding reporting news that could create panic 
among the society or any tension that takes place within the political party, giving more 




 Amendments regulated the scope of the rights to controvert and rebut, thus meeting the 
criteria for publishing responses and corrections were made more onerous for the press. It 
criminalised reporting confidential meetings, decisions made as a result of these meetings, and 
detailed explanations that could cause excitement in society that would impair moral order. It also 
compelled the publication of response and readjustment letters.
371
 It forbade the publication of notes 
from confidential meetings, confidential investigation and judicial commentaries on these 
investigations.
372
 Metin Toker, Yusuf Ziya Ademhan, Adnan Duvenci, Ziya Hanhan, Ratio Tahir 
Burak, Kasin Gulek, Ibrahim Cuceoglu, Sinasi Nahit Berker, and Nihat Subasi were among the 
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journalists who were prosecuted in 1956 after the enactment of this law
373
 for the “publication of 
notes taken from confidential meetings and leading to excitement that would disarray the morals 
and order of the society”. The DP government decided to enact this law after the journalists 




 The discussions based on Legislation no. 6733 in the parliament revealed the view of PM 
Adnan Menderes, who stated that it was a mistake to give freedom to the press when he first came 
into power in 1950.
375
 This declaration supports the previous observation of the present author that 
the DP allowed the rights and freedoms of the press to be used only in conditions that did not 
contradict the government and stayed in the borders of non-opposition. 
 
 Ahmad and Ahmad discuss the effects of this legislation and the stance of the PM as a solid 
ground for the self-censorship of the press because journalists avoided expressing their opinions on 
the matter.
376
 Self-censorship was manifested by the journalists upon this legislation which was 
considered by Turan Gunes as “violent law that transforms the government into a police state.”
377
 
Another approach toward the journalists’ silence on the legislation came from Muserref Hekimoglu, 
according to whom the capital position of the press led to a reaction based on self-interest. 
Hekimoglu, in his criticism, wanted to attract attention to the fact that the newspaper owners were 
not interested in the rights and freedoms of the press, and therefore by definition not the people’s 
right to information but only reacted because the new law was against their financial interests. He 
stated that the newspaper owners could not join forces against the 6733 legislative provisions 
because they thought that if one newspaper decided to protest by not dispatching newspapers for 




 The law about holding meetings and peaceful demonstrations, enacted in 1956, limited the 
operations of political parties by prohibiting them from holding meetings except during election 
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 and gave police the authority to shoot
380
 during the peaceful demonstrations that gathered 
without any prior permission needed.
381
 It was heavily criticised by Osman Bolukbasi, who 
requested the DP to be honest with its intentions and openly declare the name of the new regime 
that was being formed
382




3.4.7 Direct impact of the political insecurity on the freedom of the press 
 
 In 1957, the DP could not experience similar success as in previous elections. Winning the 
election, despite losing a considerable percentage of votes and the country’s economic problems 
resulted in a government even more intolerant to criticism. The political insecurity of the DP caused 
by fear of a possible military intervention and DP’s will to keep its political power had a direct 
impact on the freedom of the press. Throughout 1957, journalists faced physical violence as the 
police  were given authority to cosh protestors including journalists who tried to cover and 
disseminate the incidents.
383
 Sanctions and allowance cuts resulted in even heavier criticism from 
the opposition press.
384
 Clashes between the opposition press and the DP led to an extensive 
suppressive climate in the country, and by 1957 the pressure on the press had reached its peak. As a 
result, between 1954 and 1958
385
, 1161 journalists were investigated and 238 of them were 
convicted.
386
 It was forbidden for the press to cover the protests that took place in the country and to 
criticise the government’s violent reactions. Between the years of 1957 and 1960, the DP’s attempts 
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to silence the opposition caused a greater reaction among the opposition groups, and the majority of 
the press that supported the DP in the first elections opposed the party during this period.
387
 The 
oppressive behaviour of DP turned into violence toward the end of its third period, between 1957 
and 1960, the police used physical violence against journalists, as a result the Union of Journalists 




 Finally, this author argues that DP’s aim of democratisation in press functions before it 
came into power
389
 formed suitable grounds for the press to fulfil its two crucial duties; namely, 
disseminating information and adopting the watchdog role in the initial years of the DP 
government. However, these roles of the press had started to be seen as a danger/threat toward its 
political power by the DP, which led to the censorship of the press. 
 
 
3.4.8 The significance of the multi-party period for Turkey’s democratisation 
 
 The 1950s and the DP period is significant in Turkish political history for being the first 
multi-party phase of Turkish politics considering that it formed the first step of democratisation in 
the country. However, the desired means of democracy was not established in the transition to the 
multi-party democracy, for since the DP was elected as the ruling party in 1950, the CHP used the 
military and bureaucratic aggression toward the DP, preventing smooth communication between the 
two parties.
390
 DP’s lack of toleration towards opposition, which became more apparent after the 
1954 elections,
391
 and the CHP’s use of military power in case of the DP’s “activation of 
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 hindered democratisation and the establishment of liberal press standards in 
Turkey. 
 
 Finally, an analysis of this period demonstrates the direct effects of politics on freedom of 
the press in Turkey. The traditions on which the press was based during the formation of the 
Republic appears to have applied to the political reactions towards the press; despite the efforts of 
press liberalisation in the initial phases of its power, the DP did not show tolerance to opposition 
and chose to silence the press through the controversial legal provisions as observed above. The 
top-down approach of modernisation/democratisation also indicated that one of the fundamental 
criteria, “freedom of expression”, was not fully internalised even by the DP despite its ostensible 
democratic agenda and motives for improving the rights and freedoms of the press. However, the 
question remains whether the DP would cease pressure on the pressor impose more challenges to 
the freedom of expression, without military intervention. Such a possibility is discussed in Chapter 
4 based on AKP’s reactions to the press, who had started its political life with similar promises to 
the DP and  made numerous democratic and judicial reforms with the motivation to accelerate the 
EU accession process. In order to understand fully the current issues experienced by the press in 
Turkey today, which attracts the attention of the international community, it is necessary to examine 
the historical elements more extensively. On that account, this chapter will continue exploring the 
influences of the military interventions on the press, which took place in ten year intervals in 1960, 




3.5 1960 military coup 
 
3.5.1 Military pressure on DP 
  
 Despite the liberal ideology DP adopted during the initial years of its power, the DP’s strict 
course of action in combination with TSK’s secularist concerns formed the grounds
393
 for TSK’s 
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military intervention, which brought the end of the civil governance for a period of three years in 
Turkey. In relation to the press censorship during the DP government and its effects on the military 
coup, Arikanoglu suggests that “the first way of oppressing any opposition group was enactment 
and enforcing it on the press. The tension increased when the same methods were applied 
continuously and the issue was carried onto the international platform. The miscommunication and 




 The Commission of Inquiry (Tahkikat Komisyonu),
395
 established in 1960 by the DP, was 
authorised to prevent the printing and distribution of newspapers and magazines that did not comply 
with the government-led embargo. The commission was also able to close down the publications 
that did not obey these decisions. The newspapers could no longer report on the sessions of 
parliament after the commission started to operate.
396
 The special authority afforded to the 
commission was perceived by the opposition as pressure to silence the divergent ideas. Closures of 
the printing houses were used as a means of punishment.
397
 The Commission of Inquiry lacked 
legitimacy because it clearly violated Article 20 of the Constitution, which states that “all sessions 
of parliament are open sessions.”
398
 However, this clause did not prevent the government from 
interrogating editors, journalists, and the responsible persons of the printing houses with strong 
views against the government.
399
 Through the last elections before the coup d’etat in 1960, when 
the government was facing rumours of a possible coup. The PM rejected taking steps to put the 
army out of action, for the high ranking officers
400
 repeated their loyalty towards the government.
401
 
The PM’s rejection of taking action against the army was based on his trust in the credibility of 
these military officers but most importantly on his faith in the public’s support, which was revealed 
through the elections in 1950 (55,2%), 1954 (57,61%), and 1957 (47,87%). The PM, based on 
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public’s support, rejected the suggestions by the DP’s plenary assembly for a revision in the 
cabinet, the motion given by 90 MPs to abolish the commission of inquiry ;— to call for an early 
election and to take action against the tension within the army toward the DP.
402
 Finally, putting an 
end to the highly controversial Commission of Inquiry’s operations. The government failed to 
prevent military intervention, which took place on the 27th of May 1960 based on strong secularist 
concerns. The Turkish army/military removed the DP from power
403
 by declaring a coup d’etat over 
the radio made by Alparslan Turkes (who then became the leader of Nationalist Movement Party 
between 1969-1997). 
 
 It is fair to argue that social and economic unrest, which started to take place in 1954, also 
contributed greatly to the coup d’etat in 1960. Internal and external national debt disbursements 
were delayed, and the DP government had built the economy on the external national debts and 
credits raised by USA.
404
 A group of DP supporters in the army lost enthusiasm for the DP after the 
government’s decision to change the language for the call to prayer from Turkish to Arabic and the 
harassment of the CHP party leader Ismet Inonu (whom the army held in great esteem) by the 
Democrat Party members. The army was also nervous about the DP’s intention to merge military 




 Stagnation of manufacturing trade and a foreign exchange shortage, concurrent with the 6-7 
September (1955) incident, had an impact on the growing unrest within the government and the 
country. Another reason put forward by the army to bring the DP down, was the DP’s decision to 
join the Korean War. However, this decision was not opposed by any institution in Turkey except 
CHP whose objection was based on the fact that it was decided without consulting the 
parliament.
406
 The Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, as a result of these developments and the rising 
tension within the DP, lost the support of his cabinet. The fear of a military intervention alongside 
losing the support of his party led the PM to take measures to protect himself and his party’s power. 
This formed one of the reasons why the government, with the addition of two more articles to the 
1954 Press Code, aimed to prohibit opponent publications, and as a result journalists such as Mertin 
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  After the coup, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Fatin Rustu Zorlu, and Hasan Polatkan 
were executed by the military. Their execution was based on Turkish Penal Code Article 146 which 
regulated high treason
408
 by “any person who attempts to change or revoke the Fundamental 
Organisation Act (the Turkish Constitution) partly or fully, or attempts to dissolve the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly. Partially or entirely avoids performance of the legislative organs by 
using force or threat, is punished with the death penalty.”
409
 This execution proves the undeveloped 
democracy in Turkey,
410
 for the Court’s decision contradicts the 1924 Turkish Constitution Article 
17 that protects the “parliamentary immunity”: “no member of parliament is liable for his/her vote 
within the Parliament, deliberation and declaration. No member of parliament is liable for 




 Continuing its role as self-appointed protector of secularism and democracy, the Turkish 
military once again followed the top-down approach to democratisation, ironically, interfering with 
democratically elected political party operations. This irony was expressed by Ahmad’s claim that 




 Heper and Tachau suggest that securing the homogeneity of the population with the focus 
on protecting “Turkishness” has been the self-appointed duty of the Turkish military (TSK). On 
these grounds, their political influence is emphatic. Observing the number of convicted journalists 
who report on the Kurdish issue in Chapter 3, the TSK’s emphasis on “Turkishness” and the 
civilian governments in the following years of the modern period in Turkey, precipitating the 
suppression of any other ethnic or otherwise identity,
413
 becomes obvious.   
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3.5.2 Effects of the coup d’etat on press freedom 
 
 The press, which played a crucial role in DP’s accession to power in 1950, was supporting 
the opposition (CHP) in 1960 through provocative publications against the government.
414
 The 
press did not take a stance against the military intervention but rather supported the coup d’etat,
415
 
because it considered the military coup as a necessity for the improvement of its conditions. The 
newspapers that criticised the military intervention, however, were censored and closed down. 
 
 The 1961 Constitution was enacted as a result of the ruling politicians’ will to adopt a 
democratic political system, a new constitution incorporated individual rights, civil liberties and 
freedom to form associations. 
416
 Freedom of the press was regulated by Article 22 accordingly: 
 
The press is free; must not be censored. The state takes the necessary measures to 
allow the freedom of the press and the right to information. Freedom of the press 
and the right to information can only be restricted on the basis to protect national 
security, morals in the society, reputation of individuals, to prevent the 
provocation to crime and for the appropriate operation of the judiciary, by law. 
Embargo cannot be brought on the press for the judicial operations unless it is 
stated by law for the appropriate operations of the judiciary. Suppressing the 
papers can only be allowed by the Court’s decision, based on law which regulated 
the prevention of crimes stated above. Newspapers and magazines in Turkey can 
only be ceased based on the conviction of the crimes regulated in the article 57 
with the Court’s decision.
417
 
 The most striking freedom endorsed by the 1961 constitution was the freedom held by the 
leftist groups to be able to form parties, giving way to a different/new political ideology other than 
the one pre-dominantly applied since the establishment of the Republic.
418
 Nevertheless, these legal 
changes found grounds in practice by the press, and political parties reserved the use of the new 
                                                 
414
 Umit Ozdag, Menderes Doneminde Ordu-Siyaset Iliskileri ve 27 Mayis Ihtilali/Military-Politics Relationship 
During Menderes’ Period and 27 May Coup (Boyut Yayin Grubu, 2004) 144-148 
415
 Gurhan Savgi, ‘Turkiye’de Askeri Darbeler ve Basinin Tavri (1946-1997)/Military Coups in Turkey and the 
Reaction of the Press (Master Thesis, Istanbul University 2006)  
416
 Feroz Ahmad, The making of modern Turkey (London and New York: Routledge, 1993) 129 
417
 Suna Kili and A. Seref Gozubuyuk, Türk Anayasa Metinleri (Senedi İttifaktan Günümüze)/Turkish Constitution 
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civil rights and liberties for the benefit of their governments or the state.
419
Yet again indicating the 
harm caused by the mindset that prioritises the state interests rather than the protection and 
promotion of individuals rights and freedoms, to benefit society and the inconsistency between the 
language of law and its application.   
 
 On another note, it is important to discuss the role of the press owners on the censorship of 
the press due to the monopolisation within the press sector, given that newspapers were owned no 
longer by journalist families  but by business monopolies. A most telling example of this is the 
“nine boss incident” that took place in 1961 after the Law no. 212 on Opinion Workers
420
 had been 
passed. It is possible to see from this example that as the law enlarged the limits of press freedom, 
the press owners were not satisfied with the new regulations and therefore decided not to publish 
their newspapers for three days. Law no. 212 was enacted on 10 January 1961, which regulated the 
journalists’ rights as “workers of ideas” with amendments and additions to the Law no. 5953 
regulating “The relations between the ones who work for press and the owners.” Newspaper owners 
protested the law and tried to prevent its enactment. On the 10th of January 1961, the newspapers 
Akşam, Cumhuriyet, Dünya, Hürriyet, Milliyet, Tercüman, Vatan, Yeni İstanbul, and Yeni Sabah 
published a common declaration stating that the newspapers will be closed for three days. In 
opposition to this, Istanbul Journalists Federation started publishing a newspaper called “The Press” 
in order to communicate to readers the message that they did not agree with this closure. “The 
Press” was published between 11 January to 14 January with the message: “freedom to the press”, 
which follows: 
 
The newspaper owners who did not decide to close down their newspapers even 
during the dark days where our basic rights and freedoms are seriously restricted 
will not be remembered well in history for closing down for three days as a 




 The disagreement between the press owners and press workers and the different  focus 
points of their reactions (press owners prioritising their interests rather than the rights and freedoms 
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of the press workers), sets in relief the importance given to the ethics and people’s right to 
information. This also appears to become one of the main problems facing the press in Turkey. 
Since the media ownership has seemed solely based on making business, the journalistic concerns 
have been sidelined. This has had profound negative effects on the democratisation process of the 
country because the press owners were not willing to protects their workers’ and people’s right to 
information as much as they did their own economic interests.  
 
 However, the press owners were under strict control of the government as their paper 
allocation were decided by the DP. The government halved the paper allocation of Hurriyet422 for 
reasons such as tension between the owner of the newspaper and the government. 423  These 
politically driven decisions and limitations created an economic burden on the owners, who were 
left with no choice but to support the government, or at least not to oppose its policies. The 
approach of the press that was desired by the government was summarised by the Manisa MP of 
DP, Sezai Akdag: “it was unacceptable that even the newspapers such as Izmir, Hurriyet and 





3.6 Political and ideological changes before, during and after 1971: the second 
military intervention into politics 
 
 The transition to civilian rule after the 1960 military intervention into politics changed the 
shape of politics in Turkey.
425
 Such intention revealed itself clearly in the 1960s and 1970s when 
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 In the 1961 elections, notwithstanding that the military preferred the CHP as the only party, 
the CHP had to form a coalition with the DP’s successor, namely the Justice Party (AP).
427
 
Needless to say, the TSK was not satisfied with this result and maintained heavy control of the 
politics. Constitutional changes allowed military officers to be in close communication with civilian 
rulers under the aegis of the National Security Council, which was formed to put the civilian 
politician under the responsibility of taking the military commanders’ views on security matters into 
consideration when making decisions. As the broad definition of “security” included possible 
domestic and international threats, it is fair to argue that the commanders had control over a wide 




 TSK’s control over politics became apparent when “the military ultimatum”, widely known 
as 12 March Memorandum (coup by memorandum) was declared. This declaration was justified by 
the military based on the fact that democracy was disrupted by the problems in forming the 
government,
429
 as Demirel’s (AP) and Ecevit’s (CHP) refusal to cooperate, fuelled partisanship 
among the masses.
430
 More crucially, the left-right wing student clashes, which took a violent turn, 
could not be combatted by PM Demirel, and were even worsened by his government’s 
inefficiency.
431
 The political pressure Suleyman Demirel felt was based on the 1960 coup that took 
down the previous prime minister Adnan Menderes, who chose to deal with student clashes 
roughly.
432
 The TSK argued that the intervention was necessary for the protection of ideological 
integrity within the country.
433
 As a result, the second military intervention, which was designed to 
defeat the leftist movement, once more reversed the democratisation process in the country. The 
1961 Constitution was amended, on the basis that the civil and political freedoms it embraced could 
not effectively be ‘controlled’ by the political elites. 
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  The changes made to Article 22 of the 1961 Constitution introduced broad and vague terms 
that related to the restriction of the press. The changes regulated that “the press and the right to 
information can only be restricted by law in order to protect the integrity of the country, the nation,  
public peace, morals, national security, privacy, and to prevent defamation against one’s personal 
rights and freedoms. Also, to prevent encouragement of crime and to ensure the effective 




 1971  saw changes to the 5th and the 6th clauses of Article 22  allowing the seizure of 
newspapers and magazines as well as their closure on the authority of a court’s decision. A decision 
based on the determination of a perceived threat to the integrity of the country and the nation, 




 These changes restricted the 1961 Constitution’s press-related articles which were argued to 
involve one of the most detailed and liberal regulations on freedom of the press in the world.
436
 The 
1961 Constitution Article 22 regulated that the press and the right to information could not be 
restricted even by law and no embargo (unless exceptions are clearly specified) could be put on 




 As a result of the 12 March military memorandum, Demirel resigned and military rule 
continued until the 1973 elections during which Demirel’s party (AP) was not prevented by the 
military from joining.
438
 Following that, between 1973 and 1977, Turkey was run by coalition 
politics; the Justice Party (AP), under the leadership of Demirel, lost support, and despite the 
majority of the votes earned by the CHP in 1977, it continued its opposition role as it experienced 
difficulty finding a coalition party, while the AP formed a coalition with the right wing parties
439
, 
lasting for three years.
440
 While there was a clear divergence between the AP and CHP in terms of 
right and left ideologies, two new parties from the right emerged, namely Nationalist Action Party 
(MHP) and the National Salvation Party (NSP). Although the majority of the voters supported the 
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CHP and AP, political and ideological polarisation in the country led to clashes between the 
extreme left and extreme right ideologies towards the end of the 1970s.
441
 The execution of Deniz 
Gezmis, Huseyin Inan and Yusuf Aslan (prominent left-wing political figures who were committed 
Marxist-Leninists and enjoyed widespread support among students and other members of society) 




 Tachau explains the background of the 1980 military coup by highlighting the escalated 
tension between the CHP and AP under the leadership of Bulent Ecevit and Suleyman Demirel. The 
reflection of this ideological division between these two leaders and/or parties, and the mounting 
tensions in the streets based on ethnic (Turkish-Kurdish), religious (Alevi-Sunni) and ideological 





3.7 1980 Military Coup 
 
 Despite the civil violence, economic breakdown, and  high rate of political killings (as high 
as twenty killing per day during the first half of 1980
444
), the military intervention took place based 
on TSK’s secularist concerns. The National Salvation Party was considered to be a clear threat to 
the secular movement and the aim of democratisation in Turkey,
445
 especially after the party 
organised a politically provocative gathering during which brimless headgear, which was forbidden, 
was worn and participants refused to sing the national anthem. What precipitated the 1980 Military 
Coup was the failure of the coalition regimes. However, the National Salvation Party, which had 
religious orientations under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, was one of the main concerns of 
the Generals. This concern was based on NSP’s success in the political arena in the 1970s as it 
formed the coalition with a number of governments during this period. The party under the 
leadership of Erbakan received the support of mostly conservative business people because it 
emphasised industrialisation as well as providing voters from poorer backgrounds with an assurance 
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of social welfare by cutting down inflation.
446
 The dangers that, according to the Generals’ view, 
were threatening Ataturk’s principles were NSP’s potential to shape education and foreign policy 
with a religious agenda that seemed against secular national and state interests.
447
 These concerns, 
combined with the ineffective policies of the government to disentangle the violence in 
Southeastern Turkey, created the impression among the senior military officers that the civil 
governance was unable to sustain order
448
.The armed radical right and leftist groups and the 
conflicts between them were seen as a threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity that needed to be 
combatted.
449
 These were considered to be sufficient reasons for the 1980 military coup to take 
place. Most importantly, the military officers did not consider the government authority sufficient 
due to the 1961 Constitution, which lacked efficiency in terms of providing authority to the 
governments despite the amendments in 1971
450
.As discussed by Tachau and Heper, Governmental 
authority was of great importance to Turkey’s political culture.
451
 Finally, NSP were closed as a 




 It was the longest period of military rule, for after the coup the military stayed in power for 
three years until Kenan Evren was “elected” president for seven years during which he was 
authorised extensive political powers, which could not be subject to any judiciary action.
453
 This 
allowed the strengthening of executive powers against the judiciary. Accordingly, the new 
Constitution adopted in 1982 included Article 15, which stated that “no allegation of 
unconstitutionality can be made in respect of laws, law-amending ordinances and act and decisions 




 The most crucial difference between the 1980 military coup and the 1960 and 1971 military 
interventions is the intention of the military to maintain its power; this was based on the intention to 
change the attitudes that caused the perceived climate of anarchy that dominated the country in the 
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late 1970s. In light of this context, it is possible to argue that as opposed to the 1960 military 
intervention, the 1980 military coup brought about a state-centric ideology with heavy political 
controls which meant reverting to the centralisation of power.
455
 The 1980 coup established a period 
of demanding obedience — the consequence of rewritten political rules, a new constitution, new 
Political Parties Act and a new election law.  
 
 One of the initial actions was to make changes in the Martial Law,authorising Martial Law 
commanders to apply heavy restrictions on the press Article 3(c) allowed military officers to control 
any sort of publication made by any means; they could limit, seize, censor, or close the publication, 
including any sort of magazine, newspapers and books.
456
 In 1982, amendments made to the same 





 The country was under the governance of the Chief of the General Staff General Kenan 
Evren, who became the Chief of State as head of the National Security Council with expanded 
powers, and the Navy Chief Bulend Ulusu who was appointed Prime Minister. As the military took 
control, all political activity was forbidden and the political party leaders were put under restraint. 
The 1982 constitution allegedly aimed to give the electorate freedom of expression.458 Ironically, it 
was the 1982 Constitution that set the 10% threshold (in European countries such threshold changes 
between 0% and 5%) that blocks the minor parties from gaining seats in parliament. In practice, the 
first time this threshold was not applied, was during the elections of 1 November 2015. 
 
 The Turkish constitution that is in force today was drafted and implemented in 1982, and 
was written under the directions of military officials based on the intentions explained above. It 
therefore differed significantly from the 1961 Constitution, which was based on liberal ideas.
459
 
Similarly, the 1950 Press Code was amended, collective press courts were abolished, and foreign 
publications were subject to stricter restrictions under the inspection of the Council of Ministers.
460
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 In light of this context, the 1982 Constitution was accepted in a popular referendum, 
including extensive powers to the National Security Council, meaning the military. On that basis, 
Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution regulated the obligations of the council of ministers as follows: 
“the council of ministers are obliged to prioritise the decisions of the National Security Council 
concerning  necessary measures for the protection of the existence and independence of the State, 
the unity and indivisibility of the country and the security and peace of the society.”
461
 On the other 
hand, Article 103 of the Constitution gave extensive powers to President Kenan Evren. These 
powers included safeguarding the security and integrity of the country, the indivisibility and 
integrity of the nation, the rule of law, the unconditional sovereignty of the people, and finally the 
secular Republic, which was built on the foundations of Ataturk’s principles, as well as public 




 Nevertheless, the 1982 Constitution, despite the secularist concerns of TSK, included 
Article 24, which promoted religious instruction and moral education in primary and secondary 
schools with the aim of fighting the emergence of anti-systemic ideologies such as Marxism-
Leninism and fascism.
463
 This represented the birth of Turkish-Islamic synthesis in Turkey, which 
profoundly affected political ideologies. Tanel Demirel argues that the military promoted Islam as 
an antidote against communism,
464
 which the TSK deemed to be one of the biggest threats to the 
well-being of the Turkish state. 
 
  Overall, these changes gave rise to the legal system which brought heavy limitations to the 
press in combination with the Turkish Penal Code, which was based on the outmoded Italian Penal 
Code of 1889. In that regard, by way of this research it is observed that the 1982 Turkish 
Constitution, which remains in force,
465
 incorporates reflections from a past that was encoded with 
the military mindset after the coup d’etat. Prioritising state interests and Kemalist ideology,
466
 
resulting in limitations on the freedom of expression and of the press, enforced by the state. 
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 The press was used as a propaganda tool by the state to prepare society for a possible 
intervention into civil governance. On that note, it is possible to argue that the press before and 
during the 1980 coup was supportive of the coup, mainstream newspapers such as Hurriyet, 
Milliyet, Cumhuriyet, and Tercuman followed the same pattern , including headlines emphasising 
chaos in the country that could not be controlled by the civil governments.
467
 Accordingly, 
newspaper headlines followed a similar pattern by giving the number of losses during the clashes 
between the right and left wing; Milliyet’s suggests that 25 people were killed by anarchist incidents 
and published a report on the last 8 months of the Demirel government stating that ten people lost 
their lives every day,
468
 Cumhuriyet suggests this was due to the inefficiency of the government.
469
 
This style of reporting continued throughout the post-coup period when the press were making 
publications supporting the military intervention. Hürriyet newspaper reported the coup with the 
headline, “The result of terror: the rule is in the hands of the National Security Council - Carrying 
on the road of Ataturk.”
470
 The ideology enforced by the military rule did not allow opposing 
commentary  in the news. The magazines and newspapers that disagreed with the military 
intervention were being seized and closed based on the changes that provided extensive authority to 
the commanders. Newspapers such as Democrat (Democrat), Hergun (Every Day) and Aydinlik 
(The Light) were closed down. Newspapers such as Cumhuriyet, Tercuman, Gunaydin, Gunes, 
Milliyet, and Hurriyet were seized many times with a number of journalists being detained and 
imprisoned for making publications in opposition to the military power; the duration of their 




 Given this background of TSK’s intentions for the coups, there is a recurring argument 
stating that throughout the political history of Turkey, none of the military interventions explained 
above aimed to establish a military regime that would be permanent. The military interventions 
were meant to protect the state and the nation based on the Kemalist ideology and to support the 
“democratic order.” This common pattern is justified by the fact that none of the military 
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interventions lasted long, and power was returned to the civil governments once the perceived threat 
was eliminated.472 The literature unanimously agrees that protecting the secularity of the nation and 
sustaining the Kemalist democracy have always been the ultimate reason for all Turkish military 
interventions. The Turkish military has acted as a modernising entity, having carried this duty since 
the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey. Promoting civil governance 
prevents the TSK from being like any other military interventions such as the ones that took place 
in South America, the Middle East or North Africa.473 However, Harris, in opposition with scholars 
who suggest that the Turkish military did not intend to maintain power after the 1960 military coup, 
argues that the constitutional and legal amendments were put in place in 1960 by the generals to 
reinforce their political power. He supports his idea suggesting that thirty-five articles of the 
constitution (and its additional nine temporary articles) enabled ongoing supervision of the civilian 
government by the military on the grounds of safeguarding public order, national unity and security, 
and increased the freedom of self-rule of the military.474 This author concludes that the danger of the 
emphasis put on national security and unity was visible through the restrictions on the press: the 
leftist ideologies and groups were the ones being accused of threatening national security. These 
groups were censored and self-censored with the fear of being tried/sentenced for infringing 
national security. This is where the closest link between the political sensitivities are proven to play 
an important role in the suppression of the press because these amendments gave autonomous 






 The Turkish military did not find the civilian governments’ implementations effective 
during the major internal events in the 1950s (when the Islamist fundamentalism was escalating), in 
the 1960s (when the right and the left ideologies in the country were in violent clashes as 
ideological polarisation was increasing), and in the 1970s (when terrorism in South East Turkey 
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was escalating). TSK, whose ideology was based on secular philosophy, found itself as the only 





 On the other hand, the press perceived military rule as a viable and legitimate option by 
showing support to the military intervention in 1960 and 1980, despite the consequences of these 
interventions being negative for the democratic regime that the society and the military or/and the 
state were aiming to create. As Demirel suggests, “the perception of military rule as a success or 
failure might have a crucial impact on the stability of the democratic regime, as illustrated in the 
discussion of the Turkish example”
476
; she discusses that the military regimes were not seen as a 
repressive measure or perceived to be a political failure, even by the political agents.
477
 It is fair to 
argue that the lack of effective internalisation of democracy by both the political agents and the 
press could be the reasons for such reactions towards the military rule in the country. Therefore, it is 
possible to conclude that allowing the military power to intervene in politics as a solution to 
political or economic problems within the country was acceptable for the political agents and the 
press even though doing so meant renouncing democracy.
478
 
    
 Eventually, it was necessary to make an in depth analysis of the reasons which led to the 
military interventions, the reactions they created in society and politics and the general stance taken 
by the press in support of the military; in order to understand the sensitivities of the current 
government. Under the current government, the press experience the worst period since the 
establishment of Modern Turkey, even when compared to the coup periods. It was also crucial to 
make this examination  to see the grounds on which the press in Turkey have built its traditions. 
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3.9 Motherland Party: effects of democratisation and economic liberalisation 
process on the freedom of the press 
 
 In a political environment where the military maintained power (President Kenan Evren 
indicated that the control might be taken back if required)
479
political parties were banned, and the 
president had the power to veto the formation of new parties,
480
 the Motherland Party (ANAP)
481
 
successfully came to power in 1983 under the leadership of Turgut Ozal despite the open 
declaration of Kenan Evren supporting the Nationalist Democracy Party, which was led by a former 
general.
482
 ANAP came with promises to advance democratic and economic liberalisation 
policies.The military regime between 1980 and 1983 was criticised by both centre left and centre 
right political wings for being destructive of democracy,
483
 especially for persons who experienced 
hardship under the military regime.
484
 Liberation of economic life and the will to establish an open 
economy in concert with the conservative cultural values of society was ANAP’s political 
agenda,
485
 with a strong will to attain EEC membership, which had not been progressing because of 




 Such liberal approaches guided the system into a free-market economy
487
 that impacted the 
media sector in which press ownership passed from “journalist families”’ hands into the hands of 
“big companies” — in other words, holdings.
488
 This transition meant the adoption of a different 
approach to the censorship of the press, which was no longer under the direct influence of the state 
and politics but the media owners who carried out their media ownership functions alongside other 
businesses, namely infrastructure and construction.
489
 The economic growth alongside these 
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changes in media sector ownership led to broader discussions on the objectivity of the press as well 
as press censorship by the media owners.
490
 In order to continue doing business with the 
government, the news media was using its commercial power, which Nohl and Algan argue caused 
the press to lose its control on politics and the appropriate dissemination of ideas and news.
491
 This 
shift which had started during the DP period, found more favourable economic conditions under the 
Motherland Party government. The interlaced relationship of the press with economic and political 
power today with the tabloidisation of the news, are highly influenced by the transition of the press 




 Economic changes and liberal ideas had positive influences such as the Ozal government’s 
removal of the restriction on the use of the Kurdish language in everyday life.
493
 Similarly, Harris 
observes that the transition to civilian rule was governed well by Ozal, who rejected granting 
amnesty to those who were jailed for spreading violence while the military ruled, this provided an 




 However, it is not convincing to argue that the liberalist approach to everyday life and 
economy had the same impact on the freedom of the press as the neoliberal political and economic 
policies, for the press shifted away from the “social responsibility concept” it once followed.
495
 It is 
fair to argue that the transformation from the social state to a free market economy made it 
inevitable that the press would operate within a liberal market economy as a tool of a commercial 
institution whose initial aim was to make profit.This turning point for the press in Turkey allowed 
political opinion and analysis to have a place only in magazine journalism rather than in daily 
newspapers.
496
 Newspaper owners  during the 1960s and 70s had formed into organisations that 
were mainly owned by commercial holdings.
497
 The most remarkable phenomenon during this 
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period was the transition from family-based press businesses into press with foreign based capital. 
After the assassination of Milliyet’s owner Abdi Ipekci in 1979 (who defended freedom of 
journalists from pressure groups, and felt that newspapers must have separate editorial and 
ownership departments),
498
 Aydin Dogan (who then became the owner of the biggest media 
monopoly by owning the 43% of the newspaper sales by 2003)
499
 purchased Milliyet, and Asil 
Nadir whose capital was based abroad, purchased Gunaydin, Tan, Ulus, Sakarya.
500
 In this chapter 
the present author argues that the situation of today’s press does not differ from the press in Ozal’s 
period regarding the quality of news and ethical issues, yet is worse in terms of government through 
nepotistic business relationships with media owners and controversial legal provisions. 
 
 The big holding ownership of the press during the ANAP period placed increased pressure 
on the socialist press, and editors were under the censorship of the 1984 Press Code as it involved, 
“responsible editors”  would hold the legal responsibility for the content of publications. Therefore, 
it is possible that Ozal chose not to censor the press directly but through other means. 
 
 Finally, it is possible to argue that the foundations of the current media sector, which are 
controlled by holdings, echo the system that was established in the 1980s, which also affected the 
employee rights of journalists through legal applications that took place after 1980. This was 
followed by the weakening of journalists’ unions due to the intervention of media barons.
501
 Ozge 
states that this was caused by Ozal’s application of neoliberal politics that supported a free market 




3.10 “The lost decade”: political and social crises and the press in Turkey 
 
 Sustaining this materialist approach, the newspapers during the first half of the 1990s were 
involved heavily in promotions aimed at selling more newspapers and increasing their 
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; this led to a fall in the conscious reader potential
504
 and the creation of mass popular 
journalism that generated today’s interest-based press, which is part of big holdings. Starting in the 
1990s, the media owners became involved in both the production of the media and in other business 
sectors alongside various media fields, leading to cross-ownership.
505
 Ozgen suggests that this is 
why the conscious readers have moved away from the press.
506
 It is therefore fair to argue that 
during the 1990s the press lost its credibility as an independent institution and harmed its reputation 
based on the close relationship it established with the governments and the holding owners.
507
 The 
present author believes that this also reflects society’s disengagement from politics based on a 
perceived lack of trust in the press’s integrity. The press’s social responsibility has vanished under 
the control of the governments and the media owners because it acts as the spokesman of the 
government rather than disseminating information. The Gezi protests in 2013 were the biggest 
social uprising in the history of Modern Turkey and serve as the most applicable example of 
irresponsibility. In order to understand the problems  journalists in Turkey encounter today and their 
effects on the democratisation process, it is important to understand the strong and close relations 
built between the press, the economic powers, and the governments founded in the 1980s and 
established in the 1990s. 
 
 However, this period is critically important also because of the social, political, and security 
incidents that led to the strict censorship of the press — namely terrorism and security issues in 
South East Turkey,
508
 that resulted in thousands of anonymous killings and tens of assassinated 
journalists. Because of the danger these events posed to the integrity and the security of the state, 
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the Turkish state applied strict censorship on reporting the Kurdish issue.
509
 Separatist terrorism and 
opposition to the state’s policies became one of the sensitive subjects that received rigorous 
censorship from the state.
510
 In light of this context, the Anti-Terror Law, which was enacted in 
1991, was used (and still is being used) to silence, censor, and imprison journalists who report on 
the Kurdish issue even if their reporting involves non-violent expression.
511
 Torture was a method 
of interrogating for cases in connection with this law. Arbitrary arrests, physical violence, unknown 
assailants, disappearances and murder took place based on the expression of restricted ( “sensitive”) 
subjects in Turkey during the “lost decade”. Forty journalists were killed during the 1990s 
including: Ugur Mumcu (Cumhuriyet/Republic Newspaper), who was an investigative journalist 
working on PKK’s links with National Intelligence Service (MIT) and assassinated on 24 January 
1993, Metin Goktepe (Evrensel/Universal Newspaper), who was a Kurdish journalist working for 
the Kurdish newspaper Haberde Yorumda Gercek/Truth in News and Comments and killed by 
police torture on 8 January 1996,
512
 and Ahmet Taner Kislali (Cumhuriyet Newspaper), who was a 
journalist, lawyer and an intellectual writing articles defending Kemalism, secularism democracy, 




 The case of Ozgur Gundem v Turkey demonstrates the main issues encountered by the 
Kurdish journalists and the journalists who raised concerns or reported on the Kurdish issue during 
the 1990s. Ozgur Gundem was a pro-Kurdish newspaper that experienced a high number of 
journalist killings based on differences in opinion, starting from the 1990s. In 1992, which is 
defined as the “dark year” of press history, fourteen journalists were killed in Turkey; four of them 
were from Ozgur Gundem, and seven of its journalists were killed in total throughout the 1990s, 
which “was the subject of serious attacks and harassment which forced its eventual closure and for 
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 More specifically, Ozgur Gundem faced violent attacks and seven of its journalists were 
shot dead; when the government was informed of these attacks and threats, it did not respond.
515
 In 
addition, various branches of the newspaper were searched by the police, and documents such as 
articles written on PKK leader Ocalan and other books constituted evidence for their later 
conviction of “being a member of PKK and making propaganda of terrorist organisation” by 
Istanbul DGM.
516
 The newspaper was seized and closed down several times while its journalists 
were sentenced to 147 years of imprisonment,
517
 based on allegations of making publications that 
defamed the Turkish nation, the Republic, and/or government officials.Incited hatred based on race, 
religion and class, issued propaganda of discrimination, identified government officials’ names 
fighting against terrorism, and disseminated reports of terrorist organisations.
518
 On that basis, the 
applicants made an application to the ECtHR with an alleged violation of Article 10 of ECHR 
stating that the threats, attacks, and measures taken against the newspaper finally led to its 
closure.
519
 Therefore, the applicants alleged that the Turkish government had not fulfilled its 
responsibility under Article 10 of the ECHR by not preventing the deadly attacks towards the 
newspaper. Not affording protection for the journalists who were openly threatened and who asked 
for protection from the government officials, by not effectively investigating the journalist killings, 




 Based on the reports provided by both parties, ECtHR concluded that despite the significant 
number of complaints raised by Ozgur Gundem members, the government had tolerated the violent 
campaign against the newspaper by failing to take protective measures. ECtHR also recalled that 
the effective application of the democratic freedom of expression does not only require the states to 
abstain from interference but also to take effective measures to prevent criminal activities against 
the press (even if the newspaper — as in this case — was alleged by the Turkish government to 
support terrorist organisation, PKK).
521
 In relation to the 1991 Anti-Terror Law, the ECtHR stated 
that even though the language of law is broad and vague, the intervention of the government were 
defined by law to protect the integrity of the country’s territories and national security.
522
 The Court 
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was consistent in following previous case law based on Surek v Turkey in which the court decided 
that the measures taken by the Turkish government were defined by law and legitimate for the 
prevention of crime.
523
 However, the ECtHR concluded that the measures taken against Ozgur 
Gundem by the Turkish government were not necessary in a democratic society because the 
government officials must realise their dominant positions and must not use criminal cases against 
journalists. According to ECtHR, Ozgur Gundem’s articles (including PKK establishments’ 
declarations and reports, an interview with PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, a declaration of PKK 
European representative, an interview with PKK’s commander Osman Ocalan, a declaration of 
Giant-Left/Dev Sol by its European branch and an interview with PKK commander Cemil Bayik) 
were provocative but still remained within the limits of critical observations.
524
 According to the 
Court, even if the subject matter of interviews and articles were of  the terrorist organisation and its 
members, this was not a sufficient reason for the censorship of the press. In conclusion the ECtHR 
approved that the Turkish state had violated Article 10 of the ECHR by not taking effective 
measures for the protection of the journalists’ right to free expression and in taking disproportionate 





 This ECtHR verdict once again shows that the official state ideology which considers 
Kurdish separatism as a threat to the integrity of the country had in the name of national security, 
once more unduly prioritised the state interests over the right to free expression of the press, 
resulting in disproportionate measures against freedom of the press.  
 
 Most trials concerning freedom of expression in Turkey were heard by the State Security 
Courts (DGMs), which were constituted in accordance with Article 143 of the Constitution “to deal 
with offences against the indivisible integrity of the State and its territory and nation, offences 
against the Republic which are contrary to the democratic order enunciated in the Constitution, and 
offences which undermine the internal or external security of the State.” Thus the DGMs had 
jurisdiction over Articles 125, 172, and 312 of the Turkish Penal Code and Articles 6 to 8 of the 
Law to Fight Terrorism. There were eight DGM precincts (Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Konya, Kayseri, 
Erzincan, Diyarbakir and Malatya) and 17 tribunals, five of which are in Istanbul. The DGMs 
comprise three members, one of whom is a military judge. Article 7(a), annexed to the Law on 
                                                 
523
 Surek v Turkey App no 26682/95 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) para 52  
524
 Ozgur Gundem v Turkey App no 23144/93 (ECtHR, 16 March 2000) para. 60, 62 
525
 Ibid. para. 63, 70, 71 
Page | 116  
 
Military Judges, makes eligibility for promotion, seniority in grade, and salary increments of 
military judges serving in DGMs dependent on “the first hierarchical competent superior”. The 
presence of a military judge answerable to his military superiors in the judging of civilians has 





 On that note, it is important to draw attention to the important role the civil society played in 
the freedom of the press during the 1990s when there was a civil disobedience campaign
527
 carried 
out by writers and intellectuals. A bold stance against Yasar Kemal’s trial (started on 23 January 
1995 by the State Security Court) based on his article, published in a German magazine (Der 
Spiegel), that purportedly endorsed “separatist propaganda” and“ provoked hatred and hostility 
among the people”. Kemal’s article emphasised the Kurdish issue and Human Rights in Turkey 
harshly criticising the Turkish state, saying that: 
 
“Since the establishment of the Republic in 29 October 1923, Turkey is made a 
system based on restrictions and persecution… Such suppression on the Anatolian 
people of the Republic made people long for the authority of the Ottoman 
Empire…Then something unexpected happened; while Turkish people continued 
their life oppressed under heavy authority, Kurdish people stood up as they were 
the ones who received the most cruel suppression, whose language was forbidden, 
their identities were banned under the name “mountain Turcs’ given, and they 
were the ones facing ethnic massacres…To my knowledge the number of Kurds 
who wants an independent state in Turkey is not much. However, is it not their 




 In reaction to his trial process, Turkish intellectuals started a civil disobedience movement 
and ten articles (which were accused on similar grounds with Kemal’s work) were collected in one 
book titled “Freedom to Thought”.  These academics collected 1,080 signatures, which initiated a 
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publication called “Freedom of Expression” asking for the prosecutor of the State Security Court to 
be tried with the same charges as Yasar Kemal.
529
 Finally, Yasar Kemal was acquitted. 
 
 In the first 10 months of 1996, 1,024 people were in custody and 1,943 people were 
sentenced based on the 1991 Law to Fight Terrorism, 530 of whom were accused of helping or 
being a member of the terrorist organisation - PKK. Scholars acknowledge that the prevalent use of 
the 1991 Law to Fight Terrorism, to curtail freedom of expression was facilitated by its vague and 
broad definition of terrorism, which can easily make anyone an offender under its definition. 
Specifically, Article 6 includes writing and reporting ideas as methods of  “pressure” prescribed 
under Article 1 if the government deems them to threaten the state on a number of grounds, 
including damaging the “indivisible unity of the State” or endangering “the existence of the Turkish 
State and Republic”. Article 8, amended in October 1995, still prohibits written and oral 
propaganda, assemblies, meetings and demonstrations "aimed at damaging the indivisible unity of 
the State . . . regardless of method, intention, and ideas behind them" and in which there is an 
element of incitement to violence. 
 
 Freedom of the press was strictly and negatively influenced by the security concerns of the 
government , raised by the Kurdish issue, and terrorism formed a major factor for the pressure on 
the press.
531
 It was forbidden to use any terminology that could express support for separatism or 
terrorism or separatist propaganda based on the Kurdish issue. This decision made by the Ministry 
of Interior in 1999 led to a significant increase in imprisoned journalists who reported on the 
sensitive subjects
532
 on the basis of Articles 7 and 8 of the Anti-Terror Law as well as Articles 159 
and 169 of the Turkish Penal Code, for the Ministry of Interior Affairs had the power to prohibit the 
circulation of a publication in six regions in South East Turkey. The power to close down a printing 
press for thirty days did not have a location restriction, the only condition was to give prior warning 
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 The circulation of political news was put restricted based on these legal regulations, which 
did not meet the international standards for the protection of press freedom. The state’s perception 
of the minority groups as a danger was clear from its failure to distinguish between the terrorist 
group PKK and the Kurdish minority who discussed that the State’s failure to protect their rights 
and freedoms contradicted with Turkey’s international obligations.
534
 This contradiction was 
emphasised by the 1999 European Commission Report on freedom of expression, which 
emphasised the inconsistency between the positive steps taken by the Turkish authorities for the 





 In conclusion, this author observes that the state’s approach to the Kurdish issue (seeing it as 
a threat to secular Kemalist ideology) hindered Turkey’s democratisation process
536
 and allowed 
military presence in politics
537
. As Poulton has stated, the problem was caused by the unitary nation 
state model that brought pressure on groups who expressed their own identities and did not adopt 





3.10.1 Post-modern military coup: the fall of Welfare Party and the rise of AKP 
 
 In the troubled phase of Turkey’s political life in the 1990s, the rise of the pro-Islamist and 
ultra-nationalist parties
539
 were considered a threat to secularism in the country. The Welfare Party 
(RP), the largest political party within the Turkish Grand National Assembly, formed a coalition 
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with the True Path Party (DYP) in 1996.
540
 Islam was politicised by RP in the early 1990s. The 
party’s inclination towards the non-secularisation of education and its investments in religious 
institutions as well as its strong Islamic roots led to secularist concerns. RP’s rejection of Kemalist 
ideology
541
 and its anti-secular statements and actions led to a “post-modern”
542
 military 





 One of the reasons why the military chose not to prepare a traditional coup, it could be 
argued, was the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis”
544
 strategy that TSK adopted during the Cold War Era 
to protect the nation’s unity using religion where a civil uprising could have been inevitable.
545
 The 
military’s avoidance of a traditional coup was also due to its will not to harm the modernisation 




 However, the Constitutional Court approved the closure of the Welfare Party based on being 
the “focus point of anti-secular ideologies.”
547
 According to the Turkish Army, the secular state was 
under threat from the Islamist Welfare Party. The military’s attempt of another coup caused 
mainstream media once more to support it based on the national security concerns. Dogan and 
Bilgin Media groups were disseminating news based on the threat against the secularity of the 
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 In the process of the military coup attempt and the closure of the Welfare Party, journalists 




 The Kurdish issue continued to be  sensitive during the last years of the 1990s. Islam was a 
threat to the secularist state of Turkey, and the Kurdish issue was seen as a threat to national 
security and to the Turkish nation. Thus, journalists who wrote heavily about Kurdish rights such as 
M.A. Brand and C. Candar were fired and jailed with allegations of belonging to a terrorist 
organisation or making PKK’s propaganda.
550
 Such censorship is found to be strongly influenced 
by the media owners who after the transition to the free market economy during Turgut Ozal’s 
leadership under ANAP, were able to do business with the government alongside their media 
ownership,
551




 The current AKP government was formed after the unsuccessful attempt to form a coalition 
government (DSP-MHP-ANAP) in 2002. Meanwhile, the legal structure of human rights was set in 
2000 by the ratification of ICCPR and ICESCR (International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights) before AKP came into power. Despite becoming a party to these human rights 
agreements, Turkey was still internationally criticised for failing to implement the reforms, and for 
this this reason Turkey was argued to have only the basics of democracy
553
 — insufficient 
scaffolding for advancing a full-fledged democratisation process. Soon after the 2001 European 
Commission, report, Articles 13 and 14 of the Constitution were amended for the elimination of 
restrictions on the freedom of expression with the addition of the “proportionality” principle that 
regulated the limitations applied on expressions.
554
 Besides, the constitutional changes, the Kurdish 
minority was given educational and cultural rights including the right to broadcast in the Kurdish 
language.
555
 Nevertheless, despite the constitutional changes, in 2001 more than eighty journalists 
were in prison on the basis of “insulting the judiciary”, “insulting the Republic”, and “dissemination 
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 Finally, given this background, it is possible to argue that AKP, when it first entered the 
political scene, was criticised on the same grounds as the Welfare Party, because of its Islamist 
background.
557
 However, AKP's promotion of a democratic political agenda, its willingness to 
accelerate the EU accession process, and its promises to improve Human Rights
558
 resulted in its 
success, for the liberal wings and opinion leaders were supportive of the party in the general 
elections in 2002.
559
 Based on this support, AKP declared its will to establish governance based on 
guarantees of freedom of expression (they stated that they accept this as a fundamental right in 
democracies), rule of law, and, an impartial and independent judiciary. In order to achieve these 
principles, AKP, in its 2002 party programme, made promises of legal amendments for the 
guarantee of freedom of expression and press as well as necessary constitutional amendments to 
achieve that purpose;
560
 these are discussed in the following chapter.   
 
3.11 Discussions and conclusion  
 
 This chapter demonstrates that, despite the differences in the political phases, the censorship 
of the press was caused by the highly influential national state ideology emphasising a “centrist 
government”, which Mardin argues had an impact on the decision-making process because its 
ideology causes political parties to act for the people, in other words, they make decisions on behalf 
of the people.
561
 In relation to this idea, Kamali suggests that the first attempt of modernisation in 
Turkey entailed authoritative modernisation rather than building a Westernised democracy by 
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 Turkish politics was highly influenced by the militarist traditions based on the coups which 
took place in 1960, 1971, 1980 and finally the postmodern coup in 1997,
563
 which negatively 
impacted on the freedom of the press. Looking at DP’s treatment of journalists and the press during 
the multi-party period, it is possible to see the practical application of the hegemonic state ideology 
that led to the primacy of the state interests rather than the people.
564
 As this is the foundation of the 
press from the early days of modern Turkey, it is possible to understand the link it has with today’s 
mentality of the press, taking a stance as the spokesman of the state, as seen in the case of Hrant 
Dink in Chapter 2 rather than functioning as a watchdog. 
 
 In that regard, it is observed that the transition from authoritarian press theory into 
libertarian press theory could not take place in Turkey despite the transition into free market 
economy. ‘Free market of ideas’ promoted by the Libertarian press theory was not adopted because 
of the military interventions into politics that did not allow the press to embrace the role of a fourth 
estate.
565
 Finally, the ‘free market’ was only applicable to the media ownership which is explained 
in Chapter 4 as leading to the control of the press by big holdings, that does not promote keeping 
the government’s pressure over the press at minimum levels based on the business relationship 
between the media owners and the government. Chomsky has further elaborated arguing that “while 
Westerners usually equate the marketplace with freedom of opinion, the hidden hand of the market 




 Generally, the literature discusses the role of the press on the democratisation process in 
Turkey; However, this chapter adopts a different approach to this issue and by questioning the 
effects of politics and the democratisation process on the freedom of the press, illustrating the 
relationship between the press, politics, and democratisation (which are closely linked to the current 
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debates on the freedom of the press). The socio-political context — from the single-party period, 
multi-party period, to the political stages of the military coups — were investigated to show how. 
 
 As observed, the governments in different democratic stages and the military after the coup 
d’etats had a strong will to take control of the press and manipulate news in order to shape the 
public opinion for their own vested interests.
567
 In addition, the support the press gave to the 
military intervention is another example of the deeply ingrained state ideology that prioritised state 
security against the threat of political parties with Islamic roots or policies that threaten the secular 
structure of the country. However, the constant military intervention into civil governance and the 
backsliding of democracy did not allow a critical press tradition to evolve. Keeping the restrictive 
legal measures as a means to silence the opposition press in the name of protecting the integrity of 
the country and national security (as observed in Ozgur Gundem v Turkey) which are still the 
grounds (TCK and TMK) to silence opposition journalism today. However, the changing needs of 
society, observed in the next chapter (Gezi protests), require genuine amendments to be made in the 
TMK and TCK that include broadly drawn articles being used to silence the press.  
 
 Moreover, problems experienced throughout the history of Turkish politics had negative 
effects overall on the democratisation process and, in relation to this, the freedom of the press. This 
information is applied in Chapter 6 as a basis for legal recommendations designed to create  
stronger legal protection for the press in Turkey that will minimise the political influence on the 
freedom of the press, if not completely eliminate it. 
 
 Finally, based on the ECHR statement that an effective political democracy is a requirement 
for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
568
 the next chapter will discuss 
whether a lack of political democracy leads to the censorship of the press as a burden to the 
democratisation process in Turkey. The evaluation of these political, social, and democratic 
practices will be extended in the next chapter to analyse the current legal problems encountered by 
the press under the AKP government in light of the recent uprising in Turkey — the Gezi protests.  
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Chapter 4 - Freedom of the Press in Turkey under the AKP 
Government: A Critical Analysis of the Political Influences on 
the Law and its Application 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 In this chapter, the reasons why the press experienced one of the worst periods in the history 
of the Republic of Turkey during the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) will be 
explored in light of the NGO reports suggesting that the press in Turkey was “not free”
569
, once the 
biggest crackdown on journalists started to take place with the governance of AKP. This situation 
will be critically analysed in light of the legal reforms undertaken by the state in the EU accession 
process, the loopholes in the legal provisions regulating freedom of expression, and the press, and 
the negative effects of the business relationship between AKP and media owners. In addition, the 
tendencies of the government to silence the opposition press will be explored in light of the 
historical experiences encountered by the political parties that were examined in the previous 
chapter, for the current political influences on the press cannot be separated from the historical 
elements that have had a direct impact on the mentality of political agents. In order to reach a 
detailed understanding of the problems encountered by the press during the AKP government, with 
the aim to make recommendations towards a solution. Jailed journalists and heavy fines incurred by 
the media outlets will be discussed within the chapter. 
 
4.2 The rise of AKP 
 
 European principles and democratic consolidation played an important role during the early 
years of the AKP governance because the EU accession process required democratic and legal 
reforms.
570
 In that regard, AKP declared its will to establish a governance based on guarantees of 
freedom of expression (having stated that they accept this as a fundamental right in democracies), 
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rule of law, and an impartial and independent judiciary.
571
 In order to achieve these principles, 
AKP, in its 2002 party programme, made promises of legal amendments for the guarantee of 





 AKP came to power in the 2002 elections gaining 34% of the votes.
573
 Columnist Tarhan 
Erdem from Radikal (Radical) newspaper suggests that the percentage was a combination of the 
voters who previously voted for other parties such as the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), the National 
Action Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi), the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi), the True Path 
Party (Dogruyol Partisi), and the Democratic Left Party (Demokrat Sol Parti), which attracted 
voters from different segments of the society. Considering that AKP received 69% of Virtue Party’s 
votes, 38% of the National Action Party’s votes, and 28% of Motherland Party’s votes, it seemed to 
have been supported mainly by the conservative right in the 2002 general elections.
574
 On the other 
hand, Milliyet columnist Taha Akyol, in his article analysing the reasons behind AKP’s success in 
the 2002 elections, argued that AKP’s voters were mainly from the indigent and repressed part of 
society.
575
 Dagi, however, emphasises that the Welfare Party under the leadership of Erbakan, 
which is based on the “National View (Milli Gorus)” ideology,
576
 received only 2% in the 2002 
general elections because it lost support from the Islamic groups. He attributes this loss to the set-
back the Islamic political movement received when it was at its most popular during the mid 1990s; 
under the influence of the military, the opinion took hold that policies openly based on political 
Islam were not suitable for the prevailing social and economic conditions. By contrast, AKP chose 
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 Nevertheless, AKP’s Islamic identity was highlighted by the party leader Erdogan in various 
forums such as the Symposium for International Conservatism and Democracy578: his speeches 
before his Prime Ministry, which were being circulated by social media channels, were leading to 
heavy criticism of his Islamic background as well as creating suspicion of a secret Islamic agenda 
that AKP allegedly had since its establishment. In this context, Dagi considers AKP’s self-
definition — Muslim democrat — as an “invention” that was used by the party to escape the 
classifications based on social or political stigma.579  
 
 
4.2.1 AKP’s early years: initial democratic approaches of AKP 
 
 In this political setting, AKP’s party programme before the elections reflected its 
“democrat” side with an emphasis on human rights and democracy. AKP claimed to be sensitive 
most importantly to the individual happiness of the citizens, that would be satisfied by the 
application of rights and freedoms through the establishment and application of legal guarantees of 
human rights.
580
 In relation to Dagi’s suggestions as observed above, it is possible to argue that 
AKP was forming legitimate grounds for its political existence (far from the previous parties that 
had Islamic roots who were unable to avoid the secular concerns of the Turkish Armed Forces 
(TSK) and society’s strong links with secularism). Prioritising human rights and democracy rather 
than conservatism. The Conservative-democrat label was only a definition for the party, not its 
ultimate aim, as portrayed by AKP in its initial years on the political arena. Abdullah Gul (President 
of Turkey between 2007-2014) defended this ideology by stating that “We had put in front of us a 
mission to accomplish: We were to prove that a Muslim society is capable of changing and 
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 Kaya and Cakmur, argue that a liberal market economy was identified as one of AKP’s 
primary aims which resulted in support by the big business owners (holdings) and the attention of 
the mainstream media; AKP marketed itself as the one and only party that could make the EU 
accession process possible by enacting the necessary reforms that could also provide stability to the 
business sector.
582
 Therefore, AKP, despite its conservative background, was economically more 
promising than the other political alternatives for the “big bosses” in Turkey. In that regard, as 
Finkel suggests, it can be argued that AKP’s success could result from the inefficiency of the 
previous governments, for it was the first time in Turkey’s political history that a party with a 







 Another important point to remember is that AKP’s party policy based on democracy, 
human rights, and the rule of law, as argued by Dagi, allowed them to reach the liberal/democratic 
groups in the country and internationally, protecting the party from the dominant secular centre in 
the meantime.
585
 It is submitted by this author that, in order to appeal to a broader background of 
voters, governments in Turkey, rather than choosing to restrict the press for the elimination of 
opposition, should favour a freer press. The case of AKP clearly shows that democratic expressions 
incorporating human rights and the rule of law appeal to a broad segment of the society. Parallel to 
the fact that such liberalisation promises can lead to securing almost 50% in elections, lack of its 
implementation results in mass reaction within society, regardless of political background, as will 
be discussed regarding the protests of Gezi Park later in this chapter. 
 
 Given its background emphasis on democracy and human rights, and its consideration of the 
danger of the secular political atmosphere in the country, the AKP was following an original 
pattern. A different path from the previous political parties who openly declared their Islamic roots 
in order to receive the support of the pro-Islamic groups; yet failed to survive the political 
challenges, especially in the mid to late 1990s. More specifically, Duran discusses that the EU 
accession motivations of AKP were based on the intention to successfully stand in the secular 
dominated political arena, so individual rights and freedoms as well as the rule of law were 
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highlighted in order to “survive” such secular challenges.586 Saatcioglu, in concert with Duran, 
states that “the Europeanisation agenda would lend legitimacy to the AKP’s disputed ‘conservative 
democracy’ ideology by proving its compatibility with European liberal democratic values. 
Consequently, all else being equal on the domestic economic front Europeanisation would allow the 
AKP to expand its electoral support base towards the centre and thus improve its vote share.”587 
This implied that the rise of AKP and its will to accelerate the EU accession process fell 
appropriately within the party’s concept of “liberalisation”, which also secured its political 
positioning within the dominant secular ideology; Saatcioglu argues that “the EU emerged as a 
strategic ally for the AKP in that liberalising democratic reforms needed for membership promised 
to make the rigid Kemalist model of secularism ‘less repressive and more inclusive’ and neutralise 





4.2.2 Turkey’s candidacy to the EU: catalyst for democratisation? 
 
 The European Union accession process is argued to have a great impact on the freedom of 
expression in relation to Turkey’s democratisation process.
589
 In this section, the impact of the EU 
accession process on domestic changes in Turkey is discussed in light of the reforms made on the 
laws regulating the freedom of expression. 
 
 To start with, it is essential to look at the democratic principles that form the basis of EU 
membership. Turkey’s application to become an associate member of the EU in 1959 is considered 
to be the continuation of its modernisation process.
590
 During the Motherland Party government, the 
modernisation process entered a different stage in 1987 when Turkey made the first membership 
application to the European Community,
591
 and finally in 1996 Turkey joined the customs union.
592
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The EU in 1999 accepted Turkey’s candidacy for membership, which Mohapatra defines as “the 





 In the 1970s, the reference point for democratisation was the EEC as suggested by Pridham. 
It was argued to have a strong impact on the democratisation processes among the countries who 
aimed to become a part of it.
594
 In addition, the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms was based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which 
accepted the superiority of peace, justice, and a democratic political system
595
 in parallel to the 




 Finally, in 2001, the democratic principles of the EU were brought closer in sync with UN 
standards with the new strategy offered by the Commission based on the advancement of the 
democratisation process through the application of human rights.
597
 More specifically for the 
protection of freedom of expression as a fundamental human right, the European Initiative for 
Human Rights and Democracy (EIDHR) aspired to promote a pluralistic civil society, which was a 
critical step in Turkey’s promotion of improved citizen-government dialogue.
598
 Overall, these 
democratic principles formed the basis of the EU-Turkey relationship after the Helsinki Summit in 
1999 when Turkey gained candidacy status to the EU, and membership negotiations that 
commenced in 2004 were perceived to be AKP’s international success
599
, because they catalysed 
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4.3 Setting the legal background: legal reforms in relation to the freedom of the 
press  
 
 Turkey was required to fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria600 in order to have accession to EU  
membership, the requirements specifically highlighted the importance of the human rights, market 
economy, and democratic politics.
601
 The latter was considered to be crucial for Turkey because the 
state was given the responsibility for endorsing a democratic government.
602
 Turkey was expected 
by the EC to adopt the Copenhagen criteria in order to make reforms especially to improve the 
conditions of free expression in accordance with ECHR Article 10.
603
 The impact of these criteria 
on the improvement of freedom of the press is examined below with respect to the legal reforms 
that took place from 2002 under the AKP government. The exposition of the AKP government’s 
legal reforms in this chapter recapitulates some of the articles of TCK and TMK examined in 
Chapter 2, so as to provide integrity to the explanation of these reforms within the current chapter. 
Such an analysis is useful for a deeper understanding of the inconsistency between the language of 
law and its application despite the legal reforms that took place in light of the European criteria.  
 
 
 Based on the Europeanisation process in Turkey, the European Commission report in 2001 
advised that:  
 
The basic features of a democratic system exist but Turkey is slow in 
implementing the institutional reforms needed to guarantee democracy and the 
rule of law. Changes in the executive have taken place with respect to EU-Turkey 
relations but a number of basic institutional issues, such as civilian control over 
the military, remain to be addressed.…Despite a number of constitutional, 
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legislative and administrative changes, the actual human rights situation as it 




 Following the European Commission’s report, the Constitutional Reform Package that was 
adopted in October 2001 led to legislative amendments on August 2003. Reducing the role of the 
National Security Council (MGK) from a position in which it had a direct influence on politics to an 
advisory position. This step abolished the previous practice under which the MGK recommendation 





4.3.1 Changes in the Turkish Penal Code in relation to freedom of expression and the press 
 
 The first harmonisation package on 19 February 2002 reduced the punishment under old 
TCK no. 765 Article 159
606
 from 1 to 6 years to 1 to 3 years of imprisonment.
607
 With the same 
package, Article 312 of TCK no. 765 was amended, and the monetary fines included in the article 
were removed.
608
 Therefore, Article 312 (Threat with the intention of causing fear and panic among 
people), which holds crucial importance for drawing the limits of freedom of expression, was 
initially drawn as: 
 
Any person who openly praises an offence or the person committing the offences 
is punished with imprisonment from six months to two years and monetary fine 
from 2 thousand lira to ten thousand lira. 
Any person who openly provokes a group of people belonging to different social 
class, religion, race, sect, or coming from another origin, to be rancorous or 
hostile against another group, is punished with imprisonment from one year to 
three years and a monetary fine from three thousand liras to twelve thousand liras. 
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Punishment to be increased by one third in cases where the offence is committed 
in a way that can cause danger to public security.  
If the above offences are committed through the means of mass communication 






 version of the Article was: 
Any person who openly praises an offence or the person committing the offences 
is punished with imprisonment from six months to two years. 
Any person who openly provokes a group of people belonging to different social 
class, religion, race, sect, or coming from another origin, to be rancorous or 
hostile against another group, in a way that could be dangerous for public 
order   is punished with imprisonment from one year to three years. 
Any person who openly humiliates another person just because he belongs to 
different social class, religion, race, sect, or comes from another origin, is 
punished with imprisonment from six months to two years. 
 
Punishment to be increased by one third in cases where the offence is committed 
in a way that can cause danger to public security. If the above offences are 
committed through the means of mass communication the punishment would be 
increased by one as much again. 
 
 TCK no. 765 having been abolished in 2004, Article 312 was included in the new Penal 
Code under Articles 215 and 216: “any person who openly praises an offence or the person 
committing the offences, in a way that could be dangerous for public order, is punished with 
imprisonment for up to two years”
611
 and “Any person who openly provokes a group of people 
belonging to different social class, religion, race, sect, or coming from another origin, to be 
rancorous or hostile against another group, in a way that could be dangerous for public order is 
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punished with imprisonment from one year to three years.”
612
 These articles continue to be used to 
censor the press. With the second harmonisation package, Article 159 of TCK no. 765 was 





 On 19 July 2003 (6th harmonisation package) Article 159 of TCK no. 765 was once more 
amended, reducing the minimum penalty for denigrating Turkishness, the State of the Turkish 
Republic, the Grand Assembly of Turkey, the Ministry, the Judicial institutions of the State, the 
military, and police organisations of the State from one year to six months. The clause specifying 
that “expression of thought intended to criticise shall not constitute crime”
614
 was also added to the 
Article.
615
 However, with the adoption of the new Penal Code, old Article 159 was added to the 
new Penal Code under the highly controversial Article 301
616





 With the seventh harmonisation package, Article 159 of TCK no. 765 was amended
618
 and 
the minimum imprisonment for “publicly denigrating the Turkish state” was changed from one year 
to six months, and the activities specified in the Article were accepted not to constitute crime on 




 In 2004, Article 126, which regulated “provoking people to be rancorous and hostile” by 
stating that “any person who openly provokes a group of people belonging to different social class, 
religion, race, sect, or coming from another origin, to be rancorous or hostile against another group 
is punished with imprisonment from one year to three years in case of such act causes risk to public 
safety”, was amended, and the last criteria specifying penalisation only if the individual’s 
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“incitement to enmity and hatred” constituted a “clear and close danger” was added.
620
 This was 
considered to be a positive step toward narrowing the scope of expressions that were previously 




 In 2005, in light of the ECtHR’s verdicts against Turkey and in accordance with the 
international agreements to which Turkey is committed, international human rights organisation 
observations, and the European Commission’s reports on the problems of press freedom in Turkey 
due to the application of the Turkish Penal Code, various amendments were made in the Turkish 
Penal Code.
622
 On that basis Article 301 of TCK no. 5237 which regulated “denigrating 
Turkishness, the Republic and the State organs”, which was restrictive of freedom of expression 
and the press as it created ambiguity in terms of language and its application was amended.
623
 The 
amendment brought the requirement of the Minister of Justice’s approval for the investigation of 
these offences.
624
 However, the European Commission in its 2005 report stated that, even though 
the positive impact of the accession process is undeniable, the legal amendments undertaken until 
now still do not ameliorate or resolve controversial articles that continue to endanger freedom of the 
press, owing to their vague definitions of “criticising symbols of state sovereignty, reputation of the 
state and state organs, state security, national security and terrorism.” The European Commission’s 
report went on to observe that “the Turkish Courts continue to widely use Article 301 and the Anti-




 Again, with the purpose of broadening the scope of press freedom, Articles 285 and 288 of 
TCK no. 5237, which regulate violating the confidentiality of investigations and the attempt to 
influence a fair trial, were amended as the press had been facing investigations and prosecutions 
because what constituted a crime was not clear under these articles.
626
 The amendments aimed at 
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eliminating journalist detainment on the basis of expressing their views or simply disseminating 
information about a case. 
 
 Praising the offence and the offender is another crime restricting journalists. Therefore, 
Article 215 of TCK no. 5237 was changed from “any person who openly praises an offence or the 
person committing the offences is punished with imprisonment up to two years” to “any person who 
openly praises an offence or the person committing the offences is punished with imprisonment up 
to two years, in a case which creates open and direct danger to the public order”.
627
 As a result of 
this amendment, the expression of thought is no longer sufficient on its own for the crime to take 
place; such expression must be examined in order to determine that it creates an open danger to 
public order. This amendment is arguably a positive change towards improving freedom of 
expression, for ECtHR criteria also suggest that praising an offence or the offender could only be 




 Finally, Article 220 (7), which provided that “any person who knowingly and willingly 
helps an organised criminal group although not takes place within the hierarchic structure of the 
group, is punished as if he is a member of the organised groups”, was amended by the 3rd 
harmonisation package and “the penalty for being a member of organised criminal group can be 
reduced down to one third, depending on the nature of help”
629
 was added to the clause in the 
amended version. Karakaya and Ozhabebes observe that this amendment only provides judicial 
discretion, it still penalises helping an organised criminal group on the same grounds as actually 
being a member of the organised criminal group.
630
 Considering that these types of crime are 
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4.3.2 Changes in the Anti-Terror Law 
 
 
 With the first harmonisation package, Article 7 of the Anti-Terror Law no. 3713 was 
amended,
632
specifying that only propaganda that promotes terror would constitute a crime. This 
amendment broadened the limits of freedom of expression because the designation of the crime was 




 On 19 July 2003 (6th harmonisation package), with the intention of broadening the limits of 
free expression, Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law no. 3713, which defined the offence of making 
propaganda against the indivisible unity of the state, was abolished.
634
 Article 1 (Definition of 
terrorism) of the Anti-Terror Law
635
 was also amended;
636
 the previous version of Article 1 before 
the amendment was: 
 
Terrorism is an act done by one or more persons belonging to an organisation with 
the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic as specified in the 
Constitution, its political, legal, social, secular and economic system, damaging 
the indivisible unity of the State with its territory and nation, endangering the 
existence of the Turkish State and Republic, weakening or destroying or seizing 
the authority of the State, eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms, or 
damaging the internal and external security of the State, public order or general 
health by means of pressure, threat, oppression and intimidation. 
 
 In relation to the definition of terrorism, the amendment introduced the criteria of force and 
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 With the seventh harmonisation package on 7 August 2003 (7th harmonisation package), 
Article 7 (Terrorist organisations) of the Anti-Terror Law no. 3713 was amended.
638
 “Promoting 
violence” was added to the text as a criterion for the propaganda to constitute a crime, for the older 
version read: “whoever helps the members of a terrorist organisation or makes propaganda of the 
terrorist organisation shall be punished by imprisonment for one to five years and a monetary fine 
from five hundred lira to one thousand lira.”
639





 Similarly, to the changes made in TCK, the Anti-Terror Law was also subject to various 
amendments after 2004 in order to eliminate the limitations experienced by journalists through the 
arbitrary use of legal provisions based on their vague language. Article 13 of TMK no. 3713, which 
regulated that no penalty given for crimes committed under TMK could turned into monetary fines 
or preliminary injunctions or suspended, was abolished.
641
 With similar purposes, (5) of the same 
law, which regulated prosecutors and the courts’ authority to suspend newspapers and magazines 
accused of offences of “making terrorist propaganda” for up to 30 days , which ECtHR found to 
violate the right to free expression of the press was abolished. In 2013, two of the most 
controversial articles of TMK, Article 6 and 7 were amended. Article 6 regulated “those who print 
or publish declarations or announcements of terrorist organisations shall be punished with 
imprisonment from one to three years”; after the changes it regulated that “Those who print or 
publish declarations or announcements of terrorist organisations, which praise or promote the 
violent methods of these terrorist organisations,shall be punished with imprisonment from one to 
three years.”
642
  Article 7 (propaganda of terrorist organisation) of the same law added a similar 
criterion for terrorist organisation propaganda to be considered as a crime by regulating that 
“Whoever makes propaganda of the terrorist organisation by promoting violence shall be punished 




                                                 
638
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4.3.3 Changes in the Turkish Press Code 
 
 With the second harmonisation package, Press Code no. 5680 was amended, and the 





 With the third harmonisation package, Press Code no. 5680 was amended, exchanging 
punishment of imprisonment for monetary fines, and in the fourth harmonisation package, the same 
law Article 15 was amended,
645
 accepting that the press cannot be forced to declare its sources of 
information in accordance with ECtHR case law, stating that the role of the press in a democratic 




 The Seventh harmonisation package included the enactment of a new press code, thereby 
abolishing Press Code no. 5680.
647
 Press Code no. 5187 was accepted, for revisions to the previous 
code resulted in the deterioration of rights and freedoms. The goal was to conform with the 
international agreements.
648
 Therefore, the new press code was prepared in order to comply with 





 In 2012, Article 19 of the Press Code no. 5187 was abolished; it regulated “influencing the 
judiciary” and was found to thwart freedom of the press as the press faced monetary fines for 





                                                 
644
 Law regulating amendments to various laws no. 4748 (26/03/2002) 
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4.3.4 Changes in the Constitution 
 
 On 7 May 2004, Article 30 of the Constitution, which regulated the “protection of the 
printing facilities”, was amended, specifying that “a printing house and its annexes, duly established 
as a press enterprise under law, and press equipment shall not be seized, confiscated, or barred from 
operation on the grounds of having been used in a crime”
651
; AKP argued that this strengthened the 




 One of the most crucial legal amendments for securing the freedom of the press was made in 
May 2004 with the acceptance of the supremacy of international law over domestic law. In cases of 
conflict between principles of both laws relating to basic rights and liberties, international law must 
be taken as a basis for judgement by the Turkish courts as stated by the Constitution Article 90 (5): 
 
International agreements duly put into effect have the force of law. No appeal to 
the Constitutional Court shall be made with regard to these agreements, on the 
grounds that they are unconstitutional. (Sentence added on May 7, 2004; Act No. 
5170) In the case of a conflict between international agreements, duly put into 
effect, concerning fundamental rights and freedoms and the laws due to 





 It is observed by the present author that despite AKP’s steps to amend the legal provisions 
to improve the individual rights and freedom in relation to press freedom, the 1982 Constitution 
which was adopted under military rule of the 1982 coup remains restrictive in spirit, for it still 
prioritises nationalism and conservatism in Article 26 (2) and 28 (2).
654
 Its effects on the law 
regulating the exceptions to press freedom are observed in Article 3 of the Turkish Press Law which 
follows as: 
 
The press is free. This freedom includes the right to acquire and disseminate 
information, and to criticise, interpret and create works.   
                                                 
651
 The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 1982 s 2(30) 
652
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653
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654
 See chapter 2 for further discussion of the broad language of the constitution that allows restrictions on the freedom 
of expression and the press. 
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The exercise of this freedom may be restricted in accordance with the 
requirements of a democratic society to protect the reputation and rights of others 
as well as public health and public morality, national security, and public order 
and public safety; to safeguard the indivisible integrity of the state’s territory; to 
prevent crime; to withhold information duly classified as state secrets; and to 





4.4.1 Law on the Books 
 
 The legal changes designed to improve freedom of expression and the press, in concert with 
the Turkish state’s attempt to align its legal provisions with the European Union in order to fulfil 
the Copenhagen criteria, suggests that a more democratic approach has been adopted
656
 in theory. 
However, it is suggested by way of this research that looking closely at the nature of these changes 
it is also possible to see that the changes, especially in TCK and Anti-Terror Law, have been mostly 
cosmetic. Article 312 of old TCK no. 765 was amended, and the monetary fines included in the 
article were removed. The term “in a way that could be dangerous for public order” lacked 
objective and solid grounds, which opened the way for its arbitrary application to limit the freedom 
of the press. 
 
 This author points out that considering the importance of Article 312 for defining the limits 
of freedom of expression, the intention of Turkish lawmakers for its amendment is important to 
analyse. As observed in Chapter 3, the transformation into a secular and modern social structure 
was made through legal reforms. A similar approach is still used today, for the lawmaker found the 
solution to limitations experienced by the use of Article 312, again, in the change of law.
657
 This 
indicates the consistent approaches to legal positivism followed by the Turkish lawmaker. This 
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approach to ‘change’ in combination with the state centrist approach of governance
658
 continues to 
result in limitations to free expression, because the normative regulation of law is considered 
separately from the application. Possible solutions to hindrances encountered by the press due to the 
application of Article 312, were found in the normative legal changes in line with the first 
harmonisation package.  Nevertheless, the legal amendments can only change the language of law 
but not its application. This also implies that, without internalisation and implementation of 
universal legal principles that incorporate human rights, the establishment or improvement of a 
democratic state would be hard.
659
 However, this research concludes that the actual reasons for 
amending Article 312 were not to improve the conditions of free expression but to regulate free 
expression of ideas that would stay within the lines of the deeply ingrained political ideology. 
 
 When both the older version and the amended version of Article 312 are compared, it is 
possible to determine that the word “danger”, which was added to the amended article and also 
transferred to the new Penal Code under articles 215 and 216, remains a burden for a clear 
understanding of the provision. Considering that the reason for reforms in general and the 
amendment of Article 312 specifically was based on the aim to set a legal basis that is clear and 
precise in its meaning and that would limit arbitrary interpretation by judges, it is fair to argue that 
the amendment did not manifest this intent. The reason why the reform packages could not go 
beyond cosmetic changes and various legal provisions (some discussed above were simply 
transferred into the new Penal Code 5237) is because conventionally, law is applied for the 
protection of the state interest rather than the public order. This leads to charges being brought 
against the journalists who do not follow the political ideology
660
, or the government’s approach. 
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 Similarly, even though Press Code protects journalists’ rights to protect their sources, it does 
not embrace “a strong public interest for the protection of journalists” themselves.
661
 Based on this 
argument, it is appropriate to reference articles that regulate the criminal responsibility of the 
owners of publications and their editors — namely those stipulating that “the owner of the 
publication is responsible for the crimes committed through publication.”
662
 Even though the press 
crimes specified under the Press Code mostly provide monetary fines and regulate that monetary 
fines cannot be turned into imprisonment unless not paid, Turkish legal scholars generally accept
663
 
that there is no separate group of crimes designated specifically as “press crimes” but rather “the 
crimes committed through the press”, that are provided in the Penal Code and essentially do not 
change the properties of the committed crime
664
 but rather impose a heavier fine once it is 
committed.  
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 Crimes under the Turkish Press Code specified by Articles 20 (Encouraging Sexual Assault, 
Murder or Suicide),665 21 (Illicit Disclosure of Identities)666 and 24 (Re-publication)667 provide only 
monetary fines. However, even though Article 19, which regulated influencing the judiciary and 
provides a minimum 20.000 lira monetary fine, was abolished in 2012, journalists are still 
imprisoned under the Penal Code that regulates influencing the judiciary under Article 277. In 
addition, Article 125, which regulated defamation and provided a heavier prison sentence in the 
cases where defamation took place through the press, was abolished in 2005.668  However, the 
current clause 4 of this article provides that “the punishment is increased by one sixth in case of 
performance of defamation act openly,”669 which brings a heavier penalty than its previous version, 
which provided that “if the offence is committed through press and use of any one of publication 
organs, then the punishment is increased up to one third.”670 As a result, this clause can still be 
applied to defamation through the press as the press indicates only the means of committing the 
crime but does not change the nature of it.671 
 
 It is submitted that, even though the Press Code itself does not impose a penalty of 
imprisonment, the Turkish Penal Code in effect carries a  heavy prison sentence, regulating that the 
punishment would be increased when the crime is committed through the press. In that regard, 
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Turkish Penal Code Articles 132 (Violation of Communicational Secrecy),
672
 133 (Tapping and 
recording of conversations between the individuals),
673
 134 (Violation of Privacy),
674
 217 
(Provoking people not to obey the laws), and 218 (Joint provision) increase the punishment 
imposed by one half.
675
 Articles 220 (Forming organised groups with the intention of committing 
crime), 226 (Indecency),
676
 and 318 (Discouraging people from enlisting in armed forces)
677
 all 
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provide imprisonment as a penalty and an increase in the penalty if the crime is committed through 
the press.  
  
 
4.4.2 Law in Practice 
 
 Hoffman and Werz argue that when the AKP held power, there was a significant decline in 
the number of journalists killed after 2003. They argue that the polarisation of the Turkish society 
2000 was the reason for such killings,
678
 considering the high number of journalists targeted or 
killed by ultra-nationalists, Islamists, or PKK members during the 1990s.
679
 However, Hoffman and 
Werz recognise the assassination of Hrant Dink
680
 as evidence of continuing traditional repressive 
attitude to the freedom of expression.
681
 The European Commission echoed Hoffman and Werz in 
its 2009 report that there was no longer a systematic use of TCK’s Article 301 and that the 
amendment made to the article reduced the number of journalist prosecutions in comparison with 
previous years. The Commission, on the other hand, criticised the Turkish legal system for its broad 
interpretation of the legal provisions in relation to the freedom of the press and stated that “this 
legal uncertainty puts journalists, writers, publishers, politicians, academics and others at risk of 





 Throughout the mid-2000s, which was after the beginning of the acceleration of the 
Europeanisation process under AKP rule and despite this process motivating the Turkish state to 
undertake democratic reforms, the economic crisis of the European Union and the lack of political 
support (EU countries) for Turkey’s EU accession led to a decrease in the possibility of an EU 
prospect for Turkey. It resulted in the AKP government slowing down the reform process and 
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losing the impetus for its implementation.
683
 Therefore, this author points out that in its second term 
the AKP asserted pressure on the opposition press to secure its control. Based on the political 
history in relation to the press examined in the previous chapter, and considering that the new 
governments (even the military officers who took power in the political history of Turkey) were 
eager to take control of the press in order to allow the dissemination of information in favour of 
their own agendas. It is not surprising that AKP followed this same trend as soon as it secured its 
power after its first successful election results in 2002 and started to openly interfere in journalistic 
practices after its second term. 
 
 The present researcher observes that although during the EU accession process the Turkish 
state undertook various legal and constitutional reforms, the Turkish Penal Code and the Anti-
Terror Law still remain the biggest restriction for freedom of the press. Therefore, as Hammarberg 
suggests, this legislation is “are the origin of the vast majority of freedom of expression cases 




 The 2015 Report of Freedom House, argues that the 2008 amendments to Penal Code 
Article 301 “were largely cosmetic” despite amendments such as reducing the maximum prison 
sentence and adding the requirement of the Ministry of Justice’s approval for its use; the expensive 
and time consuming trials still lead to self-censorship of the press. Penal Code Article 216 
continues to threaten the freedom of the press because it is intensively used against journalists; 
similarly Article 301 causes self-censorship of the press because it permits imprisonment of up to 
three years for “incitement to hatred.”
685
 In addition, Articles 215, 216, and 301 are merely re-
worded versions of the older provisions 312, 159, and 155 of the previous Penal Code.
686
 Because 
the reform packages did not touch TCK Articles 125, 301 and 314,
687
 despite the other press-related 
amendments made in the reform packages, the vaguely drawn language of TCK and TMK still 
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continues be used to allow journalist imprisonments.
688
 In that regard, OSCE states that in 2014 
most of the 22 imprisoned journalists in 2014 were charged and/or found guilty under Penal Code 




 Despite the amendments to TMK Articles 6(2) and 7(2) through the process of 
harmonisation with the EU, both articles still restrict the press and remain the biggest burdens to 
their freedom, especially given the increase of the sentence by half if the crime in 7(2) is committed 
through the press.
690
 Chapter 3 shows how the courts have used the Anti-Terror Law to prosecute 
Kurdish and pro-Kurdish journalists who cover the armed conflict between the Turkish military and 
the PKK; criticise the Turkish military for their operations, express pro-Kurdish political 
viewpoints, cover pro-Kurdish demonstrations, interview leaders of the PKK and/or quote them in 
their reports, especially throughout the 1990s. Despite the legal amendments and the AKP’s 
promises of reforms, the 1991 Anti-Terror Law is still being used to censor Kurdish or pro-Kurdish 
journalists. Even though the AKP initiated the “democratic opening” in 2009, based on reforms 
aimed to provide Kurds with their political and cultural rights, it could not be completed because of 
the resurgence of armed conflicts between PKK and the TSK.
691
 Soon after, between 2009 and 
2011, large numbers of journalists were arrested and charged on the alleged basis of being linked to 
the KCK, which is considered to be a part of PKK.
692
 The US Department of State suggests that by 
2011, “authorities were continuing to prosecute more than 4,000 cases against Kurdish politicians at 
year’s end. Most members were investigated and prosecuted for alleged ties to the KCK or for 
making statements critical of the government or in support of the PKK or its leader, Abdullah 
Ocalan.”
693
 According to the BIANET Report of 2011, 36 journalists were arrested on the basis of 
KCK and PKK membership as well as making terrorist propaganda.
694
 On that basis, CPJ reports 
that journalists who only carry out journalistic activities such as gathering data or making 
interviews can be interpreted as committing crimes on behalf of a terrorist organisation based on 
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Articles 2, 6, and 7 of the Anti-Terror Law and Penal Code Article 216.
695
 As discussed in Chapter 
3, Ozgur Gundem newspaper was closed down in the 1990s several times, and journalists who 
worked for Ozgur Gundem were killed. In 2012, under the KCK operations,
696
 the newspaper was 
closed down once more, and in 2011 eight of its journalists were imprisoned. 
 
 Bilge Yesil discusses that journalist arrests under the KCK operations/case affected critical 
reporting on the Kurdish issue as the journalists were discouraged from covering it. Ertugrul 
Mavioglu from Radikal newspaper, Ece Temelkuran from Haberturk newspaper, and Yildirim 
Turkey from Radikal newspaper were, in order, prosecuted, dismissed, and forced to resign on the 
basis of “their sharp criticism of the AKP’s Kurdish policy. This stands as an example of how 
police, judicial, and economic pressures symbolically work to subvert the media’s watchdog role 




 It is possible to see the implications of the broadly drawn Anti-Terror Law, for as of 2012, 
51 journalists out of 72 in prison who were Kurdish and were accused under the Anti-Terror Law 
on the basis of allegedly spreading Kurdish propaganda with the aim of harming national security 
and territorial integrity. These journalists, were accused of insulting state institutions, inciting 
hatred, and attempting to overthrow AKP (“the government” as the law provides).
698
 Yesil argues 
that, this also implies that “by widening the definition of anti-state crimes, the courts and 
government agencies use the country’s political dynamics as an excuse to justify their surveillance, 
criminalisation, and censorship practices—all in the name of protecting the nation from external 
and internal threats.”
699
 Mahoney, in that regard, states that Erdoğan and AKP have been 
appropriating the tactics previously used by nationalists, namely employing the broadly drawn 
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 According to the numbers given by Senem Aydin and Fuat Keyman, 15 journalists were in 
prison in June 2009, 57 in 2010, 68 in 2011 and 95 in 2012;
701
 these numbers resulted in Turkey 
holding the highest number of imprisoned journalists in the world including China, Eritrea and 
Iran.
702
 Freedom House confirmed the numbers of imprisoned journalists by pointing out that the 
number of ones prosecuted under the Anti-Terror Law increased to 150 in 2010 six times more than 
in 2009; it also reported that in most of the cases the alleged crime consisted of the expression of 
political opinion.
703
 As a result, in its 2013 report, Freedom House categorised Turkey “partly free” 
emphasising that the country’s civil liberties were at risk.
704
 Soon after, the European Commission, 
stated that “self-censorship had become a common phenomenon” in the press in Turkey.
705
 It can 
therefore be argued that the lack of any resolution on the Kurdish issue continues to form one of the 
biggest burdens of the freedom of the press in Turkey.
706
 However, the reasons behind the high 
number of incarcerated journalists in 2012 (this year in which the highest number of journalists 
were in jail) and the motives of their prosecutions prove that political intolerance is also one of the 
main causes of the censorship of the press in Turkey today. As the accusations and convictions are 
still justified under the two broadly drawn legal codes, namely the Turkish Penal Code and Anti-
Terror Law
707
 it is important to discuss together the dangerous combination of broadly defined legal 
provisions (based on national security and territorial integrity for the imprisonment of the Kurdish 
journalists), the monetary sanctions the government imposed on the media owners to silence the 
opposition press, and the strict authoritarian tendencies of the former PM Erdogan. 
 
 The Freedom House Report of 2015, which classifies Turkey’s press “not free”,
708
 reveals 
that despite the democratic steps AKP started to take during the initial years of its governance, 
freedom of the press has taken a wrong turn due to legal and political restrictions and the economic 
interests of the media owners who depend on their close relations with the government. Besides, 
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this author observes that Erdogan’s reactions to the people’s demand for improvement during the 
Gezi protests arguably provoked a new polarisation of society in the way he politically categorised 
people (discussed later in this chapter) as well as political sensitivities of the party which is based 
on the experiences of previous Islamic rooted political parties. 
 
 
4.5 Jailing journalists on political grounds: the Ergenekon case 
 
 The Ergenekon organisation was allegedly a military-rooted organisation that aimed to 
overthrow the AKP government with a coup that was planned to take place in 2003-2004. 
Ergenekon was also allegedly held responsible for the racist killings that took place in Turkey
709
 
over the last 25 years. Gareth Jenkins argues that the military coups in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997 
(discussed in Chapter 3) suggest that there was widespread faith among Ergenekon’s followers to 
overthrow the government.
710
 Its operations were initially supported by many newspapers and 
“liberal” intellectuals, who saw the process as a positive step that should have been taken a long 
time ago in order to bring an end to the military rule over politics and provide transparency in state 
affairs by disclosing the deep state relationships in Turkey.
711
 However, the lack of transparency 
and due process under the law when it came to prosecuting journalists led to extreme long periods 
of pretrial detention; their release on bail was uneven and unpredictable, and defendants’ 
complaints of a lack of access to evidence led to domestic and international questioning of the 
legitimacy of the case and suspicions of its political motivations. 
  
 Hoffman and Werz emphasise the number of coups that took place in the political history of 
Turkey and the conspiratorial fear that was created within society and among politicians. They 
argue that the military interventions, the closure of the Welfare Party by the Constitutional Court in 
                                                 
709
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 and the attempt to close down AKP in 2008 caused the AKP to minimise the military 
influence on politics. The present research argues that this might be another reason why opposition 
journalists as well as journalists with strong secular backgrounds were imprisoned through the 
Ergenekon trials. Therefore, despite its success in the 2002 elections, the support it received from 
different political backgrounds, and its strong party policies based on democracy, human rights, and 
EU accession, the AKP remained a target for secularist opposition by CHP, the military, and the 
civil groups who suspected AKP of having a secret Islamic agenda to roll back the secularist 
reforms in the country.
713
 AKP’s links with the previously closed down parties (arguably continuing 
to pose a legitimacy problem),
714
 and the experiences of the Islamic rooted parties in the political 
history of Turkey fuelled the motivations to silence the opposition through the Ergenekon trials. 
The attempt to close AKP in its initial years also added to the reasons why AKP felt threatened by 
the military officers and the secularists.  It is suggested by Harris that because the Turkish military 
removed legitimately elected civilian governments repeatedly in the past, yet the politicians in 
Turkey, as witnessed in the Ergenekon case, fear that the military can intervene again with 





 Because the Ergenekon case consisted of a long, complicated, and highly disputed trial 
process, it is unrealistic to fully cover all its steps. Therefore, this section focuses on unfair 
procedures and excessive detention periods veteran journalists faced, which aroused indignation 
within the domestic and international society and journalist’s unions. This section also seeks to 
demonstrate that the attempt to reduce the military’s role in Turkish politics, which the Ergenekon 




 The Ergenekon case started in 2008, and journalist Mustafa Balbay was arrested. In 2010, 
which was called “the second wave” of the Ergenekon operations, the owner of Oda Tv, 
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investigative journalist Soner Yalcin, was arrested. Finally, in the third wave of the operations, in 
2011, internationally recognised journalists Ahmet Sik and Nedim Sener were arrested, creating an 
international outcry concerning the freedom of the press in Turkey. 
 
 
4.5.1 Mustafa Balbay  
 
 Mustafa Balbay was a journalist/columnist for Cumhuriyet newspaper and is a member of 
parliament. He was accused and detained with allegations of attempting to destroy the government 
and the Parliament of the Republic of Turkey,
717
 attempting to dissolve the Government of  the 
Turkish Republic,
718
 provoking the citizens to rise in revolt against the Government of the Turkish 
Republic,
719
 forming organised groups to commit offences against state security and the 
constitutional order,
720
 destroying documents and certificates relating to state security,
721
 accessing 
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(2) Precautions specific to legal entities are imposed in case of commission of the offences defined in this article 
by corporation. 
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documents beyond its purpose, is punished with imprisonment from eight years to twelve years. 
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the restricted information related to state security,
722
 and disclosing of restricted information about 
state security
723
 under TCK Articles 311, 312, 313, 314, 326, 327, and 334.  
 
 Balbay was detained under these serious accusation on 6 March 2009 and was kept in 
detention for nine months based on his news coverage and alleged relations with the military before 
his first trial.
724
 The evidence used against Balbay was documents retrieved from his home and 
office, the news stories covered by him with journalistic purposes, and wiretapped telephone 
conversations, which were used for the allegations of his relations with the military officers with the 
intention of preparing a coup against AKP.
725
 The evidence against Balbay also included notes that 
were allegedly claimed to be his; however, they were eventually found to be “not original”, 
indicating they were fabricated by external means; the expert report prepared by the Bogazici 
University Computer Engineering Department stated that the notes purportedly covering the years 




 Despite this report and Balbay’s testimony during the trials, based on Istanbul 13th High 
Criminal Court’s verdict, Balbay remained in detention for more than four years. The prosecutors 
had not provided any evidence based on this accusation under TCK 313, and Balbay was not 
interrogated based on this accusation.
727
 Balbay throughout this process criticised the allegations 
and the case for being highly “political”, and that it aimed to silence the opposition press.
728
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Regarding the government’s accusations and his journalistic documents that were introduced as 
evidence, he stated that “if you try to produce a crime from an archive belonging to a journalist, you 




 In the final verdict by the court on 5 August 2013, 34 years and 8 months imprisonment was 
ruled for Balbay. After almost 5 years of detention, Balbay was acquitted by the same court based 
on the Constitutional Court’s decision in 2013. The Constitutional Court’s verdict stated that 
Balbay’s detention lacked legitimate grounds because it did not incorporate solid collaborating 
evidence that could warrant his imprisonment and it surpassed acceptable limits. On this basis, the 
Constitutional Court decided that Article 19(7) which states that “persons under detention shall 
have the right to request trial within a reasonable time and to be released during investigation or 
prosecution. Release may be conditioned by a guarantee as to ensure the presence of the person at 
the trial proceedings or the execution of the court sentence”, was violated and that 5.000 Turkish 





4.5.2 Soner Yalcin 
 
 In 2010, in the second wave of the Ergenekon investigation, investigative journalist Soner 
Yalcin, owner of the Odatv website was arrested on 18 February 2011, with the allegations of 
“collaborating with the Ergenekon organisation”, “incitement to hatred and hostility”, and 





specifies “provoking people to be malicious and hostile”.
733
 The investigation against Yalcin was 
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based on the allegations that Odatv, and therefore its owner Yalcin and fourteen other people 
including journalists
734
 were disseminating information in support of the Ergenekon organisation 
with an aim to overthrow the AKP government and to shape public opinion in that direction.
735
 The 
evidence presented in the indictment of Yalcin’s arrest was documents relating to his journalistic 
work found in his home and office, including news articles, interviews, and books.
736
 Three expert 
reports from universities in Istanbul and Ankara found the computer files, including “documents” 
collected at Odatv offices, to have been fabricated externally by computer malware. However, 
Yalcin’s request to have the case invalidated based on these reports was rejected by the court 
because it did not take them into consideration.
737
 The lack of evidence justifying Yalcin’s 
detention violates Turkish Criminal Procedural Law Article 205 stating that “after the accused has 




 Despite the fact that no evidence included in the Odatv indictment had any direct and clear 
indication to the alleged crime, Yalcin, who was arrested on 18 February 2011, had his first trial on 
27 December 2011, which was a violation of due process as regulated by Turkish Constitution 
Article 141 (“it is the duty of the judiciary to conclude trials as quickly as possible”
739
) and ECHR 
Article 5 (“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his 




 Odatv because of its tradition of including opposition journalists criticising AKP’s policies 
and because of the political motivations behind the Ergenekon investigation, brought the issue of 
press censorship in Turkey to international attention, especially given that the indictment, consisting 
of 145 pages,
741
 used the terms “news” 361 times, “book” 280 times, “interview” 26 times and 
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 While the indictment itself was a clear indication that the journalists were 
arrested based on their professional practices in order to silence their opposition, the international 
press rights’ defenders condemned the case overall for the arbitrary detentions and “the repressive 




 Influenced by the domestic and international outcry against Odatv trials, Yalcin was 
released on parole (imposing a ban on leaving the country) on 27 December 2012 by Istanbul 16th 
High Criminal Court considering the time he spent in detention and the availability and sufficiency 





4.5.3 Nedim Sener & Ahmet Sik 
 
 Finally, investigative journalists Nedim Sener745 and Ahmet Sik were arrested on 6 March 
2011 in the third wave of the Ergenekon investigation for allegedly “being a member of a terrorist 
organisation” as provided in TCK 314/2, 314/3746, and 220(7) and Article 5 of TMK.747 Similar to 
Soner Yalcin, evidence against Sener and Sik consisted of fabricated documents found on various 
computers named “Nedim” and “Ahmet” which allegedly included assistance to the Ergenekon 
organisation.748 Journalistic documents such as notes taken for book preparations and interview 
notes and Sik’s unpublished book called “Imam’s Army”, which was claimed to have been created 
in collaboration with the Ergenekon organisation in order to overthrow the AKP government. Sik 
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was alleged to have been writing the book with Sener’s assistance, thereby allegedly facilitating the 
Ergenekon plot.749  
 
 Despite both journalists’ defence stating that they did not know the names they were 
claimed to be in co-operation with, Sik’s book was banned and confiscated
750
 and declared as being 
as dangerous as a bomb by then PM Erdogan.
751
 Because “Imam’s Army” exposed the religious 
community of the Gulenist Movement (Fethullah Gulen), and its relations with the AKP 
government (the book details the establishment of the Gülen community members into the Turkish 
bureaucracy), it raised suspicion that his arrest was a result of the book’s content rather than his 
involvement in the alleged Ergenekon organization
752
, which he has worked on only as a journalist 
to analyse and expose. 
 
 Sener’s arrest was criticised by the domestic and the international community
753
, for his 
arrest was considered to depend on his investigative work and the book he had released in 2009 
implicating the responsibility of the police officers in Hrant Dink’s murder and the lack of 




 Nevertheless, Nedim Sener and Ahmet Sik were detained for more than one year despite the 
fabricated evidence used against them (files found on their computer were reported to have been 
transferred via a virus
755
), and were released by Istanbul 16th High Court Decision taking into 
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 The Political motivations behind the Oda TV case were discussed by Sener and Sik in an 
interview by CPJ in which Sik states: 
 
The Ergenekon investigations have been turned into a tool to suppress the 
opposition.... Criticizing the government and drawing attention to the dangerous 
network of people in the police and judiciary who are members of the Gülen 
community is enough in today's Turkey to become an Ergenekon suspect…When 
you consider the reason for my arrest was a book which featured journalistic 
work, of course this is censorship.
757
 
Similarly, Sener highlights the partiality of the judiciary in order to explain the political motivation 
of the case: 
We are under arrest as a result of the coordinated stance of the police and the 
judiciary.  Zekeriya Öz, the prosecutor who had us arrested said after the reaction 
(to our arrest): “These journalists were not arrested because of the stories, books 
and articles they have written but because of some secret evidence which I cannot 
reveal now.” Almost five months passed since then, no such evidence was 




 The journalists’ cases reveal that there was a lack or no evidence to justify their detentions 
and imprisonments. Besides violating Article 206 of the Turkish Criminal Procedure Law as stated 
previously, this also breaches ECHR Article 5, which provides the “right to liberty and security”.759 
In that regard, Sener and Sik’s appeal to the ECtHR was approved by the court on the basis that the 
pre-detention period for both investigative journalists, each lasting over one year, breached the 
Convention Articles 5 (3),760 5(4),761 and Article 10.762 The court stated that the reasons for its 
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  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human 
Rights, as amended) (ECHR) art 5 
760
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human 
Rights, as amended) (ECHR) art 5 
Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be 
brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be 
entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to 
appear for trial. 
Page | 159  
 
detention was neither “relevant” nor “sufficient” to justify the detention. 763  In relation to the 
detention period the court also acknowledged the breach of Article 10, reasoning that without 
sufficient and relevant grounds keeping the applicant for a long period of time under detention 
created a chilling effect on Sik’s willingness to expressing his views on similar topics that are for 
public interest. The judges’ decision to keep Sik in detention would also lead to self-censorship of 
the other investigative journalists who report on related issues such as the government’s policies 
and operations.764  
 
4.5.4 Assessment: political motivations of the case  
 
 As one of the most disputed investigations in Modern Turkish history, the Ergenekon 
investigation was seen as a test for the judicial system. Hundreds of suspects were given arbitrary 
detentions and the investigation produced millions of documents, which raised questions regarding 
the integrity of the investigation by the judiciary; this led to criticisms about whether an objective 
critical analysis of the case was even possible.
765
 Another aspect of the criticisms against the lack of 
judicial impartiality was the way the Ergenekon investigation was handled by the judiciary with 
disregard for due process, a lack of substantial evidence supporting serious accusations of the 
suspects possible affiliations with any terrorist or other type of organisation, and the lengthy 
detention periods with no formal charges made. Finally, and most importantly, doubts were created 




 The long duration of the investigation, was seen as a way to silence criticism against the 
government and create an atmosphere of self-censorship among the press as journalists faced 4091 
investigations against them on the basis of “attempting to influence a fair trial” by reporting on 
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 Self-censorship was also based on fear caused by the imprisonment of veteran 
journalists who seemed to have been a part of the Ergenekon investigation simply because they 
opposed the government or because of their secular backgrounds, for the ones who criticised the 
investigation were brought into the spotlight by the pro-AKP newspapers as well as arrested on the 
charges of being a part of Ergenekon themselves. In the Ergenekon investigation, the common facts 
among almost all the journalists under suspicion was their clear opposition to AKP, which resulted 
in the opposition groups’ accusation of the Ergenekon investigation as being an act of revenge by 
AKP for the closure case against it in 2008.
768
 As Akalin and Eral suggest, the legitimacy of the 
case has also been hindered by the pro-AKP press, which regularly frightened the opposition press 
by illegally publishing evidence from the investigation.
769
 This took place in the form of making 
allegations in the indictment of the case as if they were the absolute facts of the case, leaking 
information to the pro-AKP press from the indictment throughout the process of its preparation, and 
specifying the allegations that were to be made by the prosecutor before the interrogation of the 
suspects started.
770
 As a result, by declaring the Ergenekon plot as a “terror organisation” before the 
trials were concluded, the journalists’ right to a presumption of innocence which is guaranteed 
under the Turkish Constitution
771
 was violated.  
 
  Therefore, in summary, the Ergenekon spread fear among the anti-AKP segments of society 
as well as the ones against Islamic conservatism.
772
 In general, it can be argued that the Ergenekon 
investigation, which effectively was a deep-state investigation, was used as a justification for 
prosecuting the opposition journalists while the media owners’ pressure led to opposition press’s 
self-censorship.  
 
 The secularists found AKP’s efforts to strengthen civilian control to be a threat to the 
military’s power status, which is seen as the protector of the Turkish state. Because of the 
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correlative paranoia between the Islamist/conservative AKP and secular Kemalists,
773
 the press was 
divided into two main groups — as pro-and-anti AKP — and the fear and suspicion of the presence 
of an Islamist/conservative settlement and manipulation in the judiciary
774
 led to mistrust in the 
Ergenekon investigation of journalists.  On the other hand, further in the chapter it is observed that 
AKP continues to act upon the fears of the deep state military power and international plots that are 
seen as the ultimate threat to its very existence. 
 
 Last but not least, the Ergenekon investigation forms a clear example of how the Turkish 
judiciary has moved from following the state ideology under the military since the establishment of 
the Republic, into a politically-driven estate that raises serious concerns regarding its impartiality. 
Jenkins argues the following about this shift: 
 
The politicisation of the Turkish judicial system is nothing new. In the past, the 
system was frequently abused to suppress what were perceived as ideological 
threats to the Turkish state; such as leftists, Islamists and Kurdish nationalists. 
Similarly, for most of the last 50 years, a system of military tutelage has served as 
a constraint on the development of a fully functioning pluralistic democracy. 
However, the Ergenekon case and its affiliated investigations suggest that, under 
the AKP, Turkey has been swapping one form of authoritarianism for another; 
and that the judicial system continues to operate not according to proof, due 




 In conclusion, this author argues that the Ergenekon investigation proves the inherited 
inclination toward conspiracy theories that directed the political phases discussed in Chapter 3 and 
motivated the judicial decisions rather than the language of law on the basis of evidence. 
Alternatively, AKP is observed to have been “using” the sensitivities in its past almost with the 
intention to retaliate for the experience of the political parties with Islamic roots, such as the 
Welfare Party from whose ashes AKP was born. AKP’s motivations have affected the freedom of 
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the press and the democratisation process in Turkey negatively, as seen in the Ergenekon case. The 
legal rights and freedoms of the journalists had been violated under the name of “democratisation” 
as the Ergenekon investigation aimed to inspect the deep-state relations within the country. This 
raises concerns on the future application of law for judicial censorship of the press, supported by 
strong political motives. In light of this context, it is fair to attribute the impetus behind the 
Ergenekon case as being the will to control press institutions rather than to facilitate 
democratisation. 
 
4.6 Media ownership and the freedom of the press 
4.6.1 Legal grounds for media ownership and the cross-ownership of the media by large 
corporations 
 
 During the AKP government, censorship of the press mostly took place via the direct control 
of the news through the media owners; the cross ownership of the media by large corporations,
776
 
which are in a business relationship with the government, explains this collusion.
777
 In Turkish Law 
there are no legal regulations which restrict the ownership of the press. Only the Press Law Article 
7 requires all print media to be registered: 
The declaration submitted bearing the signature of the owner of the publication 
and the representative of the owner if he/she is below 18 or a corporate body and 
the responsible editor shall include the following information: the name of the 
publication and its contents; in which periods it shall be published; the 
headquarters of the management; and the names and addresses of the owner, the 
representative if he/she exists, responsible editor, and the assistant editor if he/she 
exists; and the form of the publication.    
If the owner of the publication is a corporate body, documents which demonstrate 
that the conditions laid down in Articles 5 and 6 exist and one copy of the 
regulations or principle agreement or the settlement deed shall be added to the 
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declaration. Upon receipt of the declaration and its additions, the Office of the 




 This lack of legal regulation is one of the main factors thwarting pluralism of ideas in the 





 Even though free market values advocate that anyone could set up media/communication 
organisations, it must be taken into consideration that it is the capital among the economic elites 
that actually dominates news reporting. Directly affecting the quality as well as the diversity of the 
information received by readers.
781
 According to Ansah, “anyone” who is financially powerful 
enough to own a newspaper, is allowed by the “free market”, which means that those with solid 
economic grounds, will be the ones controlling the press and the capacity of the press to improve 
democracy will be weakened.
782
 As Kalyango and Eckler suggest, the fourth-estate role of the press, 
which is considered to be fundamental for democracies, can be fulfilled when media ownership 
allows editorial liberty
783
 — unimpeded by governmental and political intervention.
784
 Therefore it 
is possible to argue that the large number of newspapers in operation does not necessarily reflect a 
high degree of press freedom in Turkey, nor a contribution of the press to the enhancement of 




 The media in Turkey belongs to a small number of private companies, which earn mainly 
from outside the media sector,786 namely  energy, telecommunication, banking, and construction;787 
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this monopoly hinders freedom of the press because the investments of the media owners outside 
the media sector are bound by government regulations and contracts that would force journalists to 
follow the government788 prerogative or else be silenced or even forced to resign.789  
 
 Even though the press was in support of AKP during the first general elections in 2002, the 
press seized support from the government, and Dogan Media Group, which held the largest media 
group in Turkey, expressed disapproval of AKP’s policies and reform packages. More specifically, 
after the parliament approved the constitutional amendment permitting the use of headscarves at 
universities,
790
 Hurriyet newspaper (Dogan Media Group) proclaimed this as the beginning of a 
chaos period — “411 hands rose to chaos”, referring to the members of parliament who voted in 
favour of this change.
791
 This was one example of Hurriyet’s opposition coverage of the AKP 
government among the other reports that aimed to shape public opinion against the government 
based on secularist concerns. Therefore, the heavy tax fine (2.5 billion US dollars) against Dogan 
Media Group levied by the government in 2009 was widely seen as a political reaction, for only 
weeks before the fine was sanctioned against the Group, PM Erdogan made an open declaration 
against the opposition media stating that such newspapers must not be supported
792
 because they 




 The European Commission Report suggested that “the high fines imposed by the revenue 
authority potentially undermine the economic viability of the Group and therefore affect freedom of 
the press in practice.”
794
 This situation is suggested by John Street as a way of governments’ 
restriction of press freedom by the use of lawsuits for the punishment of media organisations.
795
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 This research observes that, the reasons for the AKP’s increasing lack of tolerance of the 
press, lies in the historical and current political sensitivities of the party. Looking at the initial 
process of EU membership, it is possible to see its positive influence on the legal reforms 
improving the legal framework
796
 despite the lack of a genuine intention to change the broadly 
drawn articles of the Turkish Penal Code and the Anti-Terror Law. However, the government’s 
willingness to accelerate the accession process between 2002 and 2007 was followed by a loss of 
motivation stemming from the government’s foreign policy shifting toward the Middle East,
797
 the 
commencement of “Euroscepticism” as suggested by Gulmez
798
 a lack of political toleration to 
opposition, and the fear of military threat against AKP — all of which resulted in restrictions on the 
press. The approval of headscarves being worn at the universities, Hurriyet’s sensational report on 
the issue, the appeal of the chief Prosecutor of the Court of Appeals to close down AKP on the basis 
of it being the “centre for anti-secular activities”
799
 (resulting in cuts in treasury grants to the 
party
800
) were all seen as a personal attack by Erdogan and as a threat to his party, resulting in his 




 It is necessary now to understand the changing trends of media ownership since the AKP 
government took power. When compared with the previous government’s will to control the 
press,
802
 Rethink Institute Washington’s study suggests the extent of AKP’s use of the tools for 
such control is similar to the one/single-party period. Left-centrist mainstream media
803
, which used 
to criticise the religious motivations of the government, deliberately toned down its rhetoric and 
ceased critical commentary against the AKP government after 2009
804
 (see Dogan Media Group 
above).  
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 The government’s creation of its own media started with Star Daily (Uzan Group), and was 
followed by the sale of Star to Ethem Sancak (Sancak Media Group), who is known to have close 
links with the former AKP leader and Prime Minister Erdogan
805
, who later sold the majority of his 
shares to former AKP member Tevhid Karakaya, whose partner Fettah Tamince sold his shares to 
Murat Sancak,
806
 nephew of Ethem Sancak.
807
 In like manner, Sabah-ATV Media Group — which 
before its sale dominated the media in Turkey with Dogan Group holding 70% of broadcast and 
print media together — was first sold to Calik Group, which held strong ties with the government, 
and then to Kalyon Group
808
 who prevailed in the public sector for constructing the third airport in 
Istanbul.
809
 Finally, today, the press is in Turkey is in the hands of a small group of media owners, 
namely Dogan, Turkuvaz, Ciner Cukurova, Dogus, and Feza, who have their holdings in energy, 




 Regarding the monopolies in the private sector of media ownership, Penman discusses that 
even though as a part of the EU harmonisation process, Competition Law in Turkey was enacted in 
1994,
811
 it was not applied to the media sector until 2000.
812
 The 4th, 6th, and 7th articles of the 
Competition Law no. 4054 regulate the contracts, actions, and decisions that restrict competition, 
abuse of the dominant state of competition, mergers and acquisitions. The unsanctioned breaches of 
Competition Law, according to Kurban and Sozeri, play a debilitative role in promoting pluralism 
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among small press owners. This also puts the Competition Authority under the subjection of the 




 As the economic alliances among media owners allowed greater control of the press, the 
government became more reluctant to implement reforms concerning freedom of expression and the 
press. The reforms undertaken during AKP’s first term in government were abandoned, 
exemplifying the control wielded by former Prime Minister Erdogan on media owners and the 
extent to which media owners were willing to follow his directions: in the October 2011, Erdogan 
directed Anadolu Agency (AA), Ankara News Agency (ANKA), Cihan News Agency (CIHAN), 
Ihlas News Agency (IHA), and Turkish News Agency (AHT) to be cautious when covering the 
news related to terrorism and violence, it was only the next day when a common announcement was 
made by these companies that they agreed to cover the news accordingly.
814
 In order to explain their 
will to comply with the PM’s orders, the news agency owners justified their decision on the basis of 
“taking account of public order, keeping a distance from interpretations that encourage fear, chaos 
hostility, panic or intimidation, not including propaganda for illegal organisations.”
815
 This was 
seen as a threat to press freedom by RSF, which criticised the government and the media owners: 
“We had hoped that the era of government directives telling the media how to cover the most 
sensitive subjects was long over in Turkey. The very vaguely formulated undertaking by the leading 




 As a result of this agreement and the economic interests of the media owners, the people’s 
right to information was highly affected
817
; this is especially evident in the Roboski/Uludere 
massacre, which took place in the South East part of Turkey where 34 Kurdish civilians were 
bombed by Turkish military jets due to an alleged misunderstanding as the villagers, who were 
engaged in cross-border smuggling were mistaken for members of PKK terrorist organisation and 
killed. The mainstream press was silent on the issue until the government’s official press statement. 
This was the first big incident before the Gezi protests where the people could hear about an event 
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only from social media sources, mainly Twitter, and was the first occasion when the people 
proclaimed their right to information had been infringed.
818
 Trust in the accurate dissemination of 
news was hindered after the censorship of the Uludere/Roboski bombing. 
 
 As previously discussed in Chapter 3, the Kurdish issue has been one of the major factors 
shaping the political policies that impact on Turkey’s press freedom. The Kurdish people’s demand 
for democratic rights in the face of repression is still ongoing, and the Turkish nationalists, with 
their strong Kemalist ideology, still put pressure on the current government not to make concession 
on the issue. Even though the issue is more openly discussed in parliament, journalists still face a 




 Besides the direct censorship of journalists through imprisonment, the AKP government is 
argued to use their business relations with media owners as an indirect way to silence opposition 
journalists, for the economic interests of the companies depend on business contracts with the 
government. This collusion restricts the expression of journalists who work within the media sector 
of these companies because the government can require the owners to apply pressure on the 
opposition. Media owners who prioritise their economic interests over the people’s right to accurate 
and non-biased information or the journalists’ right to free expression limit content of severe 
political criticism. The mainstream press therefore faces extreme pressure from media owners based 
on the owners’ direct business links with the government — links which render their economic 




 Yanardagoglu states that the press is in a worse situation than it was in the 1990s because of 
the special “AKP media” that only covers what the prime minister finds permissible. As a result, the 
significant fear and pressure experienced by the press during the AKP period
821
 demonstrates the 
sincerity of the issues that the press has encountered in the last decade. Ogun supports this 
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statement, suggesting that “in the political environment supported by AKP, the media, therefore, 
journalism in Turkey have been divided into two groups, namely, the ones who are in support of 
AKP and its policies and the ones who are against it. In result of such division, the media who do 
not support the AKP principles have been excluded from access to information”,
822
 such as when 




 This is why the terms “political parallelism”
824
 and/or “partisan media”
825
 are used to define 
the situation of the media in Turkey today. In that regard, political parallelism is defined by Hallin 
and Mancini as “media content”,
826
 and it also includes the reader’s political choices as well as a 
journalist’s personal affiliations as Yesil argues. In that regard, Yesil categorises the Turkish 
newspapers as pro-or-anti-AKP, namely Cumhuriyet, Sozcu, and Taraf being anti-AKP, Zaman, 
Sabah, Star, Bugun, Yeni Safak, and Yeni Akit being pro-AKP, and Haberturk, Hurriyet, Milliyet, 
Radikal and Vatan being the mainstream newspapers that have a degree of critical content.
827
 The 
media is therefore argued to have been divided into two camps — the mainstream press in one, 
which is mostly focused on their economic interests through high circulation and the pro-
government group in the other, which is categorised as the Islamist press and more interested in 
spreading its own ideologies.
828
 Baydar suggests that when the government creates its own media 
group and applies pressure on the other groups that do not conform with its policies, fired or 




 In that regard, as it is also observed by Kaya and Cakmur, even the transition into the liberal 
economy in 1980 and the privatisation of press ownership did not bring an end to the government 
control over the press and rather fortified political parallelism making the press a tool for the 
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fulfilment of holdings’ interests.
830
 This allows the categorisation of the press in Turkey within the 
Polarised Pluralist Model
831
 that embodies the dominant role of the government and the state as 
well as political parallelism,
832
 where the media assets of media owners are used in addition to their 
close relationship with the government as a means to acquire business contracts with the 
government.
833
 Mutually, having business relations with the media owners, the governments can 
also influence the content of the news and censor the press through economic pressure on the media 
owners
834
 as by way of this research observed to be the current practice in Turkey. 
  
 In light of media ownership and political parallelism in Turkey Duran argues that the press 
has been relocated from a position in which it protected and stood for the military to a position in 
which stands with the government.
835
 It is therefore possible to argue that, as Peterson suggests, no 
matter what press theory is adopted within the country, the press covers and reflects the politically 
and culturally dominant ideologies.
836
 Similarly, Kaya and Cakmur argue that political subservience 
is distinctively present in Turkey based on the character of former PM Erdogan, who “could not 
refrain himself from threatening the journalists in his public addresses several times. His recent call 
for media bosses to fire the columnists who failed to toe the line was a worrying illustration of the 
tendency.”
837
 Because of the political parallelism in Turkey it can be questioned whether a true 
democracy is being settled, or it merely experiences a shift from military tutelage to civilian 
tutelage.
838
 Referring back to Chapter 3 where DP government’s promises of democratisation in its 
initials years shows similarities with the AKP government’s, the present author argues that the 
diminishing democratisation promises followed a similar pattern in Turkey due to the lack of 
political toleration of press criticism, which finally resulted in changing attitudes of the 
governments towards the press as soon as the press started to hold an opposing position. 
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4.6.2 Censorship and self-censorship of the press 
 
 According to Arsan, during AKP’s rule, the percentage of journalists who were concerned 
about the censorship and the self-censorship of the press were high; his interviewees reported that 
they feared being sued by the government officials and felt threatened by governmental and 
economic pressures coming from the media owners they worked with.
839
 Journalists express that 
they receive pressure from the media owners not to go against the government, this leads to self-
censorship due to fear of redundancy.
840
 According to Kurban and Sozeri, this situation is related to 
the pressure of advertisements covering government corruption, politically motivated journalists’ 
layoffs, or any sort of demonstration that would contravene the interests of the big holdings, which 
simultaneously hold the media sector in hand.
841
 The media monopolies attempt to prevent critical 





 Hasan Cemal constitutes an appropriate example of this situation, for he was dismissed from 
Milliyet newspaper for supporting the sensational news covering the meeting between the Peace and 
Democracy Party (pro Kurdish party) representatives and the head of the terrorist organisation 
PKK
843
 in his column in Milliyet.
844
 More specifically, Namik Durukan’s report on the minutes 
from Imrali, which was seen as a journalistic success by many,
845
 was harshly criticised by the 
former PM Erdogan for harming the democratic opening process between the State and the Kurdish 
minority. Cemal’s supportive articles after Erdogan’s reaction toward the report were condemned 
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by Erdogan in his public declaration stating that “if this is journalism, down with it!”.
846
 This was 
received as a clear message by the newspaper (Milliyet) owner, who first censored Cemal’s latest 
articles, and finally Cemal was fired. 
 
 In its report Bianet states that, as a result of Erdogan’s pressure on the mainstream media, 
the executive branch’s interference in the editorial design, and the publication style media owners 
accordingly adopted, 339 journalists, authors and media workers were fired or pressured to resign in 
2014.
847
 In the study undertaken by Gecer, who asked 51 elites (consisting of members of 
mainstream media groups, NGOs, academics and members of parliament) whether there exists 
governmental pressure on the media in Turkey, 70% of the participants confirmed that there is and 
30% of them stated that there was none.
848
 Strikingly, most of the interviewees with closer ties to 
the government belonged to the 30%, and most of the leftists, nationalists and liberals claimed that 
governmental pressure on the media did exist.
849
 Moreover, such interference, even if it was 
thoroughly denied by Erdogan and the executive branch, was made public by the leaked wiretaps in 
2013 and 2014, demonstrating the government’s endeavours to create a media wing that would 
follow its policies and make news in support of its decisions.
850
 Fatih Sarac, who is in the executive 
board of Haberturk Daily that belongs to Ciner Group, was contacted by Erdogan who ordered the 




 It is discussed in Chapter 3 that the press in Turkey, especially in the initial years of its 
democratic governance, could not adopt the role of a watchdog but rather followed the political 
ideology of the ruling elites. This prevented it from allowing the free market of ideas to be 
established. It is observed in this chapter that despite the legal reforms and the changing structure of 
the military-civil government power relations, due to the private ownership of the press turning into 
a profit-run business, contradicting journalism ethics, political patronage of the press prevailed in 
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Turkey. The press’s role (irresponsibility) resulting in partisan press or political patronage is 
expressed by Yin as: 
 
Another form of press irresponsibility is the partisan press or political patronage 
of the press, in which case some press allows itself to be used as political tools 
especially when the democratic system is still young. With a political power 
vacuum as a result of the dismantling of control mechanisms; political families, 
parties, or organisations often take the rush to take the control of the media and 
use the media to advance their particular agendas, often employing such tactics as 
personal attacks or smear campaigns. Such a press tends to exist in free but less 
developed media markets as political patronage provides much needed financial 




 Even though libertarian and social-responsibility theories of the press suggest that private 
ownership of the press is necessary in order to allow the free circulation of information where there 
is no abuse of state power with the involvement of the government control,
853
 Baran and Davis 
argue that “an unregulated media inevitably serves the interests of large socially dominant 
groups”,
854
 observable from the discussions above on media ownership in Turkey. Croteau and 
Hoynes suggest that free-market ideology of the Western doctrines pave the way for the existence 
of media possessors and monopoles who mostly hold the power of manipulation. Croteau and 
Haynes therefore suggest that media being owned by private actors could lead to giving the control 
of society’s way of thinking to a certain group of people who finally become media empires which 
antagonises the idea of a pluralistic press. Then, one can ask whether having media monopoles 
controlling the thoughts of society, and having control of manipulation is any different from 
government authoritarianism.
855
 In that regard, Hachten suggests Western media being controlled 
by a small group of elite, drawing upon “capitalism” and “free market.”
856
 Finally, it is possible to 
argue that newspapers should have independent financial grounds as well as independent 
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journalists, in order to support the multi-party democratic system,
857
 especially when its ability to 
shape public opinion,
858
 with the necessity of a public sphere to exist for the functioning of 





4.6.2.1 Self-censorship of the press as a result of the governmental pressure 
 
 Based on the relationships of economic interest explained above, the press in Turkey 
adopted self-censorship as a part of its everyday practice in which critical reporting and coverage of 
sensitive issues such as the minority issues resulted in politically motivated lay-offs.
860
 This author 
argues that the lack of journalistic professionalism of the media owners inhibits their ability to help 
develop a critical approach towards the official state ideology and to allow the minority or 
opposition groups to shape or influence public opinion.
861
 The danger this situation creates is 
undeniable as the political pressure on the press is added to the professional journalistic culture 
which leads to self-censorship increasingly becoming the normal code of conduct for editors and 




 Taking a journalistic approach, Soner Yalcin classifies journalism in Turkey first by 
journalists who make news by following the interest of the government and the media owners 
(which he calls “the central media”), secondly by journalists who, regardless of the implications, 
defend the right to information and expression and make the truth available to the public. He states 
that only the latter serves the people, who are in search of the truth, which governments and the 
media owners find rather intimidating. According to Yalcin, the truth is beyond the restrictions and 
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 Based on Yalcin’s argument, one can discuss the role of journalistic ethics in the self-
censorship of the press, therefore, it is necessary to examine Turkey’s code of ethics for the 
journalists, which is predominantly set by the Journalists Association of Turkey under the 1998 
Right and Responsibilities Declaration:  
 
Journalists’ rights are the foundations of people’s right to information and 
freedom of expression. Professional ethics is the basis of honest and true 
communication. Journalists use freedom of the press in an honest manner that 
serves the people’s right to receive unbiased information. For this aim journalists 
should resist any sort of censorship and self-censorship and should also direct the 
society towards that purpose. Journalists’ responsibility towards the society comes 
before any responsibility including the ones towards their managers and media 
owners as well as public authorities. Journalists take their contracts with their 
workplace as the main border of requests. Therefore journalists have the right to 
reject any other order or requests outside that border. Journalists cannot be 
pressured to defend an idea they do not believe or undertake a mission that is 
against their professional ethics. In regard to the right to information of the 
society, whatever the implications, journalists must respect the truth and comply 
with it. Journalists, no matter the implications, defend the right to receive 
information and news, freedom of criticism. Journalists prioritise and defend 
peace, democracy, human rights, universal values of humanity, plurality and 
defends respect to differences without any discrimination of nationality, race, 
ethnicity, gender, language, religion, class and philosophical belief. Journalists 
recognises all nations’ and individuals’ rights and reputations. Journalists abstain 
from publications that trigger hatred and enmity between people, societies and 
nations, and cannot make one nation’s or a society’s cultural values and beliefs (or 
no beliefs) a target for assault. Journalists cannot make publications that promote 
or encourage violence and cannot misinterpret journalism with re-advertising, 
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public relations or propaganda. Journalists must obey the law, however must 
reject any sort of government or alike interference. Journalists only take their 
colleagues’ comments and judicial verdicts. Journalists must not become a side to 
a law case and must not declare the accused guilty until the case is finalised, and 




 Based on the journalistic ethics that journalists in Turkey must follow, it is fair to conclude 
that the government or the media owners cannot always be held liable for the self-censorship of the 
press. Former columnist at Vatan (Nation) newspaper, of which she was one of the founders, Ruhat 
Mengi placed the responsibility on the journalists under the title of “free media and government’s 
media” by stating:  
As you all know, Turkish media is now in the hands of the ones who are “very 
close” to the government. There is no necessity to do research on that as it is 
enough to take a look at the way the news is written by checking the columnists 
articles and the newspaper covers. In Turkey, there is a situation in which 
journalists support the government as if it was a football team, which you would 
not be able to observe in another country. It requires a strong will and character to 
choose the country’s benefit when their own is on the other side of the equilibrium 
and as you can guess, it does not appear in all journalists. In that regard, the 
“honest and unbiased journalism” and “checking on government on behalf of the 
people” which falls under the duty of the fourth estate of the press disappeared, 
which is the “actual” role of the press. This is unfortunately the overall picture for 




 From a journalist’s own view, Mengi suggests that the press denied its role as the fourth 
estate, for it no longer produces news that is accurate and unbiased. Mengi, after the sale of her 
newspaper to Demiroren Media Group was fired from Vatan and expressed her grief for the press 
and democracy in Turkey, proclaiming that the “Prime Minister or the President must not state that 
there is a free press or democracy in Turkey. Can there be a democracy without a free press? They 
say that there is no freedom in Egypt, Irak or Syria, however they motivate firing of the opposition 
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columnists. Apart from the government pressure on the press, it also must be highlighted that the 




 This author argues that balancing business and ethics might be the core issue/critical 
problem to touch on in order to allow the free flow of information as well as protecting the society’s 
right to information as the media owners and the chief editors apply censorship on the newspaper 
journalist, in order to prevent the government from exercising power on the newspaper owners who 
risk losing their newspapers or other businesses that are not in direct contact with the press.  
 
 Considering that the government in power has always had an influence on the situation of 
the freedom of the press as well as the tendencies to self-censorship in Turkey, this author argues 
that self-censorship of the press depends on the sensitive issues of the governments. Therefore, the 
analysis of the political history in relation to the transition of the press in Turkey is of great 
importance. This forms a good example of Ying’s statement suggesting that “self-censorship is 
probably a perfect form of political control.”
867
 
 However, the role of the press as the fourth estate868 cannot be perceived separately from the 
economic conditions in which journalists work; this will be discussed in the following section. 
 
 
4.6.2.2 Working conditions of the press 
 
 Working conditions are regulated under “the relations between the ones who work for press 
and the owners Law no. 5953.” However, despite journalists being entitled under this law to receive 
social security,
869
 because they were rather employed under the Labour Law,
870
 they have not 
received the social security were entitled to. Tilic observes that the emergence of the new media 
owners, starting in the 1990s, caused journalists to lose their jobs if they become labour union 
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 The former general manager of the Journalists’ Union of Turkey, along the same line 
as Tilic’s statement, argued that there are legal and practical barriers against the journalists’ 
freedom of association. The legal formation set by the 1982 Constitution permits the arbitrary use 
of labour law among media owners, who perceive being a member of a union a sufficient reason to 
fire journalists. On the other hand, the effects of the 1990s, during which journalists were forced out 
of unions with threats and pressure, can still be seen in the journalists’ reservations toward 
becoming a union member in the 2000s
872
 even though it is a right protected under the Turkish 
Constitution Article 51 regulating “the right to organise unions”: 
 
 Employees and employers have the right to form unions and higher organisations, 
without prior permission, and they also possess the right to become a member of a 
union and to freely withdraw from membership, in order to safeguard and develop 
their economic and social rights and the interests of their members in their labour 





 Moreover, the “gentlemen’s agreement” among media owners led to a wider application of 
self-censorship; based on this agreement, media owners agree that any journalist who quits their 
employment for any reason would not be employed by another media owner.
874
 Ahmet Sik is an 
appropriate example of this situation because he was dismissed from Radikal newspaper (Dogan 
Media Group) in 2005 for his active membership in the journalists’ union. Sik, who sued Dogan 
Media Group for failing to pay overtime wages and lowering the actual payment amounts on the 
pay sheets, was fired from Radikal and was threatened  by being told he will never be reemployed 




 The present author therefore argues that journalists are vulnerable under these conditions, 
which prevent them from following the professional ethics; they lack the legal security to resist the 
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economic pressures exerted by media owners, who are also under economic pressure from their 
business relations with the government. This domino effect stagnates editorial freedom and                            
interferes with the people’s right to information. 
 
 
4.7 Gezi Park Protests 
 
 The Gezi Park protests is a relevant and practical example of the reaction of the government 
toward the democratic demands of the people and of the censorship and the self-censorship of the 
press in relation to the biggest civil uprising in modern Turkey. 
 
 Months before the Gezi protests started, Taksim Square and the park were closed with no 
prior public declaration, and there was no clear explanation from the authorities. The historical 
events leading to the protests started on the 27th May 2013 when the trees in Gezi Park were being 
felled, and a group of young people who saw the demolishing of the trees decided to stay in the 
park and called for more people who stayed with them in tents until the 31st of May. The police 
attacks against the peaceful protestors in the park came on the dawn of the 31st of May with tear 
gas, and water cannons, and burning of the tents. The young people in Gezi were non-political but 
well-educated peaceful protestors who were mainly from the middle-class.
876
 Pictures and videos of 
the police’s disproportionate attack spread quickly on social media, which finally led to the biggest 
social unrest in modern Turkey. The reaction of the government toward a group of peaceful young 
people, whose only aim was to protect the last trees left in one of the most commercial areas in 
Istanbul, tested the patience levels of  citizens, already highly concerned with the attitude of the 
government, mainly the former prime minister, now president Erdogan. 
 
 In that regard, the Gezi protests initially started as a challenge to the transformation of the 
park into a shopping mall that architecturally would reflect Islamic identity, which is mostly found 
in Gulf Arab cities.Participants felt this represented the loss of Istanbul’s original identity
877
 and felt 
excluded from any decision-making process about their cities. Ors argues that Gezi was a creative 
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engagement of people with democracy because they were openly expressing how they desire to be 
governed, specifically by having a voice regarding how their city should look.
878
 Benhabib submits 
that such urban consciousness therefore connected and consolidated the groups that were excluded 
from everyday politics such as the environmentalists, feminist groups, LGBT members, and 
Kurdish groups.
879
   
 
 Ozbudun argues that “obviously, the Gezi Park events cannot be reduced to pure and simple 
environmentalist concerns. Rather, they were the spontaneous explosion of accumulated anxieties 
resulting from what was perceived as the government’s increasing interference with the secular way 
of life and the arena of personal choice.”
880
 Such an approach to democracy that excludes (in other 
words, ignores) the will and demands of the citizens who did not vote for AKP, are reflected in 
Erdogan’s reactions to the Gezi protesters, whom he saw as “the others” who unlawfully 
demonstrated against him. In return, the protesters saw the only way to be heard was to peacefully 
protest against the policies of the government and its interference inter everyday life, by using their 
democratic right of demonstration endorsed by Article 34 in the Constitution; “Everyone has the 





 The violent police reaction toward the peaceful protesters led to larger groups populating the 
street, but while international channels such as CNN-Turk instead aired a penguin documentary,
882
 
which led to the emergence of the penguin as an important symbol for the protesters regarding the 
subordination and silencing of the Turkish mainstream press. This was, however, just a larger-scale 
result of the media owners government business connections, the lack of legal protection for the 
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4.7.1 The government’s attitude toward political criticism 
 
 Tugal posits that the Gezi protests were born in a class-blind manner without a leader,
884
 
which allowed them to stay peaceful despite the police intervention throughout. Nevertheless, the 
exclusive approach of AKP and the PM to everyday politics is reflected on the Gezi protests in the 
same manner. The peacefully expressed democratic demands of people on the streets were 
continuously ignored by the PM throughout the month of June 2013 when he claimed that protests 
were a plot prepared by internal and international groups who aimed to overthrow his government, 
based on interest-rate lobbies and foreign hostilities. The PM alleged the media, which extensively 
covered the events during the Gezi protests, were the ones who originally organised and controlled 
the turmoil in Turkey.
885
 By way of this research it is submitted that, Erdogan’s reaction shows 
similarities with that of Adnan Menderes, who also saw international bodies’ reactions against their 
approach to the press as a “threat against the internal affairs” of the state.
886
 The way both 
Menderes and Erdogan received high public support and still consider any opposition and/or public 
protest as a threat, indicates the lack of broadmindedness and tolerance of criticism, requiring a 
change of approach towards a more practically liberal stance that regards such negative reactions as 
an opportunity to be turned into a positive step towards democratisation.  
 
 However, the PM preferred to assemble his supporters in order to strengthen his 
confirmed/core allegiances,
887
 rather than listen to the demands of “the others”. Dagi argues that, 
when compared with AKP’s political agenda — which heavily depended on EU membership, the 
improvement of human rights conditions, the democratisation process in Turkey in 2002, and the 
undemocratic turn it took before and during the Gezi protests with its reactions toward democratic 
demands of the people. AKP’s failure to internalise human rights and democracy cannot be 
evaluated separately from the insecurity it felt in response to the strong secular political 
establishment in Turkey. This is especially the case considering that AKP’s recent history involves 
party closure risk by the constitutional court on the basis of secular concerns
888
 and that the Welfare 
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Party, the precursor of AKP, followed the National View.
889
 Considering Western values to be evil. 
In that regard, Dagi suggests that AKP used the notion of embracing human rights as merely 
political leverage — a means of “instrumentalisation of human rights” rather than internalisation.
890
 
The present author concludes that despite the incontrovertible effects that political history has on 
the former AKP leader, current President Erdogan, and the AKP government, it is vital to include 
the effects of the rising authoritarian tendencies in Turkey on the censorship of the press; these 
effects can be explained by shifts in what is considered to be “sensitive subjects”. It is submitted 
that this moving of goalposts signals the government’s continual use of national security as an 
excuse to silence the opposition journalists, whereby changes to legal provisions in the 
controversial Penal Code and Anti-Terror Law are effectively cosmetic. However, it is noted that 
even though the military’s role in politics or the Kurdish issue is more openly disputed in the 
parliament, the government’s use of its conservative policies puts pressure on media 
professionals,
891
 for opposition on any grounds against the government, but especially against the 
PM himself, dominates the new sensitive subjects that cannot be openly debated by the press.
892
 
The number of people investigated on the basis of defamation against Erdogan, of which 50 out of 
460 are journalists, is an appropriate indication of the extent of the intolerance toward opposition.
893
 
This shift can be defined on the theoretical basis of “competitive authoritarianism” as suggested by 
Esen and Gumuscu, who argue that civil liberties in Turkey have been under systematic 
violation.
894
 Competitive authoritarianism defines a political atmosphere in which “government 
critics are threatened, harassed and, occasionally, prosecuted” leading to an uneven political arena 
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 This author concludes that the Gezi protests could be used as a positive change toward 
eliminating the stigma of following the political ideology — one has gradually formed throughout 
Turkey’s political history  — and the polarisation amongst the society during the AKP government 
due to the segregated social and political groups. During the protests, groups belonging to opposing 
political ideologies such as extreme right and left, Kurdish groups, and Kemalists, were together 
protesting against the policies of the current government; the protests therefore had the potential 
power to form a turning point for the general atmosphere of the country. The left and the right could 
communicate with the will and intention to understand each other rather than to impose its ideas. 
However, this potential for democracy was diminished by disproportionate police interventions,896 
which resulted in seven deaths and thousands of injured people, deepening the polarisation between 
the religious groups, pro-AKP groups, and the secularists (anti-AKP groups).897  
 
 
4.7.2 Gezi as a practical example for censorship and the censorship of the press 
 
 The PM adopted the approach of criminalising Gezi by claiming that it was organised by the 
“high interest-rate lobby” and asked his voters to support him against this lobby; the mainstream 
media, which did not want to seem to be supporting an international plot,
898
 therefore fired or 




 Gezi was a missed chance for the press to finally play its watchdog role. The press could 
serve as a power that unifies people from different political backgrounds in the country by the 
language it uses to disseminate the truth from all angles, providing a platform for beginning 
democratic and pluralistic discussions across political spectrum. However, once again, political 
pressure, media owners’ dictates on journalists, and the journalists’ choice to assume the role of the 
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government’s spokesman resulted in biased news. Rather than respecting the people’s right to 
information,  the press instead remained subservient to economic interests formed by the close 
relations between media owners and the government. Turkey’s international reputation as a 
democratic country with a Muslim majority, which could have been a model for the region of the 




 While the mainstream media preferred not to cover the protests in order to secure a 
smoother relationship with the government, during the Gezi protests in 2013 alone, 143 journalists 
were forced to resign or fired
901
 of which at least 59 resulted from reporting the Gezi Park 
protests.
902
 Meanwhile, between 27-30 September 2013, 153 journalists were battered and 39 were 
taken into custody.
903
 Journalist Tugce Tatari, who worked for Aksam newspaper for six years, was 
fired for contradicting Erdogan’s claim that Gezi was an international plot to topple him as well as 




 In conclusion, the treatment of the journalists and the clear political stance of the media 
owners during the Gezi protests, once more demonstrate the strong need in Turkey for professional 
news rather than politically driven dissemination of information. The importance of the journalists’ 
will, to resist government pressure and the legal security of the journalists though union 





 Even though AKP has played an important role in democratic consolidation — with the 
reforms adopted for the improvement of the freedom of the press in Turkey regardless of its pro-
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Islamic and anti-Western roots, this democratic consolidation would only be accurate if a genuine 
internalisation of human rights had taken place during the AKP period of governance. Yet the 
cosmetic changes made to the legal provisions related to the freedom of expression and the press, as 
well as their controversial application toward press censorship, demonstrate that these reforms do 
not carry the revolutionary impetus necessary to advance press conditions.
905
 It is fair to argue that 
the limits of freedom of expression and the press have not been extended as a result of these 
reforms  (especially given that the press in Turkey is classified to be “not free” by international 
NGOs
906
) and the political intolerance of the PM towards criticism.  
 
 The legal reforms discussed within the chapter can be seen as the second most fundamental 
codification of the law in Turkey after the law reforms of the early years of the Republic. Freedom 
of expression and the press specifically were the two areas targeted for improvement with these 
changes; nevertheless, the-top-to-bottom approach employed during the modernisation reforms 80 
years ago, were applied in a similar manner. The EU, “an external actor on democratic 
consolidation in Turkey”
907
, could not bring the level of free expression of the press to a satisfying 
level as agreed with international agreements Turkey is a party to. When considering the situation 
of the press in Turkey today, this demonstrates a continuing resistance to the internalisation of 
human rights and freedoms for one of the most fundamental pillars of democracy, freedom of the 
press.  
 
 When compared with the previous government’s attitude in light of the discussions in 
Chapter 3, no other government chose to build business connections to the extent of those built by 
the AKP government. Such networks allowed government authorities and the PM to give directions 
to the media owners on the fate of the opposition journalists, leading to increasing rates of 
censorship and self-censorship. During this period, economic sanctions emerged as a way to censor 
the press while allowing pro-AKP businessmen to own the media entities. 
 
 Finally, the role of politics in censoring the press, evident in the Ergenekon case, the 
Turkish Penal Code, and the Anti-Terror Law, are still being used by the government through the 
judiciary’s broad interpretation of these legislations, thereby putting the independency and 
impartiality of the judiciary into question. Therefore, the next chapter will examine (1) the 
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correlation between the common political ideology within the judiciary and its effects on the 
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Chapter 5 -Turkey’s Judicial Approach to Press Freedom in 
Comparison with the ECtHR and its Political Intervention in 
the Independence and Impartiality of the Judiciary 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 Political interference in the press operations, both towards journalists and media owners, is 
discussed in detail in the previous chapter. In this chapter, such interference and its impact on the 
judiciary will be discussed in light of the problems experienced due to the legal status of the 
judiciary, specifically the effects of these problems on its impartiality and independence. In addition 
to such interference, the difference between the mindset of the Turkish courts and the ECtHR will 
be discussed with reference to selected court decisions on the freedom of the press in order to 
understand the judiciary’s approach to the press as a key agent in a democratic society. 
 
 As Howard and Carey suggest, even though free media is necessary for democratisation 
besides the political parties and NGOs, the existence of an independent judiciary is vitally important 
in a political system in order to provide guarantees for the protection of individual rights against 
any political/governmental pressure;
908
 both the press and the judiciary’s role in a democratic 
society is undeniable, especially when the government is inclined to use its power arbitrarily, as it is 
in the case of Turkey. Because an independent judiciary is a must for the protection of the 
individual rights of citizens
909
 — and under the scope of this research especially the political rights 
of the press — this chapter begins by exploring the situation of judicial independence in Turkey 
considering that it is a necessity for the press to use its constitutional rights and freedoms to 
investigate government actions, whose power is based on the majority’s votes that leaves less space 




                                                 
908
 Robert M. Howard and Henry F. Carey, ‘Is an Independent Judiciary Necessary for Democracy?’ (2004) 87:6 
Judicature 284 
909
 Peter Russell and David O'Brien, Judicial Independence In the Age of Democracy, Critical Perspectives from 
around the World (Charlottesville and London, University Press of Virginia, 2001) 
Page | 188  
 
5.2 Judicial independence in Turkey 
 
 Judicial independence and impartiality are guaranteed in various articles under the Turkish 
Constitution. Article 9 regulates that “Judicial power shall be exercised by independent courts on 
behalf of the Turkish Nation”,
910
 Article 40 provides protection of fundamental rights and freedoms 
(stating that “Everyone whose constitutional rights and freedoms have been violated has the right to 
request prompt access to the competent authorities)”,
911
 and finally, Article 138 guarantees the 
independence of the courts: 
 
Judges shall be independent in the discharge of their duties; they shall give 
judgment in accordance with the Constitution, laws, and their personal conviction 
conforming with the law. 
No organ, authority, office or individual may give orders or instructions to courts 
or judges relating to the exercise of judicial power, send them circulars, or make 
recommendations or suggestions. 
No questions shall be asked, debates held, or statements made in the Legislative 
Assembly relating to the exercise of judicial power concerning a case under trial. 
Legislative and executive organs and the administration shall comply with court 
decisions; these organs and the administration shall neither alter them in any 




 Turkish Constitution Article 36 provides that “Everyone has the right of litigation either as 
plaintiff or defendant and the right to a fair trial before the courts through legitimate means and 
procedures.”
913
 Turkey is also party to international agreements, such as: UDHR (Article 10 states 
that “everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charges 
against him”),
914
 ICCPR (Article 14 provides that “in the determination of any criminal charges 
against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and 
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public hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal established by law”),
915
 and 
finally ECHR (Article 6 sets that “in determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any 
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitles to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time by an independent and an impartial tribunal established by law”).
916
 Together this legislation 
reveals that justice can only be served when individuals are tried under an independent and 
impartial court through a fair trial. Even though these international and regional Human Rights 
treaties do not provide a clear definition on what the key principles/elements of judicial 





 The Independence of judges is a specific determinant for the independence of the judiciary 
as stated by Ozek.
918
 On that basis, Erdogan argues that judicial independence should be understood 
in the sense that no governmental body, authority, or an individual should be allowed to interfere or 
influence the judges for the use of their judicial adjudicatory power.
919
 According to Kuru, 
independence of judges means that judges are uncommitted to or not dependent on the legislative or 
executive power and also that none of these powers can give orders or give instructions to the 
judges.
920
 Finally, Ozen states that besides taking no orders and instructions except the law itself, 





 Turkey is defined as a “state of law”; in other words, the state is governed by the rule of law 
in Turkish Constitution Article 2, which defines the Republic as: “a democratic, secular and social 
state governed by rule of law, within the notions of public peace, national solidarity and justice, 
respecting human rights, loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental tenets 
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set forth in the preamble.”
922
 In light of this definition, in order to meet the standards of a state that 
is governed by the rule of law, the application of the law must be consistent with its language. 
Therefore, the judiciary must operate on independent grounds without facing any political 
pressure,to allow the law to apply equally to each and every citizen and to promote their rights and 
freedoms by sustaining the legal security of the individuals.
923
 As the advancement of the rule of 
law can be argued to be one of the fundamental cornerstones of democracy, and because the 
judiciary is supposed to be an unbiased and objective institution, in its application of the rule of law, 
Tiede suggests that the judiciary is therefore a benchmark for measuring a democratic society 
governed by the rule of law.
924
   
 
 This is the point where the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers play a 
crucial role in protecting rights and freedoms while delineating the power of the ruling 
government,
925
 which must not intervene in judicial operations. The judiciary must be independent 
of any exterior order or pressure as it must only be governed by the rule of law.
926
 In that regard, 
any judiciary that is subject even possibly to any control, direction, pressure or influence by any 
power, including the legislative and executive powers, cannot be considered independent.
927
 
Therefore, the complete independence and impartiality of the judiciary sets the foundation of 




 Considering that separation of powers is one of the fundamentals of democracies, it is a 
common argument that the judiciary must be objective and should not follow the political ideology 
of the governments; otherwise, as Sayan suggests, it must be following a specific political ideology, 
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 Mustafa Erdoğan, Anayasa Hukuku/Constitutional Law (Ankara Orion Yayınevi, 2005) 80  
Mustafa Kutlu, Kuvvetler Ayrılığı/Separation of Powers (Seçkin Yayınları, Ankara 2001) 198 
926
 AYM E. 1992/37, K. 1993/18 (27/04/1993) 
927
 AYM E. 1992/37, K. 1993/18 (27/04/1993) 
Muharrem Ozen, Hakimin Cezai Sorumlulugu/Criminal Liability of the Judges (Ankara, Seckin Yayincilik Hukuk 
Dizisi, 2004) 48 
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which only exists in totalitarian regimes.
929
 However, in the judicial history of Turkey, the 
legislative power especially has had the intention to control the judiciary or to weaken its 
monitoring power, which as a result had endangered judicial independence and, correspondingly 




 Even though the first Constitution of Turkey in 1921 adopted unity of powers (the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly (TBMM) possessed absolute rule during the Independence War), it is 
argued that the judiciary nevertheless sustained its independence.
931
 The judiciary’s autonomy as a 
separate power in the Turkish Constitution was introduced with the adoption of the 1924 
Constitution, which still gave the authority to the TBMM to use the judicial power whenever 
necessary.
932
 As seen in Chapter 3, under the single-party period, even though the constitution 
stated that the judiciary was independent, the powers were consolidated into the single party 
regime.
933
 Therefore, it is fair to argue that in the initial years of the Republic, there was a dominant 
state tradition and authority
934
 whereby the judiciary was following the Kemalist ideology as well 
as the ruling elites such as the military officers. Who altogether had self-attained the role of 




  It is only with the adoption of the 1961 Constitution Article 132 that judicial authority was 
accepted as the third power alongside the legislative and executive power. This manoeuvre resulted 
from the 1960 coup (explained in Chapter 3) in which the military deemed the Democrat Party 
incapable of following Kemalist ideology.
936
 Therefore, in the 1961 Constitution, the judiciary 
emphasised its role as the Republic’s guardian against the threats from the government.
937
 As a 
result, judicial independence was strengthened and brought under legal protection: 
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Judges are independent; they judge on the basis of the Constitution, the statutes, 
law and their conscience contention. No position, authority or person can give 
orders, send notice, give advice, make suggestions to the courts and judges on 
how to use the judiciary power. In the legislative assemblies, no question can be 
asked on the use of the judiciary power, hold meetings or make statements on an 
ongoing trial. Legislative branch, executive authority and administration must 
obey court verdicts. These authorities and the administration cannot amend court 




 With the 1982 Turkish Constitution, which is still in effect, the independence of the 
judiciary is the same as it was in 1961. However, in light of the information given in Chapter 3, 
explaining the reasons for the military coup in 1980,
939
 it is possible to argue that the judiciary was 
expected to monitor political agents on their competency to make policies and act according to the 
Kemalist ideology, which prioritises secularism. This imposed role and its emphasis revealed itself 
in the party closure decisions of the Turkish Constitutional Court, and the 1982 Constitution 
provided that judges and public prosecutors could not be dismissed, contingent upon the Ministry of 
Justice. The most crucial difference, however, is that the inspection of judges was made by an 
inspector judge authorised by, High Judges Commission in the 1961 Constitution. These are now 
being done by justice inspectors authorised by the Ministry of Justice in the 1982 Constitution. Last 
but not least, when the 1961 and 1982 Constitutions are compared, it is apparent that the 1961 
Constitution (in combination with Supreme Board of Judges Law no. 45) regulated that the chair of 
the Board is elected from among the members, and the Minister of Justice cannot vote in such 
elections. On the other hand, in the 1982 Constitution, which initiated the formation of the highly 
disputed HSYK with the purpose of improving the independence of the judiciary, the Minister of 
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5.2.1 Judiciary under the influence of the political ideology in Turkey  
 
 Despite the fact that the Turkish Constitution guarantees the independence and the 
impartiality of the judiciary, Sayan suggests that it lacks independence because of the economic 
conditions of the judges, the press-judiciary relationship, and most crucially the fact that judges and 
public prosecutors are under the authority of HSYK (Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors) for 
regulations related to their appointments, promotion and registration.
941
 Therefore, this section will  
discuss how and why the practice of impartiality and independency of the judiciary does not operate 
the way it was guaranteed in the Constitution. 
 
 Selcuk suggests that HSYK has operated under the direction of the Ministry of Justice since 
its first establishment, which actually hinders judicial independence.
942
 Since then it has been the 
target of discussions questioning the independence of the judiciary. Given the judiciary’s theoretical 
regulation under Turkish law, it is crucial to discuss the effect of its actual status on the press since 
the practicality of its independence has been weak.  
 
 To begin, in light of the political stages and the political ideology examined in Chapter 3, it 
is possible to argue that since the beginning of the Republic, Turkey had an official state ideology, 
namely nationalism and secularism, wherein the judiciary was given the role to “protect the state 
power.”
943
 Based on Dink’s, case which was discussed in Chapter 2, it is possible to argue that the 
press can influence the judiciary as well as politics, as the press during Dink’s trial fostered a strong 
public opinion by intensively examining the critical elements of the case and thereby created a 
strong public opinion against Dink. This negative publicity put pressure on the judiciary that highly 
affected its impartiality. As Ozen suggests in order to secure justice, judges must make judgements 
irrespective of exterior influence, making it necessary to guarantee the judges’ independence from 
the media in addition to state powers.
944
 Therefore, there is a fallacious interaction between the 
politics, press and the judiciary for these three institutions, are thoroughly interrelated in Turkey.  
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 It is necessary now to acknowledge/contemplate the role that the state ideology plays on the 
decisions made by Turkish courts. Looking at the Islamic-based party closures by the Constitutional 
Court, on the basis of constitutionality (as seen in Chapter 3 Constitutional Court decided the 
closure of the democratically-elected governments on the basis of nonconformity with secularism 
and national unity), it is possible to argue that Kemalism has been heavily influencing both the 
Turkish Constitution itself and the political system in Turkey, as the official ideology. In that 
regard, Arslan suggests that the Turkish Constitutional Court’s (AYM) approach can be defined 




 It is generally accepted that judges must adopt objectivity as one of the principal criteria 
when applying the law; in other words, judges must set aside their personal ideological preferences 
when making deliberations. However, Erozden discusses the impossibility for judges to be 
completely purified from their political ideologies or world views. The interpretation of the law is 
inevitably an explication informed and shaped by the perspectives held by the judges on the 
purposes of the specific law. This is the outcome of an approach to law that correlates the sub-
culture of the judiciary and a constitutional state
946
; accordingly, legal reforms made in Turkey lack 
genuine implementation because of the absence of a judicial sensibility based on a democratic 
system that follows universal legal principles and respects and prioritises human rights. However, 
Sancar suggests that the political ideology followed by Turkish judges indicates that a statist 
approach dominates with an insufficient understanding and knowledge of ECtHR decisions 




 Recent criminal cases against journalists elicit discussions of the judiciary’s lack of respect 
accorded to the rule of law and fundamental freedoms, especially since the independence of the 
judiciary has been undermined since 2014. In that regard, Keong argues that when the judiciary is 
not independent, it will fail to fulfil the necessities of democracy such as the rule of law, and if there 
is no rule of law the judiciary cannot be expected to have independence. To protect civil and 
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political rights and to establish law and order, an independent judiciary must obey the rule of law, 




 Considering the rule of law and the independence of judiciary as the two main pillars of 
democracies,
949
 law no. 6524, which re-structured the High Council of Judges Prosecutors in 
Turkey and was signed by President Gul, is highly criticised for threatening the independence of the 
judiciary. Yengisu states that “The latest bill now signed into law by the President strikes at the 
principle of judicial independence at its core…In short, you have the minister of justice – a member 





 The appointment of the judges must be used as a tool to sustain the independence of the 
judiciary. Nevertheless, when their appointment is dependent solely on the executive branch, the 
impartiality of their decisions cannot be fully trusted.
951
 The appointment of judges must be 
independent of the government, but their control by the Ministry of Justice with the latest HSYK 
changes, is an open threat to judicial independence. The fault in the judiciary system is stated by the 
former chairman of AYM, Hasim Kilic, who argues that judges that cannot sustain their impartiality 
due to the fear of being arbitrarily relocated. Similarly, Sami Selcuk, Supreme Court of Appeals 
president, states that he is “disturbed by the existence of such a judicial system. We are approaching 





 Referring back to Arslan’s suggestion, which is that AYM has more of an ideology-based 
rather than rights-oriented approach, and considering the party closure decisions it has given so far, 
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it is possible to argue that AYM has upheld its function of protecting the state’s two main 
principles, namely, secularism and Turkish nationalism. The following examples show that unless 
the judiciary is equipped with a perspective that prioritises the universal legal principles of human 
rights as well as the superiority of the fundamental rights and freedoms, a constitutional guarantee 
of judicial independence and impartiality cannot be sustained. 
 
5.3 Judicial reforms in Turkey 
 
 In order to situate judicial independence in line with EU principles and practices, Turkey 
undertook judicial reforms on the basis of the EU harmonisation packages, for the Copenhagen 
criteria require the rule of law and a guarantee of democracy by sustaining the stability of 
institutions.
953
 To comply with the universal norms discussed in the first section, the judicial 
reforms (called ‘legal reforms’ in Chapter 4) took place to align the level of independence and 
impartiality of the judiciary with these norms. However, even though the reforms aspired to reduce 
or eliminate the number of cases brought to the ECtHR (between 1995-2010, the ECtHR ruled no 
less than 2573 times against Turkey — the highest number among the European Council member 
countries),
954




 Karakaya and Ozhabebes suggest that the revelation of the reform packages to public was  
met with a dissatisfied sense that they fell behind the changes within the society. Legal provisions 
regarding organised crime in the Turkish Penal Code are typical examples that, criminal 
organization are convicted under the same legal provisions as the actual members of the 
organisations despite the main principle of the law being that “criminal responsibility is personal 
and no one can be kept responsible from another’s act”
956
 and despite the Constitution’s statement 
that “criminal responsibility shall be personal.”
957
 Nevertheless, the reform packages only suggest 
an option for the judges to abate; this does not eliminate the problem itself. Moreover, amendments 
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 It is accepted that the functioning of the judiciary is only partly related to its organisational 
structure and the legislation to which it is bound because the judicial approach is at least of the 
same importance. ‘Mentality’ refers to the intuition to protect the state rather than individuals — the 
disposition that guided the creation of the 1982 Constitution. This mentality is at the centre of the 
problems experienced by the application of legal provisions despite their amendments after the 
reform packages. Therefore, judicial independence that is required for the fair application of the law 
will be examined in this section in order to fully demonstrate the reasons for the application of the 




5.3.1 2010 Constitutional Amendment Package 
 
 In 2010, Articles 146 and 148 of the Turkish Constitution were amended.
960
 These 
amendments changed the structure and organisation of the Turkish Constitutional Court (AYM)
961
 a 
great deal. Article 146, which regulates the formation of the Constitutional Court, provided that 
AYM was to be formed of eleven members; eight of them were nominated by the President based 
on the names suggested mainly by the higher courts, and three of them were nominated by the 
President directly. After the 2010 amendments, AYM is now formed of seventeen members: “The 
Grand National Assembly of Turkey shall elect, by secret ballot, two members from among three 
candidates to be nominated by, and from among the president and members of the Court of 
Accounts, for each vacant position, and one member from among three candidates nominated by the 
heads of the bar associations from among self-employed lawyers.”
962
 More specifically, three of its 
members are appointed by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), and fourteen of them are 
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appointed by the President. As observed above, the selection of the Grand National Assembly of 
Turkey is rather symbolic,
963
 whereas the President still plays an active role in the appointments.
964
   
 
 Onar suggests that when the parliament has the authority to directly appoint members, it 
highly politicises AYM. Therefore, it is a more desirable option to allow the parliament to choose 
from candidates that are nominated by others from different posts. Besides, the number of 





 Nevertheless, Taskin, in opposition argues that when the methods of the parliament for 
appointing judges are analysed, the current regulation for the appointments fall behind the 
regulations made in the 1961 Constitution, whereby the parliament would directly appoint five 
members out of fifteen (one third) to AYM; however, the current regulation allows less than one 
third of the AYM members to be selected by the parliament on the basis of others’ nominations, 
thereby limiting the discretionary power of the parliament which Taskin argues to be faulty, for the 




 On the basis of the 2010 changes, the other fourteen members of the AYM will be appointed 
by the President.
967
 Considering that before the Constitutional amendments the President could 
appoint eleven members, it is possible to argue that the new regulation strengthens the power of the 
President over AYM, and according to Kaboglu, this new regulation allows the President and the 
executive power to shape the membership of AYM in line with the political disposition of the 
majority within the parliament.
968
 Kaboglu interprets these Constitutional changes together with the 
2007 Presidential elections, which for the first time took place by a referendum. He highlights that 
when the President (who is elected by the people) appoints fourteen of AYM members; this is an 
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indication to the Constitution will indicate a presidency system.
969
 Taskin approves Kaboglu’s 
statements regarding the new regulations in the Constitution and argues that giving the President the 
authority to appoint fourteen members to AYM only means politically strengthening the position of 
the President — even beyond his already strong authority; next political phase Turkey chooses, is a 
presidency system in which AYM will be highly politicised.
970
 Finally, the 2010 changes faced 
strong debates because they were initiated by a specific political inclination for specific purposes.
971
 
On the other hand, direct individual application to the Court was not accepted before the 
constitutional changes in 2010, which allowed citizens to do so. Thus, citizens were given the right 
to make direct application to the Court after they had exhausted all other regular remedies. If they 
consider their fundamental rights and freedoms are violated by a newly drafted law. In its 2010 
review of independence Turkey, OSCE concluded that this system established after 2010 is similar  
to what was in place between 1961 until the coup in 1980.
972
 It therefore argues that the 
Constitutional Court, which has the power and the duty to overturn any law if found in violation of 
the Constitution, has a wider representation and legitimacy as well as democratic grounds given that 
individuals have the right to direct application. Ozbudun also states that the Constitutional Court, 
after the constitutional reforms in 2010, took a democratic turn with its new structure that adopted a 
more pluralistic shape by allowing individual application for constitutional complaints. He gives the 
Court’s decision on HSYK law, which is discussed in detail under the next section, as an example 





5.3.2 HSYK: its legal setting before and after 2014 
 
 The High Council of Judges was formed by the will of the military elites after the 1960 
military coup with the aim to eliminate governmental power abuses and give the Minister of Justice 
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the right to attend the sessions but not to vote.
974
 Its structure was revised in 1971 (post-modern 
coup) in order to retain the power that was given to the judges and prosecutors to determine their 
own representatives,
975
 create the High Council of Prosecutors, and give the Minister of Justice the 
right to vote.
976
 Finally, once the military took power in 1982, the High Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors was created by combining the High Council of Judges and High Council of 
Prosecutors.
977
 Differently from the 1961 and 1971 structures of the Council, which had given the 
Ministry of Justice the role of an ex-officio,
978
 the 1982 changes made the Minister of Justice the 
President of the Council.
979
 However, the structure of HSYK was highly criticised on the basis of 
independency and impartiality
980
 because the HSYK, which had the responsibility of appointing, 
promoting, and dismissing judges and prosecutors, could not be judicially reviewed, and it was 
subject to the secretariat services of the Ministry of Justice, whereby the Ministry had superiority 




 In 2010, with the constitutional amendments mentioned in the previous section, based on the 
EU accession process and the European Commission’s criticism in its progress reports
982
 the 
structure of the HSYK was changed; because the judiciary was seen as one of the agents to protect 
state interest and security based on the political ideology that prioritised nationalism and 
secularism,
983
 HSYK’s independence and impartiality was questioned because it was considered to 
be serving the tutelary regime, especially during the military coup periods.
984
 Furthermore, HSYK 
belonged to the exceptional institutions whose decisions could not be appealed, for the 1982 
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Constitution was drafted under the military regime.
985
 Bacik and Salur use the Ergenekon case as an 
applicable example of HSYK’s lack of impartiality; the HSYK sought to reuse initiating 
prosecutors and the judges of the Ergenekon investigation but was prevented by the absence of 




 With the 2010 changes, HSYK was given administrative and financial independence as well 
as a separate secretariat. The Inspection Board was also attached to the Board of the Council rather 
than the Minister of Justice. The changes in 2010 transformed HSYK into a completely separate, 




 The structure of HSYK was changed by the bill approved by the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly in February 2014. With this new legislation, the Minister of Justice is given the power to 
issue decrees on behalf of HSYK in a unilateral manner. With the recently approved bill, the 
Minister of Justice also has the power to organise the agendas for the meetings of the board and 
commence disciplinary action against judiciary members.
988
 After the restructuring of HSYK with 
the 2014 law no. 6524 and with the stronger and wider roles given to the Minister of Justice, the 
Minister of Justice appointed judges, and commenced judicial disciplinary investigations, and 
selected HSYK members and judicial trainers. Ozbudun describes these powers as AKP’s attempt 
to manipulate the judiciary.
989
 His statement was supported after 15 seats were gained by the pro-
government figures in the 22-member board after the HSYK elections in October 2014. The 
recently formed board, consisting of a majority of pro-government figures, then passed a judicial 
package that reduced the judiciary’s independence. 
 
 The Turkish Constitutional Court’s decision on April 2014 stated that the new provisions of 
Law no. 6524 regulating HSYK violated Constitution Article 159, which regulates the 
independence of the HSYK (“The High Council of Judges and Prosecutors shall be established and 
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shall exercise its functions in accordance with the principles of the independence of the courts and 
the security of the tenure of judges”
990
); because the recently adopted provisions gave extra powers 
to the Minister of Justice, AYM concluded that judicial independence was reduced. AYM clearly 
expressed that prior to the changes, HSYK members were appointed by the Plenary of the Council, 
but the new provision afforded this power instead to the Minister of Justice,
991
 making the HSYK 
highly dependent on the Ministry of Justice. As a result, the Minister of Justice had extensive 
influence on HSYK’s reorganisation.
992
 On that basis, the Constitutional Court determined that the 
new provisions of Law no. 6524 needed to be revised within three months.
993
 Nevertheless, the 
provisions of Law no. 6524 were accepted as they were initially drawn and the dismissed members 
of staff were never re-appointed, once replaced. 
 
 The changes to the selection of the board members and the new structure of the board itself 
led to heavy criticism among the opposition from the judicial and political arena and from the 
international legal arena considering the unconstitutionality of the reforms, and both national and 
international NGOs emphasised the negative effects a pro-government judicial body (in this case, 
HSYK) will have on Turkey. More specifically, Amnesty International argues that the 
independence and impartiality of the judiciary is under threat by expressing that Turkish authorities 
must “withdraw the amendments granting additional decision making powers and powers of 
appointment to the Minister of Justice which threaten the actual and perceived independence and 
impartiality of the judiciary in Turkey and the right to a fair trial.”
994
 Similarly, Freedom House 
criticises the law, stating that “Turkey's ruling AK Party’s newly proposed changes to the judicial 
system are an attempt to limit corruption investigations
995
 and would damage the country’s 
democracy.”
996
 In relation to that, the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, in its 
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“Declaration on Interference with Judicial Independence in Turkey”, criticised the new provisions 
for handing outstanding powers to the Minister of Justice. The commission noted that the 
amendment, which took place on 15th of February 2014, strengthened the powers held by the 
Minister of Justice within HSYK and thereby negatively affected the 2010 constitutional reform 
which was a positive attainment toward the independence and impartiality of the judiciary.
997
 
Referring to the AYM’s decision of unconstitutionality
998
 discussed above, the Venice Commission 
highlighted the fact that the Minister of Justice was authorised to replace key administrative 
members in HSYK as well as appoint members of HSYK to other chambers at the very point when 
the AYM was taking the decision about the unconstitutionality of the amendments.  However, 
AYM’s judgement had no retroactive effect and its decisions were not reversed. As a result, the 





 Despite that Turkey is defined by its Constitution to have a modern and democratic system, 
with a society exhibiting the same features,
1000
 the problem Turkey experiences with the freedom of 
expression and the press already raises concerns about its democratic consolidation. In such a 
system and society, it is only when legal security is provided to the press that the opposition press 
can find the grounds to discuss the government actions and policies, thereby allowing a more 
pluralistic public debate given that the main duty of the press is to investigate the government’s 




 Touraine’s emphasis on the press’s role of inspection is worth evaluation here; he suggests 
that once a political power is elected, an economically and politically free press and independent 
judicial system are the two main elements for the prevention of power abuses.
1002
 For the ideal 
conditions of democracy to be fulfilled, the people must reach unbiased and impartial information 
on all parties and be allowed to make decisions based on such information; the state must be 
                                                 
997
 The Venice Commission,Venice Commission Declaration on Interference with Judicial Independence in Turkey 
(Venice, 20 June 2015) 
998
 AYM E. 2014/57 K. 2014/81 (10/4/2014) 
999
 The Venice Commission, Venice Commission Declaration on Interference with Judicial Independence in Turkey 
(Venice, 20 June 2015) 
1000
 The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 1982 law no. 2709 (7/11/1982) 
1001
 Kayıhan İçel and Yener Ünver, Kitle Haberleşme Hukuku/Mass Communication Law (7th ed., Beta Yayınevi 2007) 
119 
1002
 Alain Touraine, Demokrasi Nedir?/What is democracy? (Yapi Kredi Yayinlari 2011) 98 
Page | 204  
 
governed by the rule of law.
1003
 This trinity of contingencies shows the close interrelation between 
the state governed by law, democracy and freedom of the press.
1004
 In cases such as Turkey, where 
the right to free expression and freedom of the press is obstructed, the right to information is 
hindered as a result, which finally distresses one of the founding pillars of democracy. This is where 
the importance of an impartial and an independent judiciary reveals itself. Therefore, the 
executive’s power and authority to appoint judicial members must not be tolerated for it results in a 
lack of confidence by the public toward the judiciary, accepting that its legitimacy lays on the 
society’s trust in the impartiality and independence of the courts.  
 
 In this context, it is possible to argue that the judges’ impartiality is overshadowed by the 
distress they experience due to the government’s power to appoint, transfer, and arrest judges, 
especially when considering that the judiciary was already criticised for following the state 
ideology
1005
 before the new regulations gave such dominance to the pro-AKP political authority.  
 
5.3.3 EU conditionality: controversies of the new judicial system with the EU conditions 
 
 Positive influences of the EU accession process on the legal reforms have been previously 
discussed. However, the 2010 judicial reform, despite the improvements provided on the more 
“rights based” verdicts of the AYM, has been overshadowed by the restructuring of HSYK that 
resulted in its political dependency. Whether the EU conditions could assist in eliminating this issue 
requires further and deeper examination; however, it is important to discuss the grounds on which 
the Turkish state is criticised by the EU bodies for contradicting EU demands and ECHR 
provisions. 
 
 As part of the ECHR Turkey is required to comply with ECHR principles and the EU’s 
demands toward completing the EU accessing process. However, Maja Kocijancic, the EU 
commissioner Johannes Hahn’s spokeswoman, states that the independence of the judiciary must be 
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respected as the fundamental value of the EU and the emerging democracies.
1006
 Furthermore, the 
Council of Europe, in its 2010 recommendations, highlighted the importance of judicial 
independence and efficiency. In order to gain EU membership, Turkey must also guarantee the 
democratic conditions within the country that required it to internalise Article 6 of the ECHR, 
respect ECtHR’s case law on Article 6 of the Convention, and to fully implement the legal 




 Finally, it is important to discuss the 2015 European Commission report, which found the 
latest changes to HSYK regulations daunting for judicial independence and reported that Turkey, 
since 2014, has been experiencing a decline in judicial independence due to the dominant and role 
of the Minister of Justice in the HSYK. In that regard the European Commission states that: 
  
the strong role of representatives of the executive in the HSYK raises concerns 
about the Council’s independence. Decisions to launch disciplinary proceedings 
against judges and public prosecutors, as well as the annual routine inspection 
schemes, require approval by the Minister of Justice who, as ex officio president 
of the Council, supervises the inspection board. The Minister’s power, again as ex 
officio president of the Council, to appoint the personnel of the Council secretariat 
also undermines the Council’s independence. There are important limitations to 
the principle of immovability of judges. Accusations of conspiracy by the 
executive in the fight against the ‘parallel structure’ led to a high number of 
judges being transferred against their will in the past two years. With the 
exception of dismissals, HSYK decisions such as transfers of judges against their 
will are not open to judicial review. A number of disciplinary and criminal cases 
against judges and prosecutors have lacked due process, and in some instances 
have been based on their rulings. This contradicted basic principles of the rule of 
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 In sum, the EU's main criticism of Turkish judiciary’s independence and impartiality has 
been its institutional structure and procedures
1009
: “to an unacceptable degree, judicial 
Independence in Turkey appears to be threatened by potential interference of the Ministry of Justice 




5.3.4 Political motivations behind the change of law: 17-25 December Operations 
 
 Fairness of trials in Turkey has been a long standing concern of Amnesty International. 
Journalists reporting in opposition to the government or commenting on sensitive subject have been 
under particular observation. On that basis, Amnesty International argues that the highly debated 
new legislation on the restructuring of HSYK was rapidly approved by the Parliament after the 
corruption investigation of bribery and corruption that targeted public officials including 
government ministers and their sons (a total of 50 people who are close to the government), 
business people such as the head of a bank, and close family members of Erdogan who was a Prime 
Minister at the time.
1011
 A retired public prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeals, Ahmet 
Gundel, criticised the change, stating that “the government wants to create a HSYK that it will like 
with this new law. It wants to appoint judges and prosecutors close to the government in key posts, 
and it has already begun doing so with the latest appointments and reassignments in the judiciary. 
The main objective is to sweep the corruption and bribery investigation under the carpet and 




 During the investigation, four ministers resigned, and a new wave of investigation pointing 
at the Prime Minister’s son was hindered by the removal of the prosecutor who directed the 
investigation. Soon after, on 21 December 2013, the police officers dealing with the investigation 
and a number of prosecutors were either moved to a lower rank or dismissed on the basis of the 
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changes to “the Judicial Police Code.”
1013
 According to this regulation, the police force were 
required to promptly inform the relevant administration of any criminal investigation underway 
(amended Article 5c).
1014
 Such a change implied that the government was finally able to learn about 
any investigation, including confidential ones, and therefore was able to react as it did in this case 




 However, the government’s reaction to the issue was characterised by any doubts or 
discussions of transparency. It rather dismissed any sort of corruption allegations, claiming that a 
conspiracy controlled by Fettullah Gulen, a Sunni cleric who is a former ally but current enemy of 
Erdogan living in the US, was taking place involving international agents aiming to overthrow 
Erdogan. The government argued that the plot against AKP was devised by the members of 
judiciary in coordination with the police officers who were claimed to be “Gulenists”, which is a 
movement that is argued to have much appeal among the police force, the judiciary, education 
sector, media, and business.
1016
 The 17-25 December operations revealed the conflict when the 
government issued the change in the Judicial Police Code and dispersed hundreds of police officers 
based on the fact that the government was ‘uninformed’ about the investigation prior to its 
commencement — as well as when the police were reluctant to effectuate prosecutors’ orders on 
arrests. Moreover, the chief prosecutor who ordered the 17-25 December Operations was appointed 




 Erdogan labelled the judiciary as “traitors” and “rascals” for continuing the judicial process 
against the government officials on the alleged corruption and bribery charges and deemed the 
judicial members as “appointed civil servants.”
1018
 Also, in reaction to HSYK members who 
expressed their disapproval of the amendments made in the Judicial Police Code for being 
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unconstitutional and for forming a barrier against the investigations,
1019
 Erdogan indicated that the 
impending changes regulating the structure of HSYK “followed what democracy requires and 
eliminated the authority held by the Ministry of Justice on HSYK. We obviously made a mistake 
there, as soon as we have the power to change the constitution we have to make another change and 
bring a system that can inspect HSYK.”
1020
 In his clear statement, Erdogan points to the existence 
of deep state control, by which he means the Gulenist movement, over the judiciary. He 
demonstrates “the deep state/parallel control” over the judiciary as the initial and overall aim of the 
2014 changes. The government therefore officially included fight against the ‘parallel structure’ in 




 On this crucial point it is necessary to refer back to the discussion in the section titled 
“Judicial Independence in Turkey”, in which the independence of the judiciary is argued to be 
hindered even by the possibility of political intervention;
1022
 that was clearly the case when the 
Prime Minister openly insulted the judiciary (for investigating a corruption and bribery allegation) 
and the judges and prosecutors in the high council court (for criticising any disturbance that could 
hinder this investigation). Kunter et al 
1023
 and Dursun suggest that judges as well as not being put 
under pressure should also face with no possibility for such pressure as it otherwise hinders 
independency of judges.
1024
 Executive power, namely the role of the Minister of Justice, must be 
eliminated from the HSYK, and there must be a strict application of separation of powers in order 
to limit the government’s power on the legislature in Turkey.
1025
 The shift of “judiciary control” 
from one hand to another in 2014 appears to be just another legal change resulting from an 
ostensible ‘plot’ by Gulen movement against the AKP government. 
  
 Turkish columnist Kadri Gursel summarises the effects of the power war in Turkey on legal 
grounds: “Turkey’s precious institutions are the victims of this fighting…The ruling power 
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coalition has collapsed and is sucking many things down with it”, namely “constitutional order, the 
state of law, legitimacy, the EU process, and the judiciary.”
1026
 The media crackdown that resulted 
in the prosecution of two judges in 2014 is a vivid example of Gursel’s statement; based on the 
power conflict between the former allies, namely Erdogan and Gulen, the press that was aligned to 
the Gulenist movement was under the target of an investigation that aimed to silence government 
opposition. Accordingly, the following section demonstrates how the political intervention in the 
judiciary and the lack of independence and impartiality caused by this affects the freedom of the 
press. 
 
5.3.5 Politically driven imprisonment of judges 
 
 On 13 December 2014, a year after the 17-25 December operations, 31 people were 
detained with a warrant issued by an Istanbul judge with the allegation of forming an organisation 
that “through lies, depriving people of their liberty and falsifying documents”, established an 
organisation that “by pressure, intimidation and threats attempted to seize state power.” Ekrem 
Dumanli, who is the general editor of Zaman newspaper, a Zaman columnist, a Bugun newspaper 
journalist, and head of Samanyolu Broadcasting group was detained with another three Samanyolu 
media workers allegedly being a part of the parallel structure/the Gulenist movement and facing 
charges for ‘affiliation to the Fethullah Terror Organisation’.
1027
 Both the legality and 
proportionality of the media operations against pro-Gulenist media are found ‘seriously concerning’ 




 Human Right Watch highlighted the timing of the operations, which was only a year after 
the corruption operations that started on 17 December the previous year. The focus on Gulen’s 
media group, namely Zaman newspaper and Samanyolu media group, for the detainments is 
expounded by Sinclair Webb suggesting “an effort to discredit and intimidate Gülenist media.” 
Sinclair Webb, referring to the alleged reasons for the journalists’ detainments, also suggested that 
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the pattern of the arrests was based on the allegations for illegal organisation membership, which is 




 Erdogan’s allegations that the 17-25 December operations was Gulen’s and therefore, the 
“parallel structures” attempt to overthrow AKP government, the journalists’ arrests (alongside the 
senior police officers arrests during the 2014 media crackdown) points to Erdogan’s will to 
emasculate the Gulenist movement. Webb argues that the political motivations behind what is 
called a “media crackdown” render the media as once again a target in Erdoğan’s political fight 
with his former Gülenist allies.”
1030
 This is why the press is defined as the fourth estate in its 
function as a watchdog for the government — making government abuses public
1031
 and serving as 
an investigatory estate over the government. In addition to this function, the press is also expected 
to criticise judicial decisions with the aim to make such decisions available to the public. This role 
of the press becomes essential when the executive power strictly influences the judicial power. 
However, as the interest driven holdings in Turkey dismiss journalists because of their critical 
comments on the government or opposition of their policies, it may be argued that, when under the 
pressure of the media owners, the press can be misleading with its information. However, the 
political polarisation revealed itself also among the journalists, for the mainstream press once more 
approached the issue from a political point of view rather than on the basis of the rights and 




 What is striking in terms of the measures taken against the judiciary in 2014 is the purely 
politically motivated detention and imprisonment of the judges who were involved in the anti-
corruption investigations.
1033
 In that regard, Metin Ozcelik, who is a judge in the Istanbul 29th 
Court of First Instance, and Mustafa Baser, who is a judge in the Istanbul 32nd Court of First 
Instance, gave the release order of the police officers and journalists who were in provisional 
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detention for six months. However, the state prosecutor who was in charge of signing the release 




 Metin Ozcelik and Mustafa Baser were severely criticised in Yeni Akit newspaper, known 
for its close ties to the government, for their judgement of the release orders,
1035
 which was then 
followed by the criticism of the former Minister of Justice on the same basis. Besides, the president 
of the HSYK declared an apology to the former Prime Minister Erdogan, who openly expressed his 
disappointment in the HSYK for not having intervened after such a release order was made by two 




 This positioned them as the figures representing the loss of judicial independence in Turkey. 
Despite that their release orders were legal and valid and the ECtHR case law was referred by the 
judges in their verdict (the suspects’ detention was not lawful as it was four days after the custody 
time prescribed by law had expired as seen in Zeynep Avci v Turkey,1037 and the detention lacked 
“strong suspicion” that a crime was committed as seen in Neumeister v Austria1038),their suspension 
by the HSYK on 27 April 2015 and the authorisation of their arrest could not be prevented.1039 
 The two judges were imprisoned by Bakirkoy 2nd High Criminal Court, allegedly based on 
“attempting to overthrow the government and preventing the government to operate partly or fully” 
(TCK Article 312) and for “being an armed organisation member” (TCK Article 314). Moreover, 
2,500 judiciary members, including the Ankara chief prosecutor and chief prosecutors in Anatolia, 




 On 16 May 2015, the European Association of Judges (EAJ) issued a statement condemning 
the unfair and illegal imprisonment of the judges, stating that “any attempt to undermine the 
freedom of a judge to establish facts and apply the law in a particular case constitutes a clear breach 
of judicial independence. EAJ condemns the arrest and detention of any judge on the basis of a 
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decision taken in the exercise of the judge’s judicial functions and calls for the immediate release of 
the judges Metin Özcelik and Mustafa Baser.”
1041
 Similarly, The Judges and Prosecutors 
Association (YARSAV) in Turkey issued a statement discussing the political motivation behind the 
imprisonment of the judges and argued that the government aimed to send a clear message in order 
to threaten the judges.
1042
 Finally, former Minister of Justice in Turkey, Hikmet Sami Türk, argued 
that the judges’ imprisonment “shows that Turkey has entered a period during which judges will no 
longer be able to give verdicts independently in line with the Turkish Constitution, the law and their 





 When examined in the context of the Turkish legal system, the violation of judicial rules 
becomes apparent, for the Code on Criminal Procedure (CMK) regulates that First Instance 
Criminal Courts’ decision can solely be objected by the Office of The Chief Prosecutor and/or the 
Criminal Judges of Peace by lodging an appeal to a higher court.1044  The lack of an independence 
guarantee for the judiciary becomes clear when the unfair and illegal treatment of the judges is 
taken into account. The illegal procedure followed for their removal from office and imprisonment 
is a clear proof of the dangerous intervention of the legislative power into the judicial power whose 
independence and impartiality is ostensibly protected by Turkish Constitution Article 138. 
 The Venice Commission stated that the decision to remove and imprison judges must not be 
made without the existence of adequate evidence; however, the rule of law was contradicted by 
HSYK, and the intervention into the judicial process is in clear infringement with European and 
universal standards because the judges were arbitrarily removed or transferred and imprisoned on 
the basis of their verdicts. The immediate reaction of the HSYK to the judges based solely on their 
verdicts greatly concerns the Venice Commission.
1045
 Finally, in its 2015 report, the European 
Commission stated that safety measures against HSYK’s interference in judicial proceedings must 
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be taken in addition to legal and constitutional safeguards in order to prevent the transfer of the 




 It is fair to argue that, despite the guarantees provided in the Constitution for the 
independency and impartiality of the judiciary, these provisions are challenged by the strong 
affiliation between the executive and the judiciary.
1047
 As observed from the above example, this 
strong bond between the executive and the judiciary; hinders the impartiality of the judiciary, this 
corruption within the judiciary and the government also makes it impractical to implement the 






5.4 Judicial interpretation of press freedom 
 
 The Independence of the judiciary has been analysed throughout the previous sections with 
the detailed examination of the the 2010 constitutional changes that resulted in changes in the 
Turkish Constitutional Court. This section revolves around the importance of a free press for a 
democratic society and how the courts’ approach to freedom of the press influences the legal 
security of the press. In order to make such an analysis, Turkish Court decisions before and after the 
legal amendments (2010) as well as the ECtHR case law will be discussed. The manner in which 
press freedom is regulated under the Turkish Constitution (“fundamental right of the individuals”) 
was discussed in Chapter 2. In light of this information, this section will analyse the Turkish courts’ 
interpretation of the constitutional provisions regulating freedom of the press and the exceptions of 
the right that can be applied to restrict freedom of the press.1049  
 
 In its 2015 report, the ECtHR identifies Turkey as possessing the second highest number of 
cases on violation of the right to free expression. In addition, Turkey is specified as the country that 
violates the right to fair trial the most.
1050
 In combination, these rankings are the result of the 
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pressure put on the press by the politics and the disputed Turkish court decisions based on their 
controversial approach to press freedom. In cases where the journalists are defined as “terrorists” 
based on the broad exceptions regulated in the Constitution and the vague definitions included in 
the Anti-Terror Law,
1051
 and where the government argues that journalists have rather been 
imprisoned for their non-journalistic activities as ruled by an independent judiciary,
1052
 the 
interpretation of law by the judges plays a crucial role in the legal protection of the press. 
 
 This section examines in detail the Turkish Courts’ approach to freedom of the press in light 
of the Turkish Constitutional Court’s approach in comparison with the ECtHR case law on press 
freedom. Considering the recent legal amendments to the Turkish Constitution that took place in 
2010
1053
 — changing Article 148 with the additional clause stating that “Everyone may apply to the 
Constitutional Court on the grounds that one of the fundamental rights and freedoms within the 
scope of the European Convention on Human Rights which are guaranteed by the Constitution has 
been violated by public authorities”
1054
 and that it attributes importance to ECHR and ECtHR case 
law on freedom of the press — it is also necessary to analyse the effects of the ECtHR’s approach 
to press freedom on the Turkish Constitutional Court’s decisions. 
 
 
5.4.1 First Instance and Constitutional Court approach to freedom of the press 
 
 The Turkish Constitutional Court (AYM) was highly criticised before 2010 for various 
verdicts  such as party closure decisions, stating that constitutional amendments made to provisions 
regulating the use of headscarfs was unconstitutional,1055 and making arbitrary judgements during 
the 1961 and 1982 Constitutions that included using the same reasoning for concluding with 
different verdicts within a period of severe months.1056 In that regard, AYM was criticised for 
lacking legitimacy on the basis of its decisions related to fundamental rights and freedoms.1057  
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5.4.1.1 Turkish Constitutional Court Decisions on press freedom before 2010 
 
 In order to be able to demonstrate the improvement to the interpretation of free press by 
AYM over time, especially with the commencement of direct application to the Constitutional 
Court on the grounds that the right to free expression through press within the scope of the 
European Convention on Human Rights had been violated, it is necessary to start by analysing the 
approach taken by the Court to the essence of press freedom. 
 
 The inconsistent approach taken by the Court to specifying the nature of freedom of the 
press can be seen in two different judgements given during the 1961 Constitution and 1982 
Constitution
1058
 whereby the Court had agreed in 1979 that if the restriction of the press is made 
through the application of restrictions on the means of publication, it would not strain the core of 
press freedom and freedom of expression would therefore not be violated.
1059
 On the other hand, 
when the Court had to deal with a statute that did not restrict freedom of thought but the means of 
dissemination of thought, in its verdict in 1993, the court ruled on the case stating that it was an 
open violation of freedom of the press.
1060
 When examined exhaustively, it is possible to observe 
that AYM experienced difficulties in making consistent decisions on what constitutes the core of 




 More specifically regarding the AYM judgements, in one of its 1997 judgements, the Court 
highlighted the importance of the right to information by specifying that in order to fully enjoy the 
right to information, the protection of press freedom must also cover the duration that is needed for 
printing the publication until it reaches the readers. According to the Court, any publication that is 
prevented from reaching the readers would violate freedom of the press because it would breach the 
readers’ right to information even for a limited period of time, and restricting individuals’ right to 
information would not comply with the requirements of a democratic society.
1062
 Therefore AYM 
in its judgment stated that no statute can include a criterion for the restriction of the press unless it is 
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specified in the Constitution; accordingly, the right and freedom of dissemination cannot be 
restricted because it would violate the freedom of the press. 
 
 Nevertheless, in another judgement in 1997, when the abolishment of an amendment made 
to the article of the Consumer Protection Law was requested based on the authorisation given to the 
executive to apply high monetary fines, opposing this would lead to a negative effect on freedom of 
the press, AYM took a different stance when compared with the previous case.
1063
 AYM in its 
verdict stated that freedom of the press did not only comprise the ones who worked within the 
sector but it is a right that is applicable to everyone because it is a vital freedom. Even though it is 
one of the duties of the lawmaker to prepare the ground to enter the sector by creating and 
sustaining a suitable atmosphere for competition, AYM argued that the lawmaker also had the duty 
to prevent the press from deviating from its actual aim (disseminating news and information) by 
coalescing with purely commercial activities. On this basis, AYM rejected the application for the 
cassation of the amendment that authorised the executive power to apply high monetary fines on the 
basis that “the amendments that regulate the penalty which would be applied to the ones who not 





          In a more recent example, which is important to analyse in order to understand AYM’s stance 
on the significance of the balance between freedom of the press and national and state security, 
AYM. With the purpose of specifying the limits for restricting freedom of the press on the basis of 
national and state security, rejected the appeal to reverse the amendments made to Anti-Terror Law 
Articles 6 and 7
1065






 and 38, which 
state that “no one shall be punished for any act which does not constitute a criminal offence under 
the law in force at the time committed. No one shall be given a heavier penalty for an offence other 
than the penalty applicable at the time when the offence was committed.”
1069
 Specifically, the 
amendment to Article 6 of the Anti-Terror Law stated that “If any of the offences indicated in the 
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paragraphs above are committed by means of mass media, editors-in-chief who have not 
participated in the perpetration of the crime shall be punished with a judicial fine from one thousand 
to fifteen thousand days’ rates. However, the upper limit of this sentence for editors-in-chief is five 
thousand days’ rates”, and the amendment to Article 7 of the same law stated that “editors-in-chief 
who have not participated in the perpetration of the crime shall be punished with a judicial fine 
from one thousand to fifteen thousand days’ rates. However, the upper limit of this sentence for 
editors-in-chief is five thousand days’ rates.”
1070
 The former President of Turkey, Ahmet Necdet 
Sezer, appealed for the changes made to the Anti-Terror Law in 2006, which violated various 
articles of the Turkish Constitution by allowing the penalisation of the individuals (the owner of the 
publication and the chief editor) who do not have complicity in the crimes specified.
1071
 
Contradicting the principle that “criminal responsibility shall be personal”;
1072
 these changes were 
rejected by the court, which stated that “the articles under subjected to appeal are legitimate as they 
are necessary for the protection of the state and national security, territorial security and public 
order when the terror experienced in the South East Turkey as well as its extend and the use of 
means to carry out the terrorist activities are taken into consideration, especially as observed that 
appealed legal amendments do not obstruct the core of the rights and the use of  guaranteed under 
the Constitution Articles 26 and 28.”
1073
 With this verdict, AYM clearly prioritised national and 
state security over the fundamental right and freedom of the press, which also distinctively supports 
the state ideology that was observed under the case examples of Hrant Dink and Pelin Sener 
analysed in Chapter 2.  
 
 The balance that needs to be sustained between freedoms and societal order reveals itself as 
one of the biggest problems for human rights in Turkey,
1074
 especially regarding freedom of 
expression. However, as Hazar suggests, freedom of expression is not the one and only value that 
needs to be protected within society; therefore, in cases where it collides with public order and 
national security, a compromised balance in between must be achieved.
1075
 Besides forming a legal 
concept, national security also has a political nature because it lacks a clear definition and therefore 
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shows differences of application in each country according to its present political condition.
1076
 This 
is where the judiciary plays an important role in determining of the limits of national security as a 
legal and political concept in order to protect the right to free expression and press. 
 
 Therefore, it is fair to argue that the effectiveness of Turkey’s justice system depends on 
achieving a balance between national security and the protection of free expression of the press; and 
this can be achieved by changing the the judiciary’s prioritisation of the state security and interest 
over individual rights and freedoms. 
 
 Despite that freedom of the press is provided and guaranteed as a fundamental right on its 
own under the Turkish Constitution, AYM perceives press freedom as a right and freedom that 
supplements freedom of thought and expression. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the court’s 
approach to press freedom plays an important role in its application, and it is fair to conclude that 
improving of the Court’s approach would result in the further enjoyment and use of the right to free 
expression by the press. 
 
 
5.4.1.2 Turkish Constitutional Court Decision on press freedom after 2010 
 
 A more positive approach to the 2010 judiciary reform was adopted by scholars who 
discussed that such an amendment is crucial to re-establish AYM’s legitimacy.
1077
 More 
specifically, according to Arslan, after the acceptance of individual application to AYM, the Court 
would start basing its judgements on the rights and freedoms rather than principles.
1078
 In parallel to 
Arslan, Cerar argues that it is thanks to the individual application to the Constitutional Courts that 
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the monopoly of statism can be eliminated in constitutionality controls and that citizens can have a 




  Starting with the 2010 judicial reform, Turkish Constitutional Court decisions on the 
freedom of the press fell more along the lines of ECtHR case law; these decisions were made on the 
basis of the amendment of the Turkish Constitution Article 148 that allowed individual applications 
to the Court. 
 
 In the cases where AYM decides regardless of ECHR, such decisions could be brought to 
ECtHR in which case it might find violations of rights stated in the ECHR. Therefore, after this 
legal change, AYM has been motivated to give more weight to the case law of ECtHR.
1080
 
Therefore, because the procedures before and after 2010 for ECtHR application were different, 
AYM’s approach after 2010 is analysed here in order to demonstrate the changes in the approach to 
a free press when ECtHR is taken as a benchmark. In light of this context, two main cases, Ilhan 
Cihaner and Bekir Coskun, will be discussed in which the Court (AYM) decided along the lines of 
the ECtHR case law and decided for the benefit of the press. 
 
 In the case of Ilhan Cihaner, the applicant is a former chief prosecutor and identifies a 
newspaper article as the basis for his application, claiming that his individual rights were violated 





The Chief Prosecutor Osman Sanal, who has been removed from the office due to 
the judicial coup against HSYK has found shocking information about Ilhan 
Cihaner, who has been accused and detained for being an Ergenekon member. 
Gendarmerie and MIT officers had a meeting under the direction of Cihaner for a 
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 A full page newspaper article, Cihaner was accused of having meetings with high ranking 
officials in order to prepare a plot against the Gulen group and AKP under the alleged Ergenekon 
organisation. On that basis, Cihaner’s cases in the Civil Court of the First Instance and the Court of 
Appeal were rejected on the following basis: 
 
The guarantee for the freedom of the press that is regulated by the Turkish 
Constitution Article 28 and Turkish Press Law no. 5187 article 1 and 3 aims for 
the establishment and the protection of a healthy society, living in peace and 
happiness. It also aims to reach these standards by respecting the right to freedom 
of the press to disseminate information that interests the society and which is 
about the incidents that that place within the society and all around the world. 
Therefore, the press has the right and the responsibility to watch, investigate, 
evaluate and disseminate the information that concerns the society. However, as 
the freedom of the press is not absolute, in cases where freedom of the press, 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in the Constitution and the Turkish Civil Law 
Articles 24 and 25 are in conflict, the public interest must be the criteria to 
provide a balance between the rights in conflict. In such evaluation of balance, the 
reality of the publication, the existence of the common good, the existence of the 
public interest, the current interest towards the subject matter must be taken into 
account and the press must not be held responsible for the publication of the news 
that subsequently turn out to be untrue.When the title and the sub title of the 
subject article which are “The Prosecutor is Drown Up to the Neck”, “Breakfast 
on coup plans with Colonel Cicek” and “He Gave It a Start After the Breakfast 
with Cicek” are examined altogether with the content of the news, it is concluded 
that the limits of press freedom, which is guaranteed under the Article 28 of the 
Turkish Constitution and the The Turkish Press Law Article 1 and 3 is not 
exceeded as with the publication of the news, the press used its duty to generate 
public opinion, used its right to public criticism and the news were in accordance 
with the apparent reality, news were made in a lawful manner and the expressions 
used in the title and the content of the news did not violate the applicant’s 
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 As a result, Cihaner applied to AYM with the allegation of the violation of his individual 
rights under the Constitution Article 17, which regulates that “Everyone has the right to life and the 
right to protect and improve his/her corporeal and spiritual existence.”
1084
 He asserted that the news 
reported in Yeni Safak was based on a smear campaign, for during his duty as a chief prosecutor, he 
opened a judicial inquiry against the owners of the newspaper; therefore, he claimed that the article 




 AYM decided that the newspaper article, which covered an alleged meeting of the applicant 
with high ranking military officers for planning an alleged possible coup against the government 
before he was arrested under the Ergenekon investigation, might have violated Cihaner’s right to 
protect his individual right of reputation.
1086
 However, the Court, by taking the Turkish Press Law 
Article 3 into account, based its final judgement on the balance
1087
 between the rights regulated in 
Articles 17
1088
 and 26 and 28 of the Constitution
1089
. Where the court stated that contribution of the 
news to the public interest, level of recognition of the subject individual and the content of the news 
or the article, previous attitudes of the subject person, the type, content and conclusions of the 
publication and the conditions in which the news or the article has been published are the criteria 
that must be taken into account when a balance needs to be sustained between freedom of 
expression and the press and the right to respect one’s honour and reputation.
1090
 The Court also 
referred to ECtHR case law and mentioned the Handyside v UK verdict, which states as follows:  
 
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of such a 
society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of 
every man. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10 (art. 10-2), it is applicable not 
only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as 
inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or 
disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of that 
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pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no “democratic 
society”. This means, amongst other things, that every “formality”, “condition”, 





 Considering the people’s right to information, the court highlighted the importance of a free 
press in a democratic society, affirming the requirement of pluralism of ideas in a democracy, 
where in the press must disseminate all sorts of information that would interest the public.
1092
 It also 
concluded that freedom of expression and the press is of vital importance for democratic action; 
therefore the government must be under the inspection of the public and the press.
1093
 In that regard, 
the Court refers to ECtHR decisions on Bladet Tromso and Stensaas v Norway (“in order to 
determine whether the interference was based on sufficient reasons which rendered it “necessary”, 
regard must be had to the public-interest aspect of the case”)
1094
 and Pedersen and Baadsaard v 
Denmark (“the national margin of appreciation is circumscribed by the interest of democratic 
society in enabling the press to exercise its vital role of “public watchdog” in imparting information 




 In considering the public interest in the subject matter (Ergenekon), the people’s right to 
information on the issue covered in the newspaper appealed by the applicant, and the acceptable 
level of exaggeration included in the subject article, the Court judged that the applicant was not 
criticised because of his judicial duties because of the trial process. The Court stated that the news 
article does not promote violence against him or prevent his public prosecutor responsibilities, and, 





 AYM’s use of ECtHR case law in this case, which constitutes the main and most important 
difference between the way AYM operated before 2010 and the AYM decisions during 1961 and 
1982 underscore how much AYM has changed considering that it now values more carefully 
ECtHR case law. Nevertheless, Sirin argues that AYM does not have to justify all of its verdicts 
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with reference to ECtHR case law. Stating that AYM lacks consistency when it digresses from 
ECtHR case law.
1097
 This raises questions regarding the sustainability of the consistency of its 
verdicts with respect to the freedom of the press. 
 
 However, individual application to the AYM has improved the inconsistency as AYM aims 
to apply its own case law, which is influenced by ECtHR decisions. AYM’s inconsistent reasoning 
could be overcome by the establishment of a “chain novel” described by Dworkin: “in this 
enterprise a group of novelists writes a novel seriatim; each novelist in the chain interprets the 
chapter he has been given in order to write a new chapter, which is then added to what the next 
novelist receives, and so on.”
1098
 In that regard, according to Dworkin’s definition of the “chain 
novel”, AYM must likewise ensure that each judgement would form a part of the chain that would 




 The second recent case was related to the journalist/columnist, Bekir Coskun, who writes 
daily in Cumhuriyet (Republic) newspaper. The article refers to the colourful stairs that were being 
painted as a reaction mainly to environmental issues but also to the expressions of the AKP 
government’s policies that took place in 2013 during and after the Gezi protests. The article, titled 
“Painted Stairs”, presents the following extended metaphor: 
 
My stairs are painted…Red…Blue…Yellow…Actually, feet should be 
painted…Wherever you go, there will be colours…Maybe this was the reason of 
conflict: the fights between colourful and colourless
1100
…For example dance is 
pink…Raki
1101
 is white…Love is red…Trees are green…Lakes are blue…Yellow 
and navy blue
1102
, yellow and red
1103
, black and white
1104
…They put a giant 
poster of our lion on the wall; with his blue eyes and golden hair
1105
…They still 
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1101
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1103
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say that “they have 44% of the votes”…After all the chaos, scandals, and 
outrage…So do you think only 6% understood what really happened in Turkey? 
Whereas they look at the colour tv…Are you colour blind my friend? War is 
black, peace is snow white…Republic is white and red…Secularism we call a 
rainbow…They do not like colours…They decided that the members of 
parliament fight a lot due to the orange colour of their seats as it makes them 
angry…So it seems that they attack when they see red…”Meeaammbers”
1106
 of 
parliament…Paint…Take the brushes, paint whatever you want; sidewalks, roads, 
walls, stones, floors and the sky…This is not the bow of a softa (a religious 




 The case is based on the criminal complaint made by the three members of parliament from 
AKP who alleged that Coskun’s article included defamation
1108
 against government officials and  
“provoking a group of people belonging to different social class, religion, race, sect, or coming 
from another origin, to be rancorous or hostile against another group” (TCK 216). Based on these 
complaints, Istanbul Attorney’s General Office brought a lawsuit for the public prosecution of 
Bekir Coskun, and Istanbul Second Criminal Court of First Instance decided that Coskun has 
committed defamation against a public officer based on his duties through the use of the press and 
convicted Coskun for one year two months, and seventeen days of imprisonment, which concluded 
with deferment of the ruling
1109
 on the basis that: 
 
The press can discuss and criticise politicians’ political or any expressions that is 
of public interest. The columnist while featuring the members of parliament in his 
article could not clearly explain what expression or public actions he based his 
ideas on…the sole purpose of the expressions he uses is observed to be  
humiliating the members of parliament. The columnist exceeded lawful levels of 
criticism by attacking the complainants’ reputation and public respectability. 
Based on the reasons explained above and because his expressions include 
disparaging value judgement, it is decided that Coskun has committed defamation 
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1107
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 Coskun appealed to AYM claiming that his right to free expression and freedom of the press 
were violated. AYM evaluated his application considering that in order to reach public and political 
pluralism, all sorts of ideas must be expressed freely in a peaceful manner. The Court also 
suggested that individual fulfilment is only possible when one can freely express and discuss one's 
ideas.
1111
 The court referred to its previous decision to explain that freedom of expression is a value 





 The Court acknowledged that limiting press freedom must also have a limitation, for when 
restricting the fundamental rights and freedoms, the criteria in Article 13 of the Constitution must 
be taken in to account. Therefore, the control over the limitations on the freedom of the press must 
be made in accordance with the criteria provided in Article 13 of the Constitution, which states that 
“fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted only by law and in conformity with the reasons 
mentioned in the relevant articles of the Constitution without infringing upon their essence. These 
restrictions shall not be contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution and the requirements of 




 The Court identifies “proportionality”, regulated under Article 13 of the Constitution, as 
another legal security against the limitations of rights and freedoms. By referring to a previous 
judgement,
1114
 it considers the criterion of proportionality as the initial examination that needs to be 
considered when dealing with applications that involve the limitation of rights and freedoms. This 
has to be evaluated on the basis that, even though the two criteria — necessity in a democratic 
society and proportionality — are provided as two separate criteria in Constitution Article 13, there 
is a strong link between both. Therefore, before the decision can be made to restrict fundamental 
rights and freedoms, these two criteria must be considered jointly in order to apply the least possible 
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restriction over rights and freedoms.
1115
 This criterion of proportionality was applied by the Court in 
Coskun’s case wherein the Court highlighted the “public observer” (used in place of the 
“watchdog”) role of the press. In light of this, the Court stated that, the grounds for restricting 
Coskun’s expressions as a journalist against the politicians and government policies, must be 





 In that regard, Coskun was considered to be a well-known columnist in Turkey, and the 
expressions in his article were evaluated within the specific period of time and under special 
circumstances (Gezi Park protests) during which a number of stairs was painted in different parts of 
Turkey; these were called the “rainbow protests” with the aim of increasing awareness onf 
environmental issues in the country. Some municipalities were against the painted stairs and 
repainted them in grey, this precipitated a political discussion as a part of the other political issues 
arising from the Gezi Park protests.
1117
 Taking these circumstances into account, the Court agreed 
that by Coskun’s actions of calling the AKP voters “colourblind”, criticising that the government 
receives 44% of the votes “no matter what they do”
1118
, and describing the members of parliament 
as “attacking when they see the colour red” must be interpreted with the rest of the article in order 




 Last but not least, on the basis of ECtHR Lingens v Austria decision,
1120
 the Court defines 
freedom of expression as a concept that mostly aims to secure the freedom of criticism. According 
to the Court, rigorous expressions used to disseminate ideas and expression of thought must be 
tolerated. Besides, the Court refers to ECtHR case law, which states that freedom of political 
discussions form “the fundamental principle of all democratic systems”, in order to explain why 
political expressions must be handled differently than other expressions.
1121
 Indeed ECtHR case law 
highlights that defending the right to political discussions is a principal criterion in a democratic 
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society as observed in Feldek v Slovakia;
1122
 the ECtHR, judges that unless there are mandatory 
circumstances and/or reasons, political expressions must not be restricted.  
 
 Finally, despite that the First Instance Court decision to defer the verdict, Coskun had still 
been sentenced for more than one year of imprisonment, which put him under five years of 
probation, that threatens Coskun as he is a columnist/journalist with the possible execution of his 
punishment. Therefore, because of the threat he would feel, Coskun is at risk of abstaining from 
expressing his ideas, and it has to be accepted this naturally leads to the risk his self-censorship.
1123
 
The Court judged that Coskun’s right to freedom of the press regulated by Articles 26 (1) and 28 (1) 







 It is observed that before the acceptance of individual applications to AYM, AYM defined 
freedom of the press as a right under the general title of ‘freedom of expression’ rather than 
providing a separate right, and in 1963 the circumstances for its restrictions were prioritised over 




Press freedom that completes and allows the use of the freedom of expression, is 
not absolute just like the freedom of expression. Freedom of the press, which 
creates public opinion and which has a strong effect on people’s thoughts and 
ideas, does not mean that expressions and/or writings which disturb the society’s 
peace and welfare and put the state’s security in danger will not be punished, it 
only means that the press cannot be subject to any prior restrictions. In order to 
fulfil its social duties, besides the requirement of freedom, the press must act with 
consciousness of responsibility. A press that lack of such responsibility, as any 
irresponsible power, would finally degenerate and become a power that creates 
danger for national security and weaken public and social order. However, the 
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freedom of thought and press is sacred, the lawmaker in any case as states above 





 However, AYM’s verdict on Coskun’s case shows how the Court now indicate the positive 
and negative responsibilities of the state for the protection of the freedom of expression generally 
and the freedom of the press specifically in this case. Therefore, public authorities are expected not 
to limit or prohibit the expression and dissemination of thought or apply sanctions unless it is 
necessary under their negative responsibility.
1127
 For the positive responsibility of the state, the 
Court refers to the ECtHR decision in Ozgur Gundem v Turkey to express that the state must take 
the necessary precautions for the real and effective protection of free expression and the press.
1128
 
The Court follows ECtHR’s Handyside v UK decision explaining that “necessity in a democratic 
society” requires the limitations on the freedom of expression and press by repressive or temporary 
injunction to be the last resort. Therefore, if the repressive measures do not fulfil a public necessity, 
or are not a last resort, they cannot be considered “necessary in a democratic society.”
1129
 Following 
ECtHR’s Handyside v UK judgement, the Court states that as a result of the previous statement, it is 
possible to argue that freedom of expression, which is one of the founding pillars of a democratic 
society, is applicable not only to those expressions that are harmless but also to those that criticise a 
part of the society or the state — freedom to express striking and disturbing commentary is a 




 Cihaner and Coskun’s cases show the lack of toleration for political criticism: in the First 
Instance Court’s verdict (as in Cihaner’s case, in where the court judged for the protection of the 
free expression of the press) and in Coskun’s case, where despite the obvious conditions that 
allowed a wider margin of criticism (Gezi protests and the current interest of the society in the 
issue), the court ruled for the conviction of Coskun. The First Instance Court decision is ironic 
when considering that the subject matter is criticism towards the government. 
 
                                                 
1126
 AYM, E. 1963/16, K. 1963/83, K.T. 08.04.1963 Author’s translation. 
1127
AYM, E.2014/12151, K.T. 04/06/2015 para. 46 
1128
 Ibid. 
Ozgur Gundem v Turkey App no. 23144/93 (ECtHR, 16 March 2000) para. 43 
1129
 AYM, E.2014/12151, K.T. 04/06/2015 para. 51 
Handyside/United Kingdom App no. 5493/72 (ECtHR, 7 December 1976) para. 48 
1130
 AYM, E.2014/12151, K.T. 04/06/2015 para. 52  
Handyside/United Kingdom App no. 5493/72 (ECtHR, 7 December 1976) para. 49 
Page | 229  
 
 However, since 2010, when judicial reform, acceptance of the direct application to AYM, 
and having to go through AYM to exhaust the ordinary legal remedies before application to ECtHR 
had commenced. The Court’s approach freedom of the press has been improving; this can be 
observed in the two recent cases examined above, where the Court took ECtHR case law as a 
benchmark. It is possible to argue that since the acceptance of individual application, AYM has 
been more “rights” oriented,
1131
 and despite the previous decisions, which failed to follow any 
international institutions’ decisions, there is improvement given that AYM has started to deal with 
individual applications.  Nevertheless, Sirin argues that AYM case law still lacks substantial 
knowledge of human rights institutions, especially on United Nations mechanisms, despite AYM 




 Similar to Sirin’s statement, it is fair to argue that the positive changes only took place on 
the Constitutional Court level, for the First Instance Courts continue to convict journalists on the 
basis of the arbitrary use of TCK and TMK as there is no binding legal provision that prevents the 
First Instance Courts from non-compliance with ECtHR jurisprudence. This demonstrates the need 
for a regulation for the First Instance Courts to follow in order to ensure coherence. 
 
5.4.3 ECtHR approach to freedom of the press 
 
 The most important feature of the ECHR is the control mechanism that it brings alongside 
the rights that are provided by the convention. ECtHR is one of the crucial mechanisms that would 
sustain such a control. ECtHR accepts individual applications provided within the framework of the 
ECHR. This is of great importance when it is considered that ECHR is given the priority against the 
domestic law in Turkey by the Turkish Constitution: “In the case of a conflict between international 
agreements, duly put into effect, concerning fundamental rights and freedoms and the laws due to 
differences in provisions on the same matter, the provisions of international agreements shall 
prevail.”
1133
 Therefore, being the judicial authority of the ECHR, ECtHR’s case law is of utmost 
importance for the law and its application in Turkey. 
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 As opposed to the Turkish courts, ECtHR shows a consistent approach toward cases in 
relation to freedom of the press versus national security, and political toleration towards opposition. 
Salihpasaoglu argues that these antagonistic forces are the main reasons why Turkey restricts 
freedom of the press, especially when looking at the legal restrictions imposed on press freedom 
specified under Turkish Constitution Articles 26 and 28 as well as Article 10 of the ECHR.
1134
 It is 
essential to analyse the view taken by the judiciary on this subject. On this basis, the current section 
aims to demonstrate the application of the above mentioned broadly drawn laws by the First 
Instance Courts and the Turkish Constitutional Court against the press. It observes the different 
approaches among the First Instance Courts, the Constitutional Court and the ECtHR’s to press 
freedom in Turkey. 
 
 In cases where disturbing public expressions do not promote armed insurgency or revolt, but 
are nevertheless censored under the exception of “national security”, ECtHR found Turkey in 
violation of Article 10 as observed in Sener v Turkey
1135
, in which ECtHR states that despite the 
acceptance of the aggressive phrases, the subject article when analysed as a whole does not promote 
or motivate to violence or does not encourage to hatred, revenge or armed resistance. In its verdict, 
ECtHR highlights that the article instead analyses the Kurdish problem from an intellectual point of 
view that promotes the settlement of the-long standing armed conflict.
1136
 Istanbul State Security 
Court’s reasons for convicting Sener were found insufficient by the ECtHR; Sener was convicted 
for disseminating separatist propaganda only for claiming that Kurdish origin citizens in the South 
East Turkey (which was defined as “Kurdistan” in the article) were under oppression. Therefore, 
the interference to her right to free expression by the Turkish court was found disproportionate by 
the ECtHR. ECtHR highlighted that the people were deprived of their right to information because 
of the censorship of a different perspective regarding the South East Turkey.
1137
 By looking at 
Sener’s case from her point of view, ECtHR states that despite her suspended sentence, because the 
national authorities had not provided a remedy or acknowledged the breach of the Convention,
1138
 
and because she continued to feel threatened by a heavy penalty
1139
 (the Istanbul State Security 
Court stipulated that she would not commit any further offence within the next three years and 
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suspended the imposition of the final sentence), Sener was limited in her potential to further discuss 
an alternative view that could benefit Turkey.
1140
 In Sener's case, ECtHR finally decided that there 




 A similar verdict is observed in Ceylan v. Turkey where ECtHR states that “the applicant 
was writing in his capacity as a trade-union leader, a player on the Turkish political scene, and that 
the article in question, despite its virulence, does not encourage the use of violence or armed 
resistance or insurrection. In the Court’s view, this is a factor which it is essential to take into 
consideration,”
1142





the basis of his article, titled “The time has come for the workers to speak out – tomorrow it will be 
too late” in the issue of Yeni Ulke (New Country), stating that State terrorism is intensifying in the 
South East Turkey and that “anyone who examines the Prevention of Terrorism Act closely can 
easily see that it is aimed at crushing not only the struggle of the Kurdish people, but the struggle of 
the whole working class and proletariat for subsistence, for freedom and for democracy.” Ceylan 





 ECtHR followed a similar approach in its verdict in Erdogdu and Ince v Turkey whereby the 
applicants were charged with disseminating propaganda under Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law
1146
 
by the Istanbul National Security Court on the basis of carrying out an interview that included 
discussions for the “Kurdish reality” and of using the term ‘Kurdistan’ in its argument that the 
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withdrawal of Turkish soldiers from South East Turkey meant the formation of a new state.
1147
 The 
court highlighted the importance of the right to information in relation to freedom of the press and 
ruled that government cannot use criminal law to censor the press with the aim to protect national 




 ECtHR consistently emphasises the importance of the freedom of the press in a democratic 
society as a condition for democratic progress as well as the self-fulfilment of the individuals.
1149
 
The ECtHR’s embodiment of press freedom as it established its case law, despite the fact that 
ECHR does not regulate press freedom in a separate article as the Turkish Constitution does, is 
astonishing. ECtHR states that the exceptions to Article 10’s second clause must be applied 
“strictly” and “convincingly” in consideration of pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness as 
foundations of democracy, which consequently will allow not only inoffensive expressions but also 
the ones that “shock”, “offend”, and/or “disturb.”
1150
 ECtHR also rules that such restrictions, 
despite the “margin of appreciation” held by the contracting states must be “necessary” determined 
by “pressing social need”. Case law on the restriction of the press/free expression also includes the 





 More specifically, Karatas v Turkey is based on a poem published by Karatas that includes 
expressions such as “let us go…children of the unyielding…we have heard there is a rebellion in the 
mountains…can we hear and do nothing?…to the majestic mountains that will lead us to 
freedom..in these mountains…freedom is blessed with death, I invite you to die.”
1152
 Istanbul 
National Security Court based its judgement of Karatas’ conviction under the Anti-Terror Law 
Article 8 for disseminating propaganda “against the indivisible unity of the State.”
1153
 ECtHR 
considered the circumstances that require the government to act accordingly in order to prevent 
terrorism, which has been ongoing in Turkey for the last three decades, and stated that “it takes note 
of the Turkish authorities’ concern about the dissemination of views which they consider might 
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exacerbate the serious disturbances that have been going on in Turkey.”
1154
 Even though the poem 
include aggressive expressions, the ECtHR determined that the small audience the publication was 
addressing and the poem’s artistic tone was more of “an expression of deep distress in the face of a 
difficult political situation” than a call for violence.
1155
 Therefore ECtHR found Karakas’ 
conviction disproportionate and not “necessary in a democratic society,” and found in violation of 




 In Lingens ve Austria, ECtHR emphasises the limits imposed on the press to criticise 
politicians stating that the press — despite its responsibility to act according to the state interests 
and security — encompasses the role of informing the society on the government affairs, the actions 
political leaders and other government officials. Therefore, the press is entitled to disseminate 
information, specially on the political issues even if disharmonious.
1157
 This is where the ECtHR 
points out the “watchdog” role of the press for the first time: “the press performs its task as 
purveyor of information and public watchdog.”
1158
 It is through this kind of information that the 
press can serve the proper functioning of democracy.
1159
 The dissemination of such information 
enables the public to form opinions and take active part in the decision-making process. ECtHR 
rules that governments must be more tolerant towards criticism as political processes and 
expressions are of public interest as democratic systems require close investigation of government 
actions.
1160
 In that regard, the ECtHR in Lingens v Austria emphasises the limits of prohibitive 
criticism against politicians: 
 
Freedom of the press furthermore affords the public one of the best means of 
discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of political leaders. 
More generally, freedom of political debate is at the very core of the concept of a 
democratic society which prevails throughout the Convention. The limits of 
acceptable criticism are accordingly wider as regards a politician as such than as 
regards a private individual. Unlike the latter, the former inevitably and 
                                                 
1154
 Karatas v Turkey App no. 23168/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) para. 51 
1155
 Ibid. para. 52 
1156
 Ibid. para. 54 
1157
 Lingens v Austria App no. 9815/82 (ECtHR, 8 July 1986) para. 41-42 
Sener v Turkey Application no. 26680/95 (ECHR, 18 July 2000) para. 41 
1158
 Lingens v Austria App no. 9815/82 (ECtHR, 8 July 1986) para. 44 
1159
 Ibid. para. 41 
1160
 Lingens v Austria App no. 9815/82 (ECtHR, 8 July 1986) para. 42  
For similar judgement see Surek v Turkey App no. 26682/95 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) para. 61  
Page | 234  
 
knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his every word and deed by both 
journalists and the public at large, and he must consequently display a greater 
degree of tolerance.
1161
   
 
 
  The ECtHR’s verdict in Incal v Turkey demonstrates that criticism of the government and 
politicians must be handled by the governments in an appropriate manner whereby the reaction does 
not exceed the expression made by the individuals; governments should use other means than 
criminal proceedings to deal with opposing ideas and expressions that do not comply with their 
own.
1162
 A similar decision was made by ECtHR in Thoma v Luxembourg where the court stated 
that, based on the establishment of “pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness”, Article 10 (2) of 
the ECHR was applicable to “information” or “ideas” that “offend, shock and disturb” in order to 




 Based on the information provided in Chapter 4 that Erdogan and the AKP government 
perceive criticism as a “personal attack”, that during his duty as a prime minister (then as a 
president) he led the biggest censorship on the press in modern Turkish history,
1164
 it is important to 
examine ECtHR case law, specifically its limits on criticising politicians, and analyse what sort of 
hierarchy is followed by the court for the levels of criticisms toward political figures and the 
government. 
 
 In that regard, in Castells v Spain ECtHR states that the permissible limits for criticising the 
government are wider than the limits for criticising private individuals.
1165
 This statement is 
repeated in Surek v Turkey
1166
 and in Lingens v Austria: “the limits of acceptable criticism are 
accordingly wider as regards to a politician rather than a private individual. Unlike the latter, the 
former inevitably and knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his every word and act by 
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 The specific example of Erdogan’s lack of toleration for critical comments is observed in 
Tusalp v Turkey. Erbil Tusalp, a journalist/author who had been sued for damages by Erdogan for 
his two articles (namely “Consistency” and “Get well soon” in 2005 and 2006 during which 
Erdogan was the prime minister) with the allegation that they violate Erdogan’s individual rights. 
The Turkish Courts decided that “permissible levels of criticism” were exceeded and convicted 
Tusalp for 10.000 Turkish Lira to be paid to Erdogan. In its judgement, ECtHR stated the wider 
margin of toleration that the politicians should have and highlighted the importance of the press in a 
democratic society, whose expressions of “exaggeration and provocation” are protected. Therefore, 
the ECtHR, based on its case law stated above, rejected the Turkish Court’s allegation of Tusalp’s 
violation of a “permissible level of criticism.”
1168
 ECtHR stated that ECHR Article 10 includes 
outrageous, shocking, and disturbing expressions, which are the requirements of the pluralism, 




 The exceptions stated in Article 10 of the ECHR which were conceived in generic terms 
give the ECtHR a great deal of judicial discretion. This allows the ECtHR to specify the reasons for 
restricting freedom of the press depending on the circumstances of the cases, which attributes 
significant importance to its case law that finally sets the principles for the basis of restrictions. 
When compared with Turkey’s judicial approach to freedom of expression, it is observed that 
ECtHR’s use of exceptions for the restriction of the press depend on a narrow interpretation and 
these restrictions leaving no room for doubt on the impartiality of the ECtHR. Because the press is 
given the watchdog role, the exceptions provided in Article 10 of the ECHR are being applied with 
utmost scrutiny in order to respect the right to free expression of the press as well as the right to 
information. Therefore, the ECtHR holds the final judgement on whether the rights of the press 
have been restricted in proportionality and with a legitimate aim and whether the restrictions to 
freedom of the press comply with the protection provided in the ECHR Article 10. 
 
 On the other hand, the notion of judicial independence and impartiality has been shaped 
under the military mindset of the 1982 Constitutions (leading to the continuous application of non-
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justifiable decisions of judges in Turkey under the influence of the political ideology prioritising 
state and national security), which led to the acceptance of juristocracy 1170  in Turkey. 1171  This 
resulted in an ideological and political impetus to govern the judicial decisions that do not comply 
with ECtHR case law as well as the failure to comply with the ECtHR verdicts on Turkey. 
 
 Finally, analysis of the hindrances experienced by the press in Turkey due to the issues in 
judicial independence, assists understanding the importance of looking at the situation of the press 
in Turkey through the role political changes play on the development of the press, rather than 
questioning the democratic situation of Turkey by examining the role of the press in its 
democratisation. According to Jiafei Yin: 
 
The media systems in transition reflect the problems of those societies undergoing 
major transformations - rough politics in the fight for the power vacuum, partisan 
press, intense competition because of the new freedom, corruption or lack of a 
strong and independent judiciary system, weak financial foundation for the media, 
and lack of training of the journalists. Democracy is still young in these societies; 




 Yin’s argument supports the need to improve the democratic conditions in order to improve 
the conditions of the press, and a strong judicial system based on impartiality and independence is 
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 Impartiality and independence of the judiciary is necessary for it to fulfil its role in a 
democratic society.
1173
 Recent legal regulations in Turkish judiciary’s independence have became 
controversial; the inconsistency of judgements on politically influenced cases also casts gloomy 
shadow on the judiciary’s impartiality when compared with the ECtHR jurisprudence, which 
provides consistency unlike the Turkish courts’ decisions.  
 
 The organisation of the judiciary therefore has a direct effect on the application of the 
statutes, which are written in vague language. Unless there is a transformative reform on the 
organisation of the judiciary, legal amendments that are made in accordance with the reform 
process in Turkey, there will be no grounds for the reliable  applicability of these changes. In that 
regard, HSYK holds a critical position for the independence of the judiciary as well as the 
application of legal reforms.  
 
 Arbitrary judgements for detentions — even in situations where the law does not oblige the 
judges — and the vague application of the Turkish Penal Code and the Anti-Terror Law by the 
Turkish courts (failing to comply with the ECtHR case law), are the kinds of problems that cannot 
be solved only by making amendments to legislations. The judiciary must be strengthened, 
independence of the judges and prosecutors must be ensured, but most crucially, the mentality of 
the judges that prioritise the security and interest of the state rather than individual rights and 
freedoms and their approach towards the importance of a free press in a democratic society must 
change. Finally, it is observed by this chapter that freedom of the press needs highlighting and the 
perspective of the judges in Turkey must change in favour of human rights and freedoms that 






                                                 
1173
 Christopher M Larkins, ‘Judicial Independence and Democratisation: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis’  
(1996) 44 The American Journal of Comparative Law 606 
Page | 238  
 
Chapter 6 - Recommendations and Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
 
 By examining the legislation limiting freedom of the press in Turkey — through a historical 
analysis of the deeply ingrained political ideology’s role in affecting the long-standing problems 
encountered by the press — the thesis has addressed two main research questions: (1) what is the 
role of politics on the censorship of the press in Turkey? and (2) what legal and organisational 
changes are required for the legal protection of the press from political intervention? The answer to 
the first question is based on the socio-legal approach to providing a unifying framework of the 
legal and political issues hindering freedom of the press in Turkey that reviews the political history 
of Turkey and the evolution of related legislation that together reflect the political changes affecting 
the present situation. The answer to the second question is based on the use of a doctrinal 
methodology, focusing on primary sources in a detailed analysis of the law in action and its 
evolution over time. Therefore, as well as concentrating on the current issues and debates, the thesis 
aims to provide a historical account of the changes that gave rise to them. 
 
 This research has brought to light the most frequently used legislation for censoring the 
press, the gaps in the Turkish Penal Code and Anti-Terror Law (in relation to the Turkish courts’ 
application of these controversial legislative provisions and approach to freedom of the press), and 
the problems encountered by the press based on the broadly drawn statutes mentioned above. The 
thesis has highlighted the urgent need for the government to undertake immediate reforms. For 
changes to the Turkish Penal Code and Anti-Terror Law have been mostly cosmetic and based on 
the government’s will to continue using national security as one of the main reasons for censoring 
the opposition press — driven by its lack of toleration to criticism. 
 
 By way of this research, foreign/external solutions, such as the changes contingent on 
Turkey’s EU membership process, have been demonstrated to be positive yet altogether insufficient 
for the improvement of press freedom in the country. Internalisation of human rights and a change 
in the prioritisation of individual rights and freedoms over state security must be prioritised. Even 
though eminent authors, human rights organisations, and scholars have suggested 
recommendations, the recommendations provided herein are practical and workable on the basis of 
this research. Therefore, this research has highlighted the necessity for legal, political, and judicial 
changes to take place concomitantly.  
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6.2 Need for amendments to the Constitution 
 
 This research recommends that — to correct the interrelated problems experienced in the 
domain of human rights in Turkey and specifically to resolve the problems experienced by the press 
— the constitution that is being drafted by the government
1174
 must be freed from the mindset of the 
military regimes and must be prepared in a manner that respects and prioritises the protection of the 
free expression of the minority, and in this case, journalists of minority groups. In the Introduction 
section of the new Constitution, the government should explicitly recognise press freedom as an 
indispensable human right that is a must for a  functioning  democracy. Because legal positivism is 
commonly applicable among the Turkish courts, the establishment and sustainment of freedom of 
the press as a legal right in the Constitution may be a way for the judges to be legally bound to 
apply it in its interpretation of press related cases. 
 
 Broadly drawn exceptions to freedom of expression and the press in Articles 26 and 28 must 
be amended with the provision of more precise definitions to freedom of expression and the press. 
 
6.3 Need for amendments to the Turkish Penal Code 
  
 Articles 125, 135, 214, 215, 220, 226, 285, 299, 314, and 318 of the Turkish Penal Code 
must be amended in light of the ECtHR judgements and on the basis of universal standards of free 
expression in a manner that would restrict the arbitrary use of these provisions for the censorship of 
the press.  
 
 Article 288 of the Turkish Penal Code must be amended — a definition of what the article 
means by “influencing the prosecutors and judges” and a clause protecting the free expression of 
the press by disseminating information that is of public interest must be added in order to prevent 
restrictions to the people’s right to information by silencing the press through penalisation for 
attempts to influence a fair trial.  
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 Article 216 of the Turkish Penal Code which brings the criteria of forming “an open and 
clear threat for public security” for penalisation of provoking a group of people be rancorous or 
hostile in its first clause, must be included as a clear cut standard for the whole article including its 
second clause, which specifies “openly humiliating another person”. This is one of the articles that 
requires a clear definition of the crime as it is intensively used for criminalising journalists. 
  
 Despite human rights organisations’ suggestions to provide appropriate training to prosecutors and 
judges for the application of Article 301 in compliance with the ECtHR case law, based on the case 
examples analysed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, the amendment to TCK Article 301 was not an effective 
solution, for the journalists are still being arrested mostly based on this article
1175
 and the broadly drawn 
Anti-Terror Law. Therefore, this research recommends that the article must be abolished altogether, and 
training programs for prosecutors and judges must address a specific understanding of freedom of expression 
and the press in compliance with ECHR principles. 
 
6.4 Need for Amendment to the Anti-Terror Law 
 
 The Anti-Terror Law must not be used generously by the judges to silence the opposition 
press. Even after the amendments that took place under the name of democratic reform packages 
during the EU membership process, the Anti-Terror Law has experienced only cosmetic changes  
because of the government’s lack of genuine commitment to internalising human rights. The 
changes are merely theoretical where its practical application has been overlooked. As a result, its 
broadly drawn language has been a tool to censor the press. Because the limited steps do not 
provide a resolution to the elemental problems occurring from a Constitutional and judicial system 
that allows the political abuse of the statute, one can argue that the long standing Anti-Terror 
Legislation written in vague language should be abolished altogether. However, considering the 
negative repercussions such a move may have on the protection of national and state security. 
Giving the continual security problems experienced in the South East of Turkey, this study suggests 
that the definition of “terrorism” must be clearly made, in a way that would not create any doubt 
whether a given action falls within the limits of its definition. Rather than broadly drawn legislative 
provisions that allow a great deal of interpretation by the judges, which is the current state of the 
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Turkish Penal Code and Anti-Terror Law, clear and explicit codification in these legislations  would 
limit the arbitrary judiciary decision-making. 
 
 
6.5 Judicial training  
  
 The judicial approach to press freedom in the name of state security has been demonstrated 
as one of the most controversial reasons for failure of the reforms. Considering that judges receive 
no specific training for dealing with cases of human and fundamental rights and freedoms, there is 
an urgent need to provide intense and continuous training on how to approach violations of freedom 
of expression of the press. Specific training on freedom of expression and the press must be 
provided to the judges in the Turkish Constitutional Court in order to allow the implementation of 
the universal criteria for protecting freedom of expression and the press in their judgements. The 
training of the first instance judges should be updated every year in light of the recent ECtHR 
jurisprudence and AYM case law take place on periodic basis in order to bring coherence to the first 
instance court rulings based on ECtHR and AYM case law rather than the political affiliations of 
the case. The training must prepare the judges to internalise the criteria of the ECtHR, namely 
“necessity in a democratic society” and “existence of a legitimate aim”. Their opinions should be 
based on the principles set forth in the ECHR. Judges should be trained to take these criteria into 
consideration in each and every single case on the basis of the unique characteristic of the case and 
to respect the suspects’ right to be released pending a trial. Internalisation of the ECtHR case law 
must take place both in the First Instance and the Constitutional Courts; restrictions to press 
freedom should be applied as an exception, not as a rule on its own. Fundamentally, judges must be 
trained to approach opposition not as a threat but a necessity in a democratic society: therefore 
judges must be trained specially to aim for a “rights based” approach in their rulings. Besides, the 
“positivist legal perspective” that is used in human rights training may be switched to a human 
rights training that is mostly based on the philosophical foundations of human rights. 
 
 Law faculties in general should have obligatory “natural law”
1176
 modules where the 
concept of human rights is examined from a philosophical angle with the aim of forming the basis 
for the acceptance of freedom of expression and press as a fundamental right for the improvement 
of society. This may positively shape the judicial approach by valuing human rights in general and 
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freedom of the press specifically rather than perpetuating the general judicial approach that has 
been shaped by 1961 and 1982 military mindset. A clear realisation, must occur in the judges and 
prosecutors on the drawbacks brought by the political ideology that prioritises state security and 
interest over individual rights and freedoms. In that regard, intensive and continuous human rights 
training must be provided for judges and prosecutors that specifically concerns the importance and 
role of a free press in a democratic society. In this way, rule of law may be respected and 
ideological motivations may hold less space in judicial decisions in general. An underlying reason 
for this recommendation is the will to propose a change in legal education that will allow the 
creation of a judicial mindset that respects human rights before any other political motivations — 
such a paradigm shift would finally restore faith in a judiciary that has been weakened by recent 




6.6 Improving judicial independence and impartiality 
 
 The absence of assurance for judicial independence against the legislative, executive, and 
media powers and the reflection of this problem in judicial decisions may be settled by the 
reorganisation of the HSYK. Therefore, this thesis recommends that the formation of the HSYK 
must be reorganised in a manner that curbs its duties and authorities away from political influences. 
This may be achieved by removing of the Minister of Justice and Undersecretary of the Ministry of 
Justice from the Board in order to minimise the risk of political control of the Board. In addition to 
that, removing the authority of direct or indirect election of the Board members by the legislative or 
executive power — in this case the President — might also assist in the eliminating political effects 
on the judiciary. 
 
 In addition to institutional changes, creating an awareness among the public of the 
importance of an independent and impartial judiciary for the protection of their individual rights 
and freedoms would also benefit one of the pillars of democracy — freedom of expression and the 
press.
1178
 This may be possible by providing education in schools on what the universal norms of 
judicial independence involve. Teaching the importance of state and national security and judicial 
protection of the individual rights and freedoms working together to promote freedom. In sum, it is 
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recommended by this research that Ministry of Justice should not be able to direct the judiciary 
altogether.   
 
 It is also recommended by this thesis that the Turkish Constitutional Court must continue 
using ECtHR case law as its benchmark specially on press-related issues; however, in order to 
create more coherence in its judgements. The Turkish Constitutional Court must internalise 
universal human rights standards and take a stance in favour of press freedom based on a genuine 
appreciation of the role of a free press in a democratic society.  In this way, impartiality of the 
judges may be sustained in politically motivated cases against the press. 
 
6.7 Faithful Implementation of ECtHR judgements 
 
 This research does not find that legal reforms adopted during the EU accession process have 
been fully implemented. Because the courts play one of the most fundamental roles in 
implementing the reforms, it is necessary to make the necessary legal changes for complying with 
ECtHR judgements. Because there are no legal provisions in Turkish law that regulate non-
compliance with the ECtHR judgements, this thesis recommends that there should be a clear and 
coherent legislation that would oblige the courts to following ECtHR judgements consistently. In 
short, failure to follow ECtHR jurisprudence, is not an offence. Therefore, making clear legislation 
regulating non-compliance with ECtHR decisions and ensuring the country-wide application of this 
legislation is essential to safeguarding the rights of the journalists and thereby ensuring and 
sustaining the freedom of the press.  
 
 There should be willingness on the part of the government to ensure the country-wide 
application of this law and the willingness of the Turkish courts to interpret the law coherently; this 
of course depends on a coherent law conducive to the courts’ interpretation. Therefore, it is 
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6.8 Reducing political interference into press operations 
 
 Political interference in the functioning of the press has been restricting freedom of the press 
and has resulted in its political polarisation and use as a vehicle for advancing personal political 
interests.  
 
 The media holdings’ involvement in other businesses results in their vulnerability to 
government pressure because of the economic reliance of these businesses on the government; 
media owners therefore choose to avoid oppositional coverage of news against the government
1179
, 
which mostly results in censorship and self censorship of the press. It is recommended by this 
research that in order to lessen (if not completely eliminate) the impact of political pressure 
resulting from media owners-government business relationship and causing forced resignation and 
the layoffs of journalists. Media ownership may be subject to legal regulation which may prevent 
direct or indirect government interference in press operations. 
 
 Increased awareness might lead to public demand for a freer press and protection of their 
right to information, by creating pressure on the media owners to provide the type of news they 
would like to receive which would be less politically motivated and more information oriented. 
 
6.9 Strengthening journalists’ unions 
 
 There should be legal regulations for strengthening journalists’ rights to become a member 
of the union they choose without any pressure from media owners.  
 
 It is recommended that journalists should unite in order to demand reinstatement of their 
union rights. Thereby establishing and sustaining their strength to resist any sort of pressure that 
may come from government officials, politicians or the media owners. Strengthening journalists’ 
unions may strengthen the legal position of the journalists against forced resignation or lay offs 
based on their union membership. 
 
                                                 
1179
 Robert W. McChesney, The Political Economy of the Media: Enduring Issues, Emerging Dilemmas (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 2008) 
Page | 245  
 
6.10 Preventing the authoritarian tendencies of the government  
  
 Ideally, in order to improve Turkey’s democratisation process, a political culture that is 
tolerant to criticism and opposition must be established. In order to allow the emergence of such a 
culture, government officials and the politicians must understand that criticism most of the time is 
by its very nature severe, offending, and inciting. However, they must adapt and be able to tolerate 
opposition rather than perceiving it as a threat that has to be suppressed and silenced. This study 
suggests that this is only possible through society’s clear and insistent/continuous demand for 
democratic criteria to be established and through the increased awareness of the press’s role in the 
formation of an arena where the public views on any topic, especially political discussions, can take 
place. One of the key features in an organised civil society is pluralism,
1180
 therefore, society must 
be well informed by NGOs of the importance of demanding a free press, the right to information, 
and their democratic right to peacefully protest against the unfair treatment of journalists. 
Considering the positive effects of national and international political pressure on the release of 
imprisoned journalists, NGOs must keep monitoring the hindrances to the press in Turkey and 
provide support for the journalists against the pressure placed on them. Therefore, civil society and 
NGOs must be responsible and play a constructive role from the beginning of the process (law 
making process, pressure for amendments) to the end, and the emphasis must be on increasing 
public awareness, for the freedom of the press is closely linked to the people’s right to information 
in a democratic society. 
 
 In that regard, it is submitted that the legal culture, specifically, the Turkish courts also play 
a crucial role in paving the way for the individual rights and freedoms that have been obstructed. 
This may be possible by switching the judicial frame of mind in Turkey, as suggested above, from 
prioritising state interest into aiming to protect individual rights and freedoms, which could finally 
limit the use of legal provisions by the government authorities and politicians to censor the press. 
Judges can start using their judicial discretion for the protection of human rights as well as 
broadening their limits. In order to do so, this research recommends the judge’s use of teleological 
interpretation,
1181
 which will allow them to interpret the law on the basis of what the law itself aims 
to regulate as well as how it will conform with the needs of time and the society. This is obviously 
only possible where judicial independence can be established — this is where the interlink among 
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the recommendations is more apparent, for no recommendation can find practical efficiency without 
the balanced weight of another one. 
 
 Also national legislators should take proactive steps towards making substantial changes in 
the legal statues that can provide a clear definition of the broadly drawn legal provisions and 
provide a balance between national security and press freedom. This balance should be 
continuously applied by the judges, especially in cases related to the journalists’ right to criticise 
government officials and politicians. This might lead to a political atmosphere where the press 
enjoys the legal protection to disseminate information freely as well as comment on government 
affairs, thereby serving an objective source of public opinion. 
 
6.11 Role of the EU 
  
 The EU accession process assisted legal reforms in the initial years of the AKP government, 
but these reforms came to a halt due to the reasons previously discussed in the scope of this thesis. 
Considering the EU being a catalyst in Turkey’s democratisation process, the harmonisation process 
must be re-activated and the EU should work closely with the Turkish government in order to 
encourage reforms in relation to freedom of the press. This will provide the government with an 
incentive to carry on with the reforms, which would be supported by the public, as recommended 




 A balance between national security and press freedom is vital to allowing a free 
environment for political discussions in Turkey. This balance needs to be established through 
legislation that clarifies the concept of national security and judicial practice that applies this 
concept toward the protection of individual rights and freedoms of journalists, when in conflict with 
the interest of the state. Accordingly, a reduction in judicial bureaucracy would further provide 
judicial independence. The continual conflict in South-East Turkey arguably necessitates the 
continuation of the application of the Turkish Penal Code and Anti-Terror Law for limiting 
provocative expressions; however, this legislation is instead being used as an excuse to silence the 
opposition press which results in non-implementation of the legal reforms. Therefore, lawmakers 
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must strive for balance between freedom of the press and national security regulations, exhibiting a 
genuine will to take proactive steps towards improving press conditions in Turkey. This thesis 
focuses on the negative effects of the political ideology on the restriction of the press. Locating the 
source of the problem from a historical and practical angle by examining the possible ways to 
minimise such effects if not eliminate them. 
 
 This research concludes that because the press has been seen and used as a tool to shape 
society since the beginning of modern Turkey, and because of the dominant role the press played 
during the military intervention in support of the political ideology, the government has labelled the 
opposition press as a threat based on a political legacy throughout Turkish political history of 
perpetual press suppression. Therefore, the thesis concludes that free circulation of ideas,  through a 
free press, is possible by seizing the political pressure of the press. 
 
 The research therefore recommends that international human rights standards must be the 
yard-post for devising and interpreting the law. Training programmes are therefore necessary for 
broadening the judiciary’s approach, acknowledging the need for a free press in a democracy 
society and governance that facilitates pluralistic discussions and create awareness of politically 
important issues that affect the decision-making process of the people. This approach might also 
promote a toleration among the members of extreme opposite ideologies by acquainting them with 
each other’s ideas through a free press that can serve the peace-making process rather than allowing 
the political ideology to suppress the opposition or minority groups. This may also allow a deeper 
understanding of the reasons for the inconsistencies in the application of the law and contribute to 
appropriate solutions.  
 
6.13 Suggestions for further study  
  
 Economic theories and aspects of the issues related to media ownership could not be 
elaborately discussed due to subject limitations. This generates new research questions such as: 
what economic regulations could be made in order to prevent political intervention by media 
ownership, that controls the news content in relation to the legal loopholes discussed in this thesis. 
Proposing a means of regulating press ownership that would eliminate its political pressure and 
intervention into press functioning, necessitates of an extensive research into the possibility of 
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making legal limitations for such ownership, considering that Turkey operates as a free market 
economy. 
 
 To be able to look deeper into the democratisation issue related to the freedom of the press, 
legal problems encountered by minority groups could be analysed starting from the establishment of 
the Republic in order to discuss the societal and judicial approach to the balance between the right 
to free expression of the journalists from minority groups and the mainstream press. Such research 
could allow a clearer interpretation of national security as a legal concept and might provide legal 
amendments that specifically target the protection of minority groups who face the most 
suppression. 
  
 In addition to print media, which was a focus of this thesis, further research could include 
other types of media, most importantly television channels in Turkey as they were observed not to 
have covered the biggest uprising in the modern history of Turkey, the Gezi protests. Legal 
restrictions on the mainstream TV coverage of issues that are of public interest could be analysed in 
terms of the grounds of limitations in order to see whether there are similar issues encountered by 
the media in Turkey overall, or if the type of restrictions are applied according to the type of 
information included in each media type.  
  
 Based on the censorship and self-censorship applied to the print press, further research could 
be made on how such restriction diverts journalists toward social media, in search of a freer 
platform for disseminating information. On this basis, it could be investigated whether legal 
limitations on journalists who operate on social media platforms take place on similar grounds; 
function in the same way as those imposed on print journalists. 
 
 Finally, empirical research could be undertaken whereby government officials, lawmakers, 
journalists, legal scholars, and media owners might be questioned on the extent to which they think 
political ideology to be one of the fundamental reasons for press censorship. 
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Üzerine Gözlemler/Independence of the Judiciary: Observations on Turkey in Relation to 
Contextual Frame, History and its Relations with Independency in Ahmet Taskin (eds) Yargının 
Bağımsızlığı, Tarafsızlığı ve Etkililiği/Independence, Impartiality and Effectiveness of the Judiciary 
(Ankara, Türkiye Adalet Akademisi Yayınları, 2009)  
T Timur, Türkiye’de Çok Partili Hayata Geçiş/Transition into Multi-Party Period in Turkey 
(Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2003) 
T Y Sancar, ‘Yine Düşünce Özgürlüğü, Yine 301. Madde/ Again Freedom of Thought, Again Article 
301’ in Ifade Ozgurlugu Ilkeler ve Turkiye/Freedom of Expression Principles and Turkey (Iletisim 
Press, 2007)  
Theodore Peterson, ‘Why the Mass Media are that Way’ in Francis H. Voelker and L. Voelker 
(eds.) Mass Media: Forces in our Society (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc, 1978) 5-16  
U Ozdag, Menderes Doneminde Ordu-Siyaset Iliskileri ve 27 Mayis Ihtilali/Military- Politics 
Relationship During Menderes’ Period and 27 May Coup (Boyut Yayin Grubu, 2004)  
W A Hachten and H Hachten, The World News Prism: Changing Media, Clashing Media of 
International Communication (IA:Iowa State University Press, 1992)  
W A Hachten and Harva Hachten, The World News Prism: Changing Media, Clashing Media of 
International Communication (IA:Iowa State University Press, 1992)  
W Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military (London: Routledge, 1994)  
Y D Çetinkaya, Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce-3: Modernleşme ve Batıcılık/Political Thought 
in Modern Turkey-3: Modernisation and Westernism (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002)  
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Y Metin, ‘Türkiye’de Yargı Bağımsızlığına İlişkin Kimi Sorunlar ve Çözüm Önerileri/ Problems 
About the Judicial Independence in Turkey and Recommendations’ (2010) 27 Anayasa Yargisi 217-
272  
Z Arslan, ‘Conflicting Paradigms: Political Rights in the Turkish Constitutional Court’ (2002) 11:1 
Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 9-25  
Z Arslan, ‘Turk Parlemento Tarihi/Turkish Parliamentary History’ (1957-1960) 156:1 TBMM 
Kultur, Sanat ve Yayin Kurulu Yayinlari  
Page | 274  
 
Z Hacimuratlar, ‘Hukuk Politika Adalet Iliskisi Acisindan Yassiada Yargilamalarina Bir Bakis/An 
Analysis of Yassiada Trials In Light of Politics and Justice’ (2008) 3 Ankara Barosu Dergisi 82-89  
Z Hazar, ‘Freedom of Press and National Security’ (2013) 17:1-2 Gazi Universitesi Hukuk 
Fakultesi Dergisi 1525-1548  
Z Onis and Fuat Keyman, ‘A New Path Emerges’ (2003) 14:2 Journal of Democracy 97-107  
Z Sonay, ‘Basinda Sendikal Orgutlenme/Unionist Organisation in the Press’ Local Media Training 
Seminar (Journalists’ Union of Turkey, 2000) <http://www.tgc.org.tr/ ybs/19-07.htm> accessed 25 
November 2014 
Z Yildirim, ‘Turkiye’de Ifade ve Basin Ozgurlugu Sorunu; Avrupa Birligi Uyum Surecinde Ifade 
ve Basin Ozgurlugu Alaninda Yapilan Calismalar/The Problem of Freedom of Expression and the 
Press in Turkey: Developments in Freedom of Expression and the Press During the Harmonisation 
with the European Union’ (2012) 16:1-2 EUFHD 53-86  
Ziya Onis, ‘Turkey, Europe, and Paradoxes of Identity: Perspectives on the International Context of 




Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Documents:working papers (Ordinary Session, 4th 
part, vol.7, September 2002)  
European Commission ‘Turkey 2012 Progress Report’ (Com 600 Final, 2012)  
European Commission Enlargement ‘EU-Turkey Relations’ <http://ec.europa.eu/ 
enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/eu_turkey_relations_en.htm> accessed 4 May 2012  
European Commission, ‘Turkey 2015 Progress Report’ (Com 216 Final, 2015) European 
Commission, ‘Turkey 2015 Progress Report’ (Com 216 Final, 2015)  
European Commission, Commission Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2009 for the 
European Instrument for the Promotion of Democracy and the Human Rights (C 7082, 2009)  
Page | 275  
 
European Commission, Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress towards 
Accession (1412 Final 700 final, 2002)  
European Commission, Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress towards 
Accession (1726/2001)  
European Commission, Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress towards 
Accession (2000)  
European Commission, Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress towards 
Accession (513, 1999)  
European Commission, Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress towards 
Accession (SEC 1412, 2002)  
European Commission, Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards 
Accession (Brussels 10 November 2003)  
European Commission, Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards 
Accession (Brussels 1756/2001)  
European Commission, Turkey 2005 Progress Report (1426, 561 Final/2005) Council of Europe 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950  
European Commission, Turkey 2009 Progress Report (SEC(2009) 1334 COM(2009) 533)  
European Commission, Turkey 2010 Progress Report, (COM 2010/660) 
European Commission, Turkey 2012 Progress Report (Com 600 final, 2012)  
European Commission, Turkey 2012 Progress Report, COM (2012) 600 final, Brussels, 2012 
European Commission, Turkey 2015 Report (216 Final, 2015) European Commission, Turkey 2015 
Report, (SDW 2015/216 final)  
European Council, Presidency Conclusions Copenhagen European Council (12-13 December 2002) 
<http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2004/4/20/ff7ff228-fa3b-4f89-b552 
808f7eb2c5b3/publishable_en.pdf> accessed 6 December 2015  
Page | 276  
 
European Court of Human Rights, ‘Annual Report 2015’ (Strasbourg, 2016) <http:// 
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_Report_2015_ENG.pdf> accessed 12 February 2016   
European Court of Human Rights, Annual Report 2010 (Strasbourg 2010) <http:// 
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/ Annual_report_2010_ENG.pdf> accessed 11 November 2012  
European Union, European Union Observations on an Evolving EU Human Rights Policy (2001)  
T Hammarberg, ‘Freedom of Expression and Media Freedom in Turkey’ (Council of Europe 
Report, 12 July 2011) <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp? p=&id=1814085&direct=true> accessed 5 
April 2013 
The European Council (Copenhagen June 1993) <http://aei.pitt.edu/1443/1/ 
Copenhagen_june_1993.pdf> accessed 19 September 2015  
 
NGOs 
Amnesty International ‘Turkey: Time to remove the shackles on freedom’ (AI, 27 March 2013) 
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/03/turkey-time-remove-shackles-freedom/> 
accessed 12 June 2013  
Amnesty International, ‘Independence and Impartiality of Judiciary under threat in Turkey’ (AI, 24 
February 2014) <http://humanrightsturkey.org/2014/02/24/amnesty-independence-and-impartiality-
of-judiciary-under-threat-in-turkey/> accessed 2 February 2015  
Amnesty International, ‘Turkey: Legal reforms fall short on freedom of expression’ (AI, 30 April 
2013) <https:// www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/04/turkey-legal-reforms-fall-short-freedom-
expression/> accessed 6 August 2014  
Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘Q&A: Two of Turkey's leading journalists speak from jail’ (CPJ, 
1 August 2011) <https://www.cpj.org/blog/2011/08/qa-two-of-turkeys-leading-journalists-speak-
from-j.php> accessed 22 January 2012 
Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘Turkey, “Civilized” Censorship under the Sword of Damocles: A 
Report’ (CPJ, November 1985)  
Page | 277  
 
Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘Turkey’s press freedom crisis: The dark days of jailing 
journalists and criminalizing dissent’ (CPJ, October 2012) <https://cpj.org/reports/turkey2012-
english.pdf> accessed 11 February 2013  
Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘Turkey’s Press Freedom Crisis’ (CPJ, 22 October 2012) 
<https://www.cpj.org/ reports/2012/10/turkeys-press-freedom-crisis-appendix-i-journalists-in-
prison.php> accessed on 2 June 2013  
Freedom House, ‘Freedom of the Press 2015 Turkey’ (Freedom House, 2015) 
<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/turkey> accessed 11 December 2015  
Freedom House, ‘Turkey Freedom of the Press 2011’ (Freedom House, 2011) 
<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2011/turkey> accessed 16 October 2014  
Freedom House, Corruption, Power and Media’ (Freedom House, 2014) 
<https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Turkey%20Report%20-%202-3-14.pdf> accessed 22 
November 2015  
HRW, ‘Turkey: Violations of Free Expression in Turkey’ (Brussels: Human Rights Watch 1999) 
<https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/turkey/> accessed 9 March 2012  
Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of Turkey (Human 
Rights Committee, 106th Session 15 October to 2 November, 2012) Advanced Unedited Version  
Human Rights Watch, ‘Report on Violations on Free Expression In Turkey’ (February 1999) 
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/turkey/> accessed 13 May 2012  
Human Rights Watch, ‘Turkey: Crackdown on Opposition Media. Arrests Damage Press Freedom’ 
(19 December 2014) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/19/turkey-crackdown-opposition-media> 
accessed 8 March 2015  
Human Rights Watch, ‘Turkey: Draft Reform Law Falls Short’ (Human Rights Watch ,13 February 
2012) accessed 01 June 2013  
Human Rights Watch, ‘Turkey: Government Amendments Will Not Protect Free Speech Article 
301 Should Be Abolished’ (HRW 16 April 2008) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/04/16/turkey-
government-amendments-will-not-protect-free-speech> accessed 23 May 2012  
Page | 278  
 
Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1998 Turkey Human Rights 
Developments (Human Rights Watch, 1998) <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/worldreport/Helsinki-
23.htm#P1117_264948> accessed 10 October 2012 
R Mahoney, ‘Mission Journal:Media under growing pressure in Turkey’(Committee to Protect 
Journalists, 27 July 2011) <https://cpj.org/blog/2011/07/mission-journal-media-under-growing-
pressure-in-tu.php> accessed 30 October 2012 
Reporters Without Borders ‘Judicial Authorities Urged to Press Ahead with Hrant Dink Murder 
Case’(RSF,23January2015)<http://fr.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/hrant_dink_davasinda_yargi_i_s_in_sonunu_
getirmeli-2.pdf> accessed 15 October 2015  
Reporters Without Borders, ‘Journalists under attack as government pursues military offensive 
against PKK’ (RSF, 26 October 2011) <http://en.rsf.org/turkey-journalists-under-pressure-as-26-10-
2011,41282.html> accessed 4 March 2015  
Reporters Without Borders, ‘Judicial system presses on with absurd trial of Oda TV journalists’ 
(RSF, 6 January 2012) <https://rsf.org/en/news/judicial-system-presses-absurd-trial-oda-tv-
journalists> accessed 16 August 2014  
Reporters Without Borders, ‘Prime Minister Warned that Terror Law Changes Could Impose 
Censorship of Kurdish Issues’ (RSF, 10 July 2006) <http://en.rsf.org/turkey prime-minister-warned-
that-terror-10-07-2006,18243.html> accessed 2 July 2012  
Reporters Without Borders, ‘Turkey-World’s Biggest Prison for Journalists’ (19 December 2012) 
<http://en.rsf.org/turkey-turkey-world-s-biggest-prison-for-19-12-2012,43816.html> accessed 03 
March 2013  
Reporters Without Borders, ‘Two journalists in Oda TV case still held after colleagues freed’ (RSF, 
17 September 2012) <https://rsf.org/en/news/two-journalists-oda-tv-case-still-held-after-colleagues-
freed> accessed 29 May 2012  
S Corke, A Finkel, D J. Kramer, Carla Anne Robbins and Nate Schenkkan, ‘Democracy in Crisis: 
Corruption, Power and Media’ (Freedom House, 2014) 
<https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Turkey%20Report %20-%202-3-14.pdf> accessed 22 
November 2015  
Page | 279  
 
Other 
2010 OSCE Review Conference Independence of the judiciary in Turkey: new composition of the 
Constitutional Court and of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK)  
A Tunc, ‘Can Pomegranates Replace Penguins? Social Media and the Rise of Citizen Journalism in 
Turkey’ (A Struggle For Turkey’s Internet, 2014) 
<http://denieuwereporter.nlwww.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Can %20Pomegranates 
%20Replace%20Penguins%20-%20Social%20Media%20and%20the%20Rise%20of%20Citizen 
%20Journalism%20in%20Turkey.pdf> accessed 2 June 2014  
CHP ‘Tutuklu Gazeteciler Raporu Dunyanin en buyuk gazeteci cezaevi: Turkiye/ Detained 
Journalists Report The Biggest Jail in the World:Turkey’ (PJA, July 2013) 
<http://www.cgd.org.tr/_belgeler/CHP_tutuklu_gazeteci_raporu_temmuz_2013.pdf> accessed 5 
January 2014  
D Greenwood, ‘Turkish Civil-Military Relations and the EU: Preparing for Continuing 
Convergence - Final Expert Report on an International Task Force’ in Sami Faltas and Sander 
Jansen (eds.) Governance and the military: perspectives for change in Turkey, (2006) Centre for 
European Studies (CESS) and the Istanbul Policy Centre  
E E Bilgic and Z Kafkasli, ‘Gencim, Ozgurlukcuyum, Ne Istiyorum?/I am Young, I am for 
Freedom, What do I want?’ Gezi Parki Survey Report (Istanbul Bilgi University) Press, 12 June 
2013) <http://www.bilgiyay.com/Content/files/DIRENGEZI.pdf> accessed 28 August 2013  
E Onderoglu, ‘Table of imprisoned journalists and examples of legislative restrictions on freedom 
of expression and media freedom in Turkey’ (OSCE, July 2015) 
<http://www.osce.org/fom/173036> accessed 01 November 2015  
E Onderoglu, ‘Updated List of Imprisoned Journalists in Turkey Including Recent Releases’ 
(OSCE, March 2014) <http://www.osce.org/fom/116291?download=true> accessed 6 March 2015  
E Onderoglu, ‘Updated List of Imprisoned Journalists in Turkey Including Recent Releases’ 
(OSCE, 20 June 2012) <https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1788_1340368562_91070.pdf> accessed 
11 November 2012  
E Onderoglu, ‘Updated List of Imprisoned Journalists in Turkey Including Recent Releases’ 
(OSCE, July 2015) <http://www.osce.org/fom/173036?download=true> accessed 1 November 2015  
Page | 280  
 
E Onderoglu, ‘Updated List of Imprisoned Journalists in Turkey Including Recent Releases’ 
(OSCE, June 2014) <http://www.osce.org/fom/119921?download=true> accessed 1 November 
2015  
E Onderoglu, ‘Updated List of Imprisoned Journalists in Turkey Including Recent Releases’ 
(OSCE, March 2014) <http://www.osce.org/fom/116291?download=true> accessed 6 March 2015  
K Björnberg and R Cranston, ‘The Functioning of the Judicial System In the Republic of Turkey: 
Report of an Advisory Visit’ (European Commission, 13-22 June 2005)  
L Gönenç, ‘2010 Proposed Constitutional Amendments to the 1982 Constitution of Turkey’ (2010) 
TEPAV Evaluation Note <http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1284468699-
0.2010_Proposed_Constitutional_Amendments_to_the_1982_Constitution_ of_Turkey.pdf> 
accessed 19 August 2015 
M Hoffman and Michael Werz, ‘Freedom of the Press and Expression in Turkey’ (Center for 
American Progress, 14 May 2013) 
<https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2013/05/14/63159/freedom-of-the-press-
and- expression-in-turkey/> accessed 16 May 2014  
N Demir, V Agbaba and O Ozel, ‘CHP Tutuklu Gazeteciler Raporu/CHP Report of Detained 
Journalists’ (2013)  
N Demir, V Agbaba and O Ozel, ‘CHP Tutuklu Gazeteciler Raporu/CHP Report of Detained 
Journalists’ (2013)  
N Karakaya and H Ozhabebes, ‘Yargi Paketleri: Hak ve Ozgurlukler Acisindan Bir 
Degerlendirme/Judicial Packages: An Evaluation on Rights and Freedoms’ (TESEV, 2013)  
N Tocci, (2001) ‘21st Century Kemalism Redefining Turkey-EU Relations in the Post- Helsinki 
Era’ (2001) No. 170 Centre for European Policy Studies EU-Turkey Working Document  
N Karakaya and H Ozhabebes, ‘Yargi Paketleri: Hak ve Ozgurlukler Acisindan Bir 
Degerlendirme/Judicial Packages: An Evaluation on Rights and Freedoms’ (TESEV, 2013)  
O Erozden, U Kardas, E Ozbudun and S Yazici, ‘Yargisal Dugum: Turkiye’de Anayasa Reformuna 
Iliskin Degerlendirme ve Oneriler/Judicial Knot: Evaluation and Suggestions on the Constitutional 
Reform in Turkey’ (TESEV, 2015) Demokratiklesme Programi Siyasal Raporlari Serisi Yargi 
Reformu 
Page | 281  
 
<http://tesev.org.tr/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/Yargisal_Dugum_Turkiyede_Anayasal_Reforma_Il
iskin_Degerlendirme_Ve_Oneriler.pdf> accessed 4 February 2015, 30  
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, ‘Main findings and table on imprisoned 
journals in Turkey’ (OSCE, 2 April 2012) <http://www.osce.org/fom/89371> accessed 29 May 
2013  
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, ‘Updated list of imprisoned journalists in 
Turkey’ (OSCE, 16 July 2015) <http://www.osce.org/fom/173036> accessed 5 November 2015  
OSCE, ‘Annex to the statement of the OSCE representative on freedom of the media and 
imprisoned journalists in Turkey’ (OSCE, 29 July 2010) 
<http://www.osce.org/fom/76373?download=true> accessed 28 May 2013  
P A V Ansah ‘The Legal and Political Framework for a Pluralistic Press in Africa’ Working 
Document Prepared for the United Nations and UNESCO Seminar on Promoting an Independent 
and Pluralistic African Press (Namibia, 1991)  
<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0009/000903/090356eb.pdf> accessed 2 September 2013  
The Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry, ‘European Union Harmonisation Packages’ (Ankara 2007)  
The Venice Commission, Venice Commission Declaration on Interference with Judicial 
Independence in Turkey (Venice, 20 June 2015)  
Turkish Republic Prime Ministry, ‘Political Reform in Turkey’ (Ankara 2007)  
Turkish statistical Institute, ‘Print Media Statistics, 2014’ (TUIK, 29 July 2015) <http:// 
www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=18523> accessed 12 December 2012  
U Emek and M Acar, ‘Public Procurement in Infrastructure: The Case of Turkey’ in Alina Mungiu-
Pippidi (ed.) Government Favouritism in Europe, The Anticorruption Report 3 (Barbara Budrich 
Publishers, 2015)  
U.S. Department of State, ‘Human rights country report: Turkey’ (U.S. Department of State, 2011) 
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186624.pdf> accessed 4 December 2014  
US Department of State, “Turkey”, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996 (Bureau 
of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor February 1997) 1161  




AYM E. 1992/37, K. 1993/18 (27/04/1993) 
AYM E. 2014/57, K. 2014/81 (14/05/2014) 
AYM, E. 1963/16, K. 1963/83, K.T. 08.04.1963  
AYM, E. 1996/70, E.1997/53, K.T. 05/06/1997  
AYM, E. 1997/19, K. 1997/66, K.T. 23/10/1997  
AYM, E. 2006/121 K. 2009/90 K.T. 18/06/2009 
AYM, E. 2008/1, K. 2008/2, K.T. 30.7.2008  
AYM, E. 2013/57754, K.T. 30.06.2014  
AYM, E. 2013/57754, K.T. 30.06.2014  
AYM, E. 2014/12151, K.T. 04/06/2015  
AYM, E.1987/54, K.1979/9, K.T. 08/02/1979  
AYM, E.1992/36, 1993/4, K.T. 20/01/1993 
AYM, E.2007/4, K.2007/81, K.T. 18/10/2007 
AYM, E.2014/12151, K.T. 04/06/2015 
Bakırköy 2. High Criminal Court E.2015/301, K.2015/207 (18/11/2015) 
Indictment no. 2011/425 Proceeding no. 2011/605 Investigation no. 2011/1657  
Istanbul 12th High Criminal Court Investigation no. 2010/857 K. 23/03/2011 (Confiscation 
2011/397)  
Istanbul 13th High Criminal Court E. 2009/191 K. 2013/95  
Istanbul 16th High Criminal Court E. 2011/14 K. 27/12/2012  
Page | 283  
 
İstanbul 2nd Criminal Court of First Instance K.T. 29/4/2014  
Istanbul State Security Court 17/11/1995 
Odatv Indictment no. 2011/425 Proceeding no. 2011/605 Investigation no. 2011/1657 
Turkish Constitutional Court E. 2012/1272 K.T. 4/12/2013  
 
ECtHR Cases 
Avci v Turkey App no. 37021/97 (ECtHR, 9 July 2003)  
Bladet Tromso and Stensaas v. Norway App no. 21980/93 (ECtHR, 20 May 1999)  
Castells v. Spain App no. 11798/85 (ECtHR, 23 April 1992)  
Ceylan v. Turkey App no. 23556/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999)  
Dink v. Turkey App no. 2668/07, 6102/08, 30079/08, 7072/09 and 7124/09 (ECtHR 14 September 
2010)  
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